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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the contracting practices for major weapon 
systems procurement in the Chilean Navy. The case analysis method, with emphasis in 
risk assessment and management, has been used to analyze the procurement of a ship 
missile system, referred to in this thesis as the "Kilo Missile System". The organizational 
structure, rules, regulations and authority chains are also analyzed using the Agency 
theory, the Information Processing model, and the Interpretivist model. Procurement 
practices used currently by the U.S. Department of Defense and private firms are used as 
a point of comparison for the case analysis. The analysis shows that the project involved a 
high risk, which was not realized by the Project Team. However, the competency and 
commitment of the Project Managers, the good relationship with the contractor, and the 
commitment of the latter with its national Navy allowed a favorable outcome. The thesis 
also provides a set of lessons learned and recommendations in the areas of organization, 
education and Project Management for improvement of future weapon acquisitions. 
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A.        PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the contracting practices for major weapon 
systems procurement in the Chilean Navy during the late eighties. The case analysis method, 
with emphasis in risk assessment and management, has been used to analyze the procurement 
practices followed by the Chilean Navy. The case focuses on the procurement of a ship 
missile system, referred to in this thesis as the "Kilo Missile System"1 and "Project Kilo". 
The thesis also reviews the organizational structure, rules, regulations and authority 
chains to analyze the contracting environment and relate it to the case. Agency theory, the 
Information Processing model, and the Interpretivist model are used to analyze 
organizational and behavioral issues2. Procurement practices used currently by the U.S. 
Department of Defense and private firms are used as a point of comparison for the case 
analysis wherever applicable. The analysis defines the process and its actors, and develops 
conclusions and recommendations in the areas of organization, education and administration 
that are useful for future acquisitions made by the Chilean Navy. 
Beyond the specific benefits for the Chilean Navy, Chilean Defense Industry might 
also learn from this thesis. Although Chilean Industries have not attempted yet to produce 
and sell sophisticated weapon systems, they have engaged in international contracts in 
several areas like shipbuilding and light weapons. Officials from those industries can find 
in this thesis helpful information, which reflects the points of view of their potential 
customers. Finally, this thesis provides insights about the international weapon procurement 
process not only to the Chilean Navy but also to any other weapon system buyer, including 
the U.S. Armed Forces. 
1
 The procurement project analyzed in this case is classified. Some figures, 
characteristics, names and dates have been modified, omitted or disguised to protect 
classified information. The names "Kilo", "ALPHA AERONAUTICS" and country 
"Omega" are not the real ones. 
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B.   BACKGROUND 
Weapon system acquisitions for the Chilean Navy are particularly difficult, due to 
the absence of a strong national industrial base and budgetary restrictions. The great 
uncertainties and risks created by the need to get leading edge technology, at low cost, and 
most of it from foreign sources, makes weapons acquisition even harder. Keeping those 
systems operational in the long run is a critical although often overlooked challenge, 
especially when the sources of logistic and technical support are spread around the world. 
Management and decision considerations in this area cover a broad spectrum, including 
political, strategic, operational, technical, financial and legal issues. 
Due to the economic size of the country, the Chilean Navy cannot carry on large 
weapon development programs. However, if the options are limited to commercially 
available systems, the Chilean Navy will never achieve a strategic or tactical advantage. This 
dilemma forces the search for creative solutions, working with foreign countries, private 
firms, universities and in-house organizations in embrionic programs, joint ventures and non 
conventional configurations. The need for fluid relationships among all the parties involved 
cannot be overemphasized. 
Contracting for the procurement of a major weapon system is a very important 
function in the acquisition process. Once a contract is signed, the basis for the relationships 
between the parties is established, and the future of the system is determined to a large 
extent. Despite all the changes introduced afterwards, they all relate to the first version of the 
contract. 
This thesis will analyze the procurement of the "Kilo" ship missile system, which 
contains all the complexities already mentioned, examining the way the contract was 
negotiated and finally written, and what happened afterwards. 
Although the objectives of this thesis, as described in the following paragraph, are 
oriented to the improvement of the Chilean Navy procurement skills, the analysis can also 
enhance the understanding between the U.S. authorities (both government and private) and 
the Chilean Navy, as well as other foreign services. As contractors and foreign government 
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2 
officials read this thesis, they will be in better position to establish fruitful relationships with 
the Chilean Navy. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze how the Chilean Navy has dealt with the 
uncertainties involved in the "Kilo" missile system procurement management. In this 
context, it focuses on the contracting process, and to what extent it created appropriate 
relationships with the supplier(s). The thesis also analyzes the organization and rules in 
which the Navy manages the acquisition and contracting process, as well as the manpower 
assigned to it, to determine to what extent they are appropriate to the task. Additionally, the 
case description and analysis will provide a set of recommendations and lessons learned to 
new generations of Program Directors and Project Managers. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis is: 
• Did the contracting practices of the Chilean Navy deal appropriately with the 
uncertainties and complexities involved in the procurement of the "Kilo" 
missile system? 
The subsidiary research questions are: 
• What are the challenges that the Chilean Navy faces when trying to acquire 
major weapons systems? 
• What are the general political, legal, financial and technical constraints 
involved in major systems procurement? 
• Was the Chilean Navy properly organized and manned for contracting? 
• What were the specific contracting challenges and constraints for the case 
under analysis? 
• How did the Contracting Team deal with those general and specific 
challenges and constraints? 










• What could have been done to make the procurement process better within 
the current constraints? 
• What can be done in the future to improve management conditions and 
eliminate constraints for achievement of better contracts? 
E.        SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis deals specifically with the project "Kilo" case, and consequently with the 
conditions and circumstances prevailing during that particular period of time. In the context 
of this thesis the contract is viewed as the conclusion of a process that included need 
assessment, strategic and tactical decisions, technical analysis, financial analysis, source 
selection and negotiation. The research will begin at a point where the need for the system 
and its operational characteristics were already determined, and the decision to acquire the 
system was supported by the authority chain. 
Financial analysis will consider the availability of funds, initial costs, uncertainty of 
costs and time value of money. Since the budget for major system acquisition is handled in 
U.S. Dollars, the time value of money discount rate will be the prevailing external debt 
interest rate. For cost analysis only the contract cost is included. 
The analysis of legal aspects is limited to the power provided to the Navy to enforce 
the fulfillment of the contract. It is initially assumed that both parties are committed to the 
explicit terms of the contract, although the uncertainties will create unexpected situations, 
which will require further communication and negotiations within the framework of the 
contract. 
For security reasons, the original contracts cannot be discussed in detail. For that 
reason some amounts, dates, names and technical characteristics have been modified or 
omitted, without affecting its value for this research. 
Being a case analysis, the results of this research are valid only to the extent that both 
the environment and the contract under study are representative of those prevailing. 
However, the changes that are taking place in the political environment and their 
implications to the acquisition and contracting process are considered in the 
recommendations found in Chapter VI. 
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F.        METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The case analysis method is used in this thesis, which is appropriate to the deductive 
nature of the research question. Through this research a framework is provided to analyze 
other contracts within the Navy, whose results will enrich the experience base for future 
contracts. 
The Information Processing Systems and Interpretivist models, as well as the Agency 
Theory, are used to analyze the contracting organization and control process. These models 
were selected because they focus on the complexities and uncertainties found in contracting, 
which is a key issue in this thesis. 
The research begins with an inquiry and data collection process based on the contract, 
related documents and interviews with the main actors of the negotiation and contracting 
process. Practices followed by the U.S. Department of Defense and private industries when 
they purchase sophisticated and unique equipment are also explored. This data gathering is 
followed by an analysis, based on the models already mentioned, the data available, the 
knowledge gained by the author through the courses at the Naval Postgraduate School, the 
related literature, and the insight of the advisors. The emphasis of the analysis is on the 
contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller, and its effect in managing the 
uncertainties of the acquisition process. 
The data consist of: 
• The contract, Financial Agreement and posterior changes, included in 
Appendix A. 
• Interviews with the program managers and other naval officers involved in 
project "Kilo". 
• Written reports of program managers. 
• Laws and regulations related to the acquisition process and Program 
Management. 







• U.S. Department of Defense Regulations and other texts related to the topic 
under research. 
• General texts about Strategy, Negotiation, Program Management, Risk 
Management and other related topics.3 
G.       ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The second chapter describes the political, strategic, legal and financial 
environment which the major weapon acquisitions were made. It also sets the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. The third chapter explains the Project Kilo case, including the 
genesis of the acquisition, the decision process, the negotiation of the contract, the result 
of those negotiations and the subsequent events. The fourth chapter is the analysis of the 
case, including the challenges for procurement, the goals of the different parties, the 
uncertainties and risks, the organizations involved, the interactions among relevant actors 
and the actual results of the procurement. The fifth chapter gives the conclusions of the 
case analysis. The last chapter suggests recommendations for improving the procurement 
process, including propositions for further research. 
3






II. ENVIRONMENT AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. GENERAL 
This thesis is a case analysis on a major missile system procurement made by the 
Chilean Navy in the late eighties4. This chapter lays down the foundations for the research, 
explains the general context in which the events occurred and presents the theoretical 
framework of the analysis. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
1.        Political Environment 
During the late eighties, the Chilean government was under the final years of military 
rule. The new constitution approved by popular vote in 1980 was under effect, and political 
parties were functioning and preparing the 1988 upcoming elections. 
The executive was led by the President General Augusto Pinochet with a civilian 
cabinet, except for the Minister of Defense who was a retired Admiral. 
The legislative power was held by a "Junta de Gobierno" consisting of the 
Commanders in Chief of the Navy, Air Force and Carabineros (Uniformed Police) plus the 
Vice-Commander of the Army. Each one, supported by a professional staff of law experts, 
looked after a specific area of government (e.g. senate committees). 
The Judicial Power, the only one untouched by the military government, was led by 
the Supreme Court. 
The military institutions were led by their commanders in chief, who had also 
government responsibilities. Most of the internal management was handled by the Chiefs of 
Staff of each branch. The Joint Staff provided advice to the Minister of Defense and 
coordination within the branches, but had no authority over the services. Practically, each 
service was quasi-autonomous, with its own budget guaranteed in the long term and 
4





reporting only to the President. 
In those days, the internal political agenda was centered in the plebiscite to be held 
in December 1988, in which the voters would decide between the continuation of the military 
government or presidential elections. The transition agenda was part of the Constitution of 
1980. The fast growing economy and the smoothness of the transition process made internal 
politics rather quiet. 
In the international arena, the Western powers (especially the U.S.) were looking 
carefully at the transition process. However, the Soviet Empire was attracting most of the 
attention as Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Lithuania and other Eastern European countries 
were undergoing a dramatic move away from Soviet rule. 
Closer to Chile, the southern cone of South America was in the midst of a 
redemocratization process. However, the main concern was the economy. Different 
approaches ranging from Socialism to Populism had not been able to recover the South 
American economies from the oil crisis of the seventies and the debt crisis of the early 
eighties. The only exception was Chile, where an aggressive free market and export-oriented 
economy was succeeding in providing growth and stability. 
2. Strategic Environment 
In the strategic arena, there were no immediate threats to Chile's national security. 
In the last twenty years Chile went through several crisis situations with Argentina and Peru, 
but in the period when this procurement was decided, both countries had enough internal 
problems to occupy their energies. 
Argentina became tragically aware of the consequences of military conflict after the 
Falklands war, and the civilian government was more interested in reducing the power and 
influence of the military than in the use of military power in external disputes. Peru was in 
even worse condition, and its military forces were engaged in guerrilla warfare against the 
Shining Path Maoist movement. 
This temporary calm caused by the internal weakness of our neighbors did not assure 
peace forever. Peru had not abandoned its long term commitment to recover their "lost 
provinces" after the 1879 war. Argentina still had the ambition for sovereign access to the 
re rtin  ly t  t e resi ent. 
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Pacific Ocean, and also for control over all the islands and maritime territory east of Cape 
Horn. At best, those claims would be on hold unless the political leadership or compelling 
circumstances changed those deeply rooted geopolitical goals5. 
At the same time, the communist subversion that had strongly affected the country 
and most of South America during the sixties and seventies, creating the need for a military 
intervention, was collapsing together with the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
Under this environment, the military institutions in Chile were primarily concerned 
with keeping long term deterrence capabilities. The transition to civilian government was 
designed with built-in stabilizing devices which ensured the non-politization of officer 
promotions, the permanence of the commanders in chief for their full period after their 
nomination, and a stable military budget, with the current one as a floor. However, those 
devices were only as strong as the political consensus that supported them, and there were 
signs that they were going to be challenged in the future by the left wing politicians. 
Under this politico-strategic environment, Navy leadership was working towards the 
strength of the human factor to meet the challenging conditions of the future and, at the same 
time, towards the updating of the aging fleet. Most ships dated from the late fifties to the 
early seventies. This update was going to require a stable funding effort to purchase and 
install the new weapon systems necessary to make those old platforms suitable to match the 
future threats. 
3. Economic Environment 
As mentioned before, the country was enjoying a period of fast growth and 
consolidation of the economic system. After the ruinous economic conditions left by the 
demised socialist government in 1973, the country faced the oil crisis. The prices of the raw 
materials that Chile exported plummeted while the prices of imported manufactured goods 
rose sharply. After a long and painful effort to restart the economy under the rules of the free 
market, the country was in spectacular performance when the debt crisis hit in 1982. The 
5
 As we know now "after the fact", bilateral relations were dramatically enhanced 
through a fast development of across-the-border private investment among Chile, Argentina 
and Peru. 
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consequences were disastrous (20% fall in the GNP), but the lessons learned and the 
ingenuity of the economists made it possible a for new recovery. This recovery was less 
spectacular than the previous one, but much more stable and structurally safe. 
To make this recovery possible, government austerity was a must, and the armed 
forces were not going to be an exception. The hardships of the recovery effort had created 
social demands that could not be postponed. 
The key actor in those days was the Ministry of Finance (Ministro de Hacienda), the 
watchdog and arbitrator of government spending, and recipient of pressures from all sectors. 
The budget designed by his cabinet was consistently approved. 
Due to this austerity effort, the Navy could not commit to buy new ships, because the 
cost of a single ship would have exhausted the procurement budget for several years. In the 
past, ships were bought under special laws, apart from the regular budget. However, this was 
not now possible. Therefore, the Navy was forced to look for other options to repower the 
fleet, like putting new weapon systems on old platforms. That is the kind of acquisition that 
occurred during this case. 
4. Legal Environment 
The legal regulations relevant to major system acquisition are basically the same that 
applied to all government acquisition over a certain value threshold. 
According to the current law6, the main rules were: 
On May 1 each Service submits an Investment Plan for the following fiscal year 
(which begins January 1). The plan is approved by the Superior Council for National 
Defense, which is an autonomous board that reports directly to the President, and is 
composed of: 
The Minister of Defense, Council Chairman. 
The Ministers of Foreign Relations and Finance. 
The three Service Commanders in Chief. 
The Chief of Joint Staff. 




The three Service Chiefs of Staff. 
The Subsecretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
The approved plan is submitted to the President through the Ministry of Defense. 
That Ministry includes the approved plan in the proposed budget for the following year. 
The budget is submitted to the Congress {Junta de Gobierno) in September. There 
is little uncertainty about approval because the minimum funding level in foreign currency 
is guaranteed by law as a percentage of the sales of copper7. 
The authorized methods of acquisition for major items (above US$ 10,000) were: 
• Public solicitation for bid except in the circumstances mentioned in the 
following point. 
• Private solicitation for bid under one of the following circumstances: 
The equipment is required in 30 days or less. 
There is not enough competition (four or more suppliers). 
The Council approves it by majority vote, and the acquisition is not 
against the Investment Plan. 
• Direct negotiated acquisition if there is only one source or if the acquisition 
is from government to government. 
The bids are submitted, opened, and awarded according to commercial practices. The 
service Economic Board makes a record of the bids' opening details, the characteristics of 
each bid and the award criteria (not necessarily price). 
The Economic Council for National Defense approves or disapproves the procedure 
and confirms the award. 
There are several formalities about publication, deadlines, and forms to be used and 
exceptions. 
In the case of foreign acquisitions through Public Bid Invitation, the offeror must 
provide a warranty note for three percent of the value of the acquisition. After award, the 
contractor must provide warranty for ten percent of the value of the contract, in the form 
specified in the Invitation for Bid. 








Transportation of the items from the country of origin must be on a Chilean flagship, 
with exceptions made for availability or foreign agreements. 
When contracts involve payments for future budgets, the funding is provided by a 
Supreme Decree, signed by the President. 
The Contracts are signed by the Commander in Chief or the Service Authority 
appointed by him for that purpose. In the case of the Navy, the Director General de los 
Servicios (Director of Finance and Logistics). 
5. Organization 
Within the Navy, the early decisions in major system acquisition processes were 
monitored directly by the Navy Chief of Staff. Once a concrete idea was granted the 
category of Project, it was assigned to a Program Director, an Admiral who oversees several 
related projects. The Program Director, in turn, appointed a Project Manager, who 
concentrates the responsibility and authority to proceed with the steps that eventually would 
end up in an acquisition process. His degree of autonomy and authority will depend on his 
skills in confidence building, and on the sensitivity of the project. The job of Program 
Director and Project Manager are usually temporary and collateral assignments. 
Since the contract for Project Kilo was between government organizations of two 
countries, they decided to sign it in a neutral field, specifically, the State of New York. An 
arbitration system was designed within the contract. 
C.        THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this section is to provide the description and framework for the 
analysis of the Project Kilo case in the following sequence: 
• General description of the procurement process and challenges from the 
perspective of the Chilean Navy 
• Contracts and their role in the procurement process 
• Environment in which this process takes place, with emphasis on the actors 
and their relationships 
• Uncertainty, risk, different components of risk, and causes of risk 
12 
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Models used to analyze the organizations involved 
• Decision making process under uncertainty 
All of these points provide a framework for a better understanding of the case, 
described in Chapter III. They are used again in Chapter IV to analyze the case from different 
perspectives, helping to understand and to evaluate the way the project was handled. 
1. The Acquisition Process and its Challenges 
Major weapon system acquisition is a complex process which includes research, 
decision making, investment, management and communication effort. There is no other 
decision making process in government that assigns such large amounts of resources to a 
single system. The Project Manager (who is also the Contract Manager in the Chilean Navy) 
works at the epicenter of this process. 
Within this process, perhaps the most challenging phase is dealing with the providers 
of goods an/or services, as offerors and contractors. The complexities arise from the 
following factors, which include: 
Different and competing interests 
Asymmetric information about capacity, cost and intentions 
Different culture, assumptions, language and ethical standards 
Different risk management approach 
Different sources of information 
Different management structure 
Competing commitment to third parties 
Policy and regulatory restrictions 
Different historical perceptions 
Limited degree of mutual trust 
Lack of buyer's commercial experience 

















2. The Contract as a Communication and Risk Reduction Device 
Given the situation described above, the contract becomes the cornerstone of the 
relationship between buyer and seller, where all expectations on both sides are converted into 
a solid agreement. However, this agreement is not the beginning of the relationship, but the 
culmination of a process of exploration, selection and negotiation. 
But the contract is not the end of the process, since there are always areas of 
uncertainty, autonomy, indefinition, interpretation, and misunderstanding that must be 
resolved after the contract. Moreover, there is always a risk of failure to fulfill the contract, 
where the provisions for such failures are tested if included, and negotiation skills play a key 
role. 
The contract is by itself a communication and risk reduction device. A good contract 
should be able to communicate unequivocally the expectations and obligations of both 
parties, provide means to prevent and solve any expected inconvenience, and provide room 
for the unexpected. 
The definition for contract used in the Naval Postgraduate School says: "Contract is 
a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty"8. The same source specifies 
the following elements of a contract: 
• Capacity: The authority and competency of those who sign the contract 
• Offer: The communication of the intention to provide goods or services, 
specified in a complete, clear and unambiguous way 
• Acceptance: The promise of acceptance of the goods provided so far they 
conform with the offer 
• Consideration: Mutual promise to compensate for the goods or services 
accepted, and to accept of the enforcement means provided. It may include 
the promise to no act legally against the other party outside the terms of the 
contract 
8
 Class notes for MN 3371: "Contract Management and Administration". 
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• Certainty of terms: The clarity and unambiguity of all terms of the contract, 
and the provision for a solution in the case of different interpretation9 
• Lawful purpose: The obligations of the contract should not force the parties 
to break the law. The obligations should also be possible to fulfill in a legal 
way with reasonable means 
• Form: Contracts may be oral, written or recorded in some other media. For 
this kind of contracts, other than written form is not conceivable 
There is a natural trend to expect commitment from both parties to the contract, and 
even in this case only very good contracts will succeed in providing adequate communication 
and problem solving devices in case of unexpected events or involuntary failures. However, 
as the definition above emphasizes by putting it in the first place, the breach of the contract 
must be considered as a possibility. This should not be considered offensive during the 
negotiation phase. 
Contractor and government agents10 have multiple commitments and constituencies, 
and sometimes they might sign a contract even knowing beforehand that they are not capable 
of fulfilling it. It may also happen that a contractor signs with the best of the intentions and 
commitment, but changes in circumstances or leadership forces an intentional failure. If on 
top of all the mentioned risks we put the chance of wrongdoing or fraud, the picture becomes 
even more complex. 
Moreover, no matter how complete, clear, or prophetic a contract might be, if it is not 
backed by enforcement authority, the parties are left to the goodwill of the other (which may 
turn out to be very convenient). This situation is frequent when dealing between two 
countries, since there are no means to impose the rule of international law other than 
sanctions or force, which are not used in this context. On the other hand, international 
9
 In government contracting, if there are two different interpretations to a clause, that 
of the party that did not write the contract prevails, thus assuming advantage of the party who 
wrote the contract. 
10
 An agent is a person who acts on behalf of the organization. Agency theory, which 
deals with the conflicts of interests between the agent and the organization, is discussed in 
this chapter. 
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sanctions can cause a contract failure. The case of the recently aborted acquisition of F-16 
fighters by Pakistan is a sad example of this kind of failure". 
Under such conditions, the challenge for the agents of the Navy and the seller in 
charge of creating a contract is: 
• Develop a deep understanding of each other, its capabilities, constraints, 
priorities, values, language, culture, procedures, methods and any other 
circumstance that can affect the relationship within the parties 
• Communicate mutual expectations in a way that both parties understand and 
agree 
• Ensure that the promises cover all the requirements of both parties, not only 
about the goods or services, but also about how, when and where will they 
be delivered, what will be the future obligations after the delivery, what 
related support is required, what is included in the contract and what is not, 
and what criteria will be used to clarify unexpected doubts 
• Negotiate conditions that satisfy both parties and that are feasible for both 
• Explore all possible cases of non fulfillment and design incentives to avoid 
such circumstances 
• Explore all possible cases of misunderstanding or misinterpretation, and 
design mechanisms to avoid or overcome such events 
• Determine how the incentives or remedies will be enforced if necessary. 
Determine also other avenues that could be used by each party to ensure 
contract compliance 
• Determine the consequences of a termination for both parties in all significant 
phases of the contract, and ensure that it will always be more beneficial to 
solve the problems rather than terminate the contract 
• Relate the current contract with other current or potential commitments; 
determine how important the contract is for both parties relative to those 
other commitments. 
11
 Pakistan contracted and paid for the purchase of F-16 aircraft. The purchase was 
stopped by the Congress, but the money was not reimbursed. In a recent visit to the U.S., 
Prime Minister Benazir Butto tried unsuccessfully to get delivery or recover the money. 
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II   
• Design mechanisms to introduce changes in the contract if agreed to by both 
parties 
• Specify the level of authority that the agents and principals had on both 
parties for the purpose of changes, renegotiation and problem solving 
• Determine the relative bargaining power of the parties throughout the 
negotiation process and during the performance of the contract 
3. Actors Involved in the Contract 
In contracts such as the "Kilo" procurement agreement, at least two complex 
organizations are engaged, and the agents in charge of negotiating and designing the contract 
are subject to multiple demands. 
The purchase of weapon system by a government agency is the result of the balance 
of different pressures, represented by some organization or authority, which can be more or 
less desegregated. For analysis purposes, this thesis refers to them as follows: 
PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT 










a. The User is the direct user command or the operational command, 
who cares about the use of the system, why it is being purchased, how it will be used, by 
whom, against what, in prevention of what. They are also concerned about the training and 
operating procedures for the system. 
b. The Technical Authority is the authority responsible for the technical 
ability of the system to accomplish its mission, the applicable standards, the relationship with 
the logistic support system, and the technical compatibility with other system that will be 
related to it (e.g. power supply, communication, interferences, and size). Usually the project 
Manager is part of the Technical Authority or has strong ties with it. It is also usual that the 
Operational Command has some or all of the technical authority. 
c. The Public Interest is represented by the government, defense or 
branch authorities, who will provide the resources for purchasing activities, and the 
legislative power which will authorize the funds and oversee the performance of the contract. 
Their responsibility is to decide if this particular project deserves the resources asked at each 
step, given availabilities, other alternative usages or requirements, and the "higher interest 
of the nation." 
d. The Navy Authorities who, with part of the government, has its own 
goals, perspective and agenda. Navy leadership must follow government guidance, but is 
also responsible for the promotion of naval power within the government and the public in 
general. Weapons systems are the visible face of naval power. Additionally, the complexity 
and visibility of the acquisition process makes it a showcase of the management capacity of 
the Navy. Consequently, Navy leaders have an involvement beyond mission fulfillment 
when dealing with weapons system acquisition. 
e. The Contractors) are the companies that will provide goods or 
services to the procuring agency in order to make the system, or part of it, a reality. They will 
design, built, test, and transport. Their responsibility is to get the highest possible profit in 
the short or long term, according to their company's policy, and to keep the purchasing 
agency convinced that they are getting the best at the lower possible cost. However, their 
main initial goal is to win the contract. 
18 
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/ The Contractor's Government will care for the implications of 
military sales in its foreign affairs and national security. Weapon sales are clear signals of 
friendship, hence a compromise with the buying government, and third parties as they relate 
to that government. There is also the concern about the chance of the weapons being used 
against the seller or its allies12. 
Some countries (including the U.S.) use foreign trade and foreign military 
sales as a foreign policy tool, which is a serious concern for potential buyers, which must 
take the sellers politics into account when requesting bids. 
g. The Marketplace is the network of users and suppliers of similar or 
related systems, components and parts of them, and the financial market that provides funds 
to them. This network establishes the standards for performance, price, quality and service 
related to the acquisition of the system. 
h. The Project Manager is the central actor in the process and the officer 
assigned with the task of procuring the system. He will get some resources to pay contractors 
or to afford administrative expenses. His responsibility is to get the system into operational 
status as soon as possible with the resources assigned, with the lowest possible risk and 
satisfying the "user" and "technical" specifications and expectations. He would like to 
accomplish this with the minimum possible interference. Dealing with a few experienced 
potential contractors who understand the process and needs is the ideal. 
4. Risks involved in Procurement 
Risk is a major issue in procurement, and also the main focus of this thesis. This 
point defines risk as different but related to uncertainty, and provides a workable 
classification for risk analysis. 
a. Definition of Risk 
According to the Acquisition Strategy Guide edited by the Defense Systems 
Management College, "Program Managers should thoroughly address risk assessment. There 
12
 During the Falklands war HMS Glamorgan was hit by an Anglo-French Exocet 





is evidence to suggest that this is the most important review/approval consideration in the 
acquisition strategy."13 
The same Strategy Guide defines risk as a measure of the probability and 
consequence of not achieving a defined program goal. This definition refers implicitly to 
uncertainty when mentioning probabilities. Specifically, the probability of achieving a 
variable of an "equal or better" value than the expected implies the existence of a distribution 
of possible values, and a threshold of satisfaction. A value below the threshold means failure, 
and the probability area at the left of the threshold is the uncertainty component of risk. 
The problem is that establishing an accurate probability of achieving a goal 
or a set of goals is a difficult proposition. Success and failure are not necessarily on/off 
situations, and the consequences of failure depend also on the degree of failure. If evaluating 
success or failure of an event is difficult, predicting it is even harder. Uncertainty has two 
major ingredients: 
• The "known unknowns" are those areas when the causes for variable results 
can be characterized and quantified via statistical tools or expert judgement. 
• The "unknown unknowns" are those factors arising from unexpected sources 
that can affect the outcome of the project. By definition, they cannot be 
characterized and less quantified. Only a strategic approach can create the 
conditions to deal with these factors when they arise. Techniques like war 
gaming, scenario simulation and team analysis with heterogeneous groups of 
people can reduce the size and impact of the "unknown unknowns", as well 
as improve the ability to obtain early assessment of these factors when they 
appear. Notice that the "unknown unknowns" may have either a positive or 
negative impact. 
The other component of risk is the consequence of not achieving the goal. 
Between two equally probable events, the one with the higher associated cost will have 
higher risk. 
Risk can be expressed mathematically as follows: 
Risk = F (PF CF) Equation 2.1 
13
 Acquisition Strategy Guide, Defense Systems Management College. Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia. First Edition July 1984. 
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Being: PF= The probability of having a result below the expected, according 
to a probability function. This function captures only the "known 
unknowns" portion of uncertainty. 
CF=The consequence of the negative result, including monetary and 
non-monetary impact. This value should be expressed in terms of the 
opportunity cost of the adverse outcome. 
b.        Areas of Risk 
Risk can be divided in three major areas as follows: 
• Procurement risk is the risk of not achieving the goals of cost, schedule 
and/or performance established as baseline for the project due to failure of the 
seller to deliver the system as expected. 
• After sales support risk is the risk of not being able to operate the system as 
expected due to lack of technical and logistic support from the seller, the 
buyer himself, or other parties. Depending on the characteristics of the 
contract, after sales support can be tied to the procurement. 
• Political risk is the risk of failure to achieve the goals of the project due to 
events occurring up in the decision making chain of the buyer or the 
authorities of the seller's country. It can include changes in funding, new 
requirements, size reduction or even the cancellation of the project. This area 
also includes the effect of foreign policy in the fulfillment of the contract and 
subsequent support when the seller or its subcontractors are not domestic. 
This is usually the case for the Chilean Navy. 
This classification serves only for the purpose of analysis, since the different 
components or causes of risk are not independent. For example, a change in size or 
requirements classified as "political risk" might have an effect over cost, schedule and 
performance. 
(1)       Procurement Risk is the area of risk traditionally associated 
with procurement, including cost, schedule and performance. 
(a)       Cost. Cost risk is usually associated with the type of 
contract, the most characteristic ones being the Firm Fixed Price (FFP) type and the Cost 
Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) type. In a Cost Plus Fixed Fee type contract the buyer bears all the 







proposal. Since this type of contract is not feasible when the Chilean Navy procures goods 
or services to foreign countries, there is no further analysis of this kind of contract in this 
thesis. 
In theory, in a Firm Fixed Price type contract the seller bears 
all the cost risk. However, there are several instances where the buyer can end up paying 
more than the initial price stated in the contract. The following are some examples of 
situations where the buyer is forced to pay more than the expected price: 
• The buyer is forced to pay for extra performance because the seller can only 
provide a superior system, and the one with the required performance is out 
of production. 
• The buyer may be tempted to pay for an extra performance offered by the 
seller. 
• The buyer is forced to pay for an extra feature, device, service or special tool 
not included in the contract but that turns to be indispensable for the safe 
and/or effective operation of the system. 
• The buyer is forced to pay for goods or services that seemed to be included 
in the contract, but were excluded by some tricky clause. The following are 
examples of those clauses: Force Majeure, Insurance, Taxes, Transportation, 
Storage or Supervision Expenses. 
• The buyer is forced to renegotiate the price under pressure by the seller, with 
the seller using a "Pay more or I go out of business," or, "this cost much more 
than expected" argument. 
• The buyer is forced to spend extra money in travel, supervision or other 
unforeseen expenses. 
• The seller refuses to pay late fees or other dues. 
• The buyer is forced to spend money in legal battles with the seller or is forced 
to settle at a disadvantage. 
Apart from these situations, it is often the buyer who puts 
himself at risk when requiring changes to the contract, thus opening it to renegotiation. In 











allowed so regularly in major weapon system contracts, fixed price contracts have essentially 
been transformed to the cost plus percentage of cost type."14 This is particularly dangerous 
under the so called "constructive changes", when the contractor performs work beyond the 
contract, perceived as informally ordered by the buyer or caused by the buyer's fault.15 
There are a variety of adjustments and incentives that can 
modify a firm fixed price contract in order to share risks and motivate the parts to commit 
their efforts to the success of the contract. Some adjustments refer to variables that are out 
of control of the contractor, such as interest rates, inflation, exchange rates, wage levels and 
cost of materials. Other adjustment or incentives are directed to variables that should be 
under control of the contractor, such as the allocation of scarce corporate resources to the 
fulfillment of the contract. This is usually reflected in timeliness and quality of the delivery 
and responsiveness to the needs of the buyer. 
(b) Schedule. A schedule overrun is always a problem 
for both the seller and the buyer. Technological advances often result in a system becoming 
obsolete before it is fielded. The buyer and the seller share the risk on schedule upon the 
arrangements of the contract, which include late fees, price adjustments, interest or even 
termination. 
From the buyer's perspective, any delay means losing a tactical 
or strategic advantage over the potential enemies, which translates in terms of opportunity 
cost. The effect of the delay depends on the criticality or of the system being procured in 
terms of the strategic or tactical need for it and the competitive edge that the system 
represents. 
From the seller's point of view, a delay can be the result of his 
inability to fulfill the contract even after his best effort. Delays can also result from not 
14
 Larry Yuspeh: "A Case for Increasing the Use of Competitive Procurement in the 
Department of Defense". Included in "Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and 
Allocation: Proceedings of a Conference at the Center for Applied Economics New York 
University" Edited by Yakov Amihud. New York University Press, New York, 1976. 
15






committing enough resources, because they are more profitable in other place. This is more 
likely to happen if the seller has no other commitments or future prospective with the same 
buyer. Therefore, the buyer's risk is fielding the system later than expected and receiving a 
remedy that is lower than the opportunity cost ofthat delay. 
The contract must provide for enough incentives to ensure the 
best effort from the seller, and remedies cover the opportunity cost of any delay. Whereas 
the opportunity cost is very hard to determine, the optimal late fees can be approached 
through analytical tools. 
(c) Performance. Establishing what the system is 
expected to accomplish, under what conditions, how it will be operated, and how will it be 
supported is a difficult task. The perception about what is needed may vary among the 
different actors on the buyer's side. The final user, the Project Manager, the service 
command and staff, government authorities, legislature, the media and the public at large will 
have different interests. 
Even if there is a common understanding about the needs, 
codifying them in an unequivocal text is practically impossible. No matter how 
comprehensive or precise, there should always be room for features not included in the 
specifications, if only to be able to exploit the creativity of the supplier or incorporate new 
ideas from the buyer. 
If the procurement includes a development phase, there is an 
expected (and desired) uncertainty about the final features of the system. The system will be 
expected to match the capacities of determined potential enemies, which the buyer may know 
only partially. Those determined enemies might not be the ones which the system will finally 
engage. 
Other difficulties arise when trying to establish the boundaries 
of the system and its links across those boundaries. This is especially difficult in retrofitting 
projects, such as the subject of this thesis. The designers need extensive information about 
the signals, power, supplies, coordination, and other interactions across the boundaries. That 
information is often incomplete, inaccurate, or outdated. Consequently, the design relies on 
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incomplete information and a set of assumptions. 
This lack of reliable information takes its toll at the integration 
phase, forcing several changes, adaptations, and eventually a complete redesign of the system 
or its surroundings. These changes end up extending the boundaries of the system. 
An aggravating factor of this "integration risk" is that multiple 
actors are sharing responsibilities, including the manufacturer, the user, technical authorities, 
the installers and above all, the project manager. When problems arise in the integration, it 
should be expected that some actors will blame the others, and only adequate communication 
and teamwork can overcome these difficulties. 
(2) After Sales Support Risk: Once the system is fielded, 
keeping it operational is a complex task. It is accomplished by the users, in-house support 
organizations, the seller, other organizations in the marketplace (such as spare part suppliers), 
and other governmental organizations, domestic or foreign. 
The design of the life-cycle logistic support system must be consistent 
with the design of the weapon system itself and the use of it. Whatever logistic support the 
seller is going to provide or allow others to provide should be in the contract. In this category 
some examples are: 
Provide any spare parts needed for "x" years at reasonable prices 
Provide the test equipment, special tools, software and all elements needed 
for maintenance and logistic support 
Provide the training,  supervision and technical support for in-house 
maintenance 
Provide the documentation and technical data needed for maintenance, 
diagnosis and spare parts identification 
Provide the technical data required for upgrades or integration with other new 
systems 
Use international standard for parts, integration links or modules 









• Keep a network of technical assistance, part sales and authorized maintenance 
facilities within or close to the bases where the system is maintained, or in 
certain areas of operation 
• Ensure the availability of technical support, parts and services without 
restrictions by the seller (e.g. exclusive distribution channels) or its 
government (sanctions or embargoes). Otherwise, the capacity to perform in- 
house (or at least in the country) support must be acquired with the system 
• Use of a language understandable for all parties involved, typically Spanish 
or English 
Another approach to avoid the risk of poor after sales support is 
choosing a system or components currently in use by other customers nationwide or 
worldwide. Weapon systems may share several components of industrial use in aeronautics, 
computers, communications, power supplies, structures, cabinets, displays, safety devices, 
and others. Having a broad customer base will provide the incentive for a better customer 
service network, and also alternatives for technical assistance and cooperation among the 
customers. The disadvantages of this approach is that if potential enemies have the same 
weapon system, there is less advantage in having it, and if the system is used worldwide it 
may be obsolete. 
In summary, the ideal is to procure a new and original system made 
with commercially available components, with a few but critical distinctive devices or 
features providing the competitive edge. 
(3) Political Risk: In 1827, the famous strategist Carl von 
Clausewitz wrote: "War is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means."16 
Experience shows that pretending to isolate politics from military decisions is not realistic. 
The government is responsible for creating military power for the security of the nation and 
the promotion of its interests. Within the government, the military services have to figure out 
what weapon systems might best serve the needs within the budget constraints. What seems 
16
 Clausewitz, "Note of 10 July 1827," On War, 69. Cited in "Makers of Modern 
Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age", edited by Peter Paret. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton NJ. 1986. 
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a straightforward process is frequently a complex interactive struggle, where several factors 
other than military considerations get into play. 
Once the weapon procurement project has gone through all of the 
authorization steps and has secured the funding, final negotiations take place and the contract 
can be signed. However, after signing the contract the risk is even higher, since higher level 
decisions may force to change or even cancel a contract to which the service is already 
committed. This interference creates tension between the project manager, the decision 
makers, and the contractor. For the most part, the political risk is borne by the contractor, 
but this can be easily reversed when dealing with foreign contractors. 
In international agreements, the contractor's government authorities 
may also be part of the political risk of the project. Military sales represent a political signal 
between the governments of the seller and the buyer. Any disagreement between the 
governments in political issues is likely to be reflected in the performance of the contract, 
or in the support after the delivery of the system. The stability in the relationships between 
the governments, and the record of using military sales as political tools should be evaluated 
in the source selection process. 
5. Models Used in this Thesis. 
For a better understanding and systematic analysis of the factors involved in the case, 
three models have been selected to be applied in this thesis: 
• The Information Processing Model 
• The Interpretivist Model 
• The Agency Theory 
The Information Processing model is used to analyze the shortage of information on 
both parties, and the mechanisms available to reduce that shortage or to handle it. 
The Interpretivist model is used to evaluate the management control systems in place 
as related to the uncertainty in the goals and tasks, which relates to the shortage of 
information mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
The agent theory provides insight about the conflicts generated between the agents 
and within their organization. Again, the asymmetry of information acquires relevance in the 
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analysis. 
a. The Information Processing Systems Model 
This model, based on the work of John Kenneth Galbraith, focuses on the 
decision making process in organization as a result of the availability of information, and the 
human ability to process it.    In this context, uncertainty is defined as: 
"The difference between the amount of information already 
available for task execution and the amount of information 
required for the job" 
Notice that this definition describes uncertainty in terms relative to the task. 
If we recognize that a task can be successfully performed with imperfect but appropriate 
information, or in other terms, with an acceptable degree of uncertainty, that acceptable level 
becomes the "zero uncertainty level" for the purpose of the analysis. It is important also to 
differentiate the concept of "data" versus "information", which is data processed in such a 
way that presents a relevant, understandable, workable and meaningful picture to the 





Organizational Design Strategies 
to Cope with High Uncertainty 
Diversity of Outputs 
(Products, services, clients) 
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(Locations, machine centers, 
departments) 













Reduce the Need for 
Information Processing 
(1) Slack Resources 
(2) Self-contained Units 
Increase the Capacity 
to Process Information 
(3) Vertical Information Systems 
(4) New lateral Relationships 
Figure 2.2 Information Processing Model 
Organizations gather, create, process, store, and disseminate great and ever 
increasing amounts of data and information. According to this model, organization design 
and the quality of the information processing systems determine to a great extent the 

























These  information  requirements  are  in  turn  function  of three  task 
characteristics: 
1. Output Diversity: the number of different tasks, products, services, customers 
and programs that the organizational unit has to deal with 
2. Input Resources Variety: the different kinds of expertise required, different 
work locations, and working variables like inventories, suppliers, and others 
required to manage the unit 
3. Goal Difficulty: complexity inherent to the task, and the level of quality 
expected by the internal and external customers. 
To provide the required information, the organization has a set of rules, goals 
and hierarchies. They prescribe behavior, provide consistency for routine situations, codify 
past experience, and create the channels for information flow within the 
organization. This organizational design includes implicitly the information systems, like 
computers, networks, data bases, and the related procedures for its maintenance and use. 
Organization can respond to uncertainty with four "uncertainty-reducing strategies": 
• Slack resources. In place of information, certain excess of resources are used 
to reduce the burden over the decision maker. Excess inventory, longer 
delivery times, extra capacity or extra budget are some examples of slack 
resources. 
• Self Contained Units. This strategy aims at the goal difficulty, by 
concentrating all the operations related to certain segment of the market or 
product. This shift from functional to divisional or project organization 
makes the task of each unit more varied but less demanding of information, 
since the whole network of costumers, suppliers and processes for their 
specific segment is controlled by the division. 
• Vertical Information Processing. This strategy increases the capacity to 
process information through improved information and reporting systems, 
designed to process and distribute the information more efficiently, giving the 
decision makers more complete, real-time and ready-to-use information. 
• New Lateral Relations. This strategy involves the selective creation of lateral 
linking relationships to share critical information between departments, 
without involvement of higher levels. This strategy is complemented with the 
location of decision centers as low as possible in the organization, where the 
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action is taking place. The lateral relationships would provide this 
empowered decision makers with the necessary corporate point of view. 
Decisions at the top are no more operational but strategic, requiring less 
internal information. 
All these strategies are widely used, and are relevant to the Project Manager 
organization, which is a good example of a self-contained unit. Each of them contributes to 
a reduction of the uncertainty in decision making, but at the same time they place new 
demands on management skills, commitment and coordination. They also require a clear 
strategic direction from the top, since middle managers have more and better information to 
decide, but nothing replaces a clear purpose and direction. 
b. The Interpretivist Model 
This model, presented by Neil Macintosh17, looks at the interaction between 
an objective reality and the subjective interpretation ofthat reality made by the management 
control system. As applied to management control systems, the model focus on the different 
uses of the outcomes of the control system, both in their pure content and in the implications 
for the members of the organization. 
The Interpretivist model is an approach to deal with the issue of uncertainty 
in management control systems. It evaluates the degree of knowledge about the task to be 
performed and the goals to be attained through it in a two-dimension domain, as shown in 
figure 2.3. 
In summary, the model states that only if there is good knowledge about the 
objectives and the task process, control systems can and should provide clear-cut answers 
based on the data gathered and processed by the system. However, this is seldom the case, 
and Macintosh argues that the information provided by the control system is often misused 
when uncertainty exists. 
17
 Macintosh, Neil: Management Accounting and Control Systems. Wiley 1995. 
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Knowledge of the Task Conversion Process 
Figure 2.3 Interpretivist Model Matrix 
The following table contrasts the proper against the often improper use of the 
control system outputs: 
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Influence decisions. 










Table 2.1 Use of Control Systems under Uncertainty 
c. The Agency Theory 
This theory describes how one person (agent) acts on behalf of other 
(principal) in accordance with an explicit or implicit contract. This model is often applied 
to managers acting for their organizations. In this case, it is especially relevant, since both 









It is expected that the agent will do his best to satisfy the goals of the 
principal, mainly because the principal has trusted him for some good reason, and he is being 
evaluated and rewarded accordingly. However the following factors can drive different 
outcomes: 
• Asymmetric information. This is one of the main aspects of Agency Theory. 
It refers to the access the agent has to information that is not available to the 
principal, what allows him to depart from the interest of the principal with no 
evidence of it. All of the other problems mentioned below stem from this 
asymmetry. 
• Self interest. The interest of the agent may be stronger than the loyalty and 
rewards expected. This conflict of interest is the other main aspect of the 
agent theory. The big questions is to what extent the agent will be loyal to the 
interest of the principal instead of his own. In contrast, the challenge is to 
find ways to make both interests as close as possible. 
• Adverse selection. The principal "contracts" the agent assuming that he 
fulfills the requirements for the task. The prospective agents possess 
privileged information about their own capabilities, allowing them to mislead 
the principal. In another case, the principal might hide the difficulty of the 
task when "contracting" the agent, out of fear to lose him or simply because 
of underestimation. In both cases, the agent might become overwhelmed by 
the task. 
• Moral hazard. Depending on the extent to which the agent is liable or 
accountable for the results of his decisions, he might have an incentive to put 
less than the best effort. As the principal puts measurement systems in place 
to incentivize the agent, the latter might be better off complying with the 
control system rather than putting the best effort. 
• Signalling. The agent tries to demonstrate his abilities to the principal 
through "signals" that can be specific attitudes, reports and other efforts that 
might not coincide with the needs of the principal. Usually it is the principal 
who drives these signalling efforts, as he tries to ensure that he has the right 
agent requiring early and visible evidence of his competence. The traditions 
and culture of the organization builds a picture of the competent manager, 
which those in that position try to fulfill. 
• Incentive schemes. The principal can create a set of measures and rewards 
to incentivize the agent. However, it is almost impossible that those 
incentives can always coincide with the best interest of the principal. 
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Consequently, the agent will have to make the choice between what he 
considers the best for the principal and what the incentive system proposes. 
Finally, it might be more comfortable and rewarding for the agent to make 
the minimum effort needed to achieve a basic satisfaction according to the 
reward scheme, instead of putting his best effort without equivalent marginal 
benefit, and creating higher expectations for a next period. 
6. Decision Under Risk 
Combining the concepts of risk analysis and the models just described, the following 
decision process can be recommended for making decisions under situations of risk. Since 
all projects require multiple and interrelated decisions, this process is aimed to find a set of 
acceptable decisions. The final choice has to be taken in the context of the whole project. 
The process is based in the definition of risk, combining uncertainty about the 
outcomes and the consequences of adverse outcomes. It takes into account also the actions 
prescribed by the three models presented in point 5. above. The suggested steps are: 
a. Define Utility. Determine what is the purpose of the decision and the 
value that the outcome has for the organization. 
b. Define the expected outcomes. Establish in the most clear and 
measurable possible manner what is considered a successful outcome from the decision. 
c. Define risk in terms of alternative outcomes. Define what outcomes 
might occur, different and worst than the expected outcome. Notice that only the "known 
unknowns" can be assessed at this point. 
d. Assess aspiration level for decision. According to the value of the 
outcome, determine how accurately risk must be assessed and how much is acceptable. This 
assessment is the basis for the resource allocation into the decision process (e.g. people, 
money, time, authority, and information). 
e. Clarify the decision making framework. Make sure that the agent 
making the decision is aware of the utility measures, defined risk and the aspiration level of 
decision. Define the control and evaluation process accordingly. (See Agent Theory and the 




/ Determine Courses of Action. Define all possible courses of actions 
that address completely the problem at hand. 
g. Reduce Uncertainty. Use all appropriate means to reduce uncertainty 
to acceptable levels. (See Information Processing Model in point 5.) 
h. Evaluate Risk. Define a model to assess the probability of adverse 
outcomes and their impact. Define a method to deal with the "unknown unknowns". 
/. Find Possible Solutions. Determine what courses of action provide 
valid solutions and satisfy the level of aspiration previously defined. If more than one 
solution satisfy the criteria, leave the options open until all other decisions are analyzed. If 
no solution is found, the options are: 
• Relax the aspiration level 
• Assign more resources to the decision making process 
• Relax one or more of the existing constraints 
D.        SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the circumstances under which the case takes place, and the 
theoretical framework that will sustain the analysis. The framework describes the 
characteristics of a contract, the risks involved in contracting, and theoretical models that can 
help to evaluate the organizations involved and behavior of the actors involved in the case. 
It also provides a method for decision making under risk. 
The next chapter will present the case itself, starting with the decision that initiated 
the project, followed by the source selection, negotiation and contracting and finishing with 







III. THE CASE 
A. GENESIS OF THE PROJECT 
In October 1984 the Commander in Chief of the Navy directed several studies to 
shape the policy for the Navy in the years to come. It was clear that the politico-strategic 
circumstances demanded profound changes, and the time was appropriate. 
Among those studies, the Fleet Repowering Study18 referred to the enhancement of 
the capabilities of the fleet to cope with the expected threats. The Falklands war provided 
valuable lessons and exposed certain vulnerabilities that needed to be dealt with. The result 
ofthat study showed the need to acquire a specific capability for the fleet. The Commander 
in Chief of the Navy created Project Kilo19, and put it under the Naval Weapons Directory. 
Figure 3.1 shows the initial organization of Project Kilo. 
B. SOURCE EXPLORATION 
Beginning with the Fleet Repowering Study, a board composed of four Admirals, 
representing the Fleet, the Logistics Directorate, the Naval Weapons Directory and the 
Commander in Chief Staff studied the different options available to provide the required 
capabilities. The Project Manager provided the technical data, information about potential 
contractors, and analyses of performance and suitability of the different options. 
The board determined that the best solution was the use of a specific type of missile. 
The Project team identified two potential sources for the missile system. One of them named 
BLAST II, manufactured by an experienced aeronautical-electronics private group, which 
was already deployed in its country of origin. The other, ALPHA I, was under development 
by a highly experienced group of industries owned by their government. 
18
 Estudio de Repotenciamiento de la Escuadra, Estado Mayor General de la Armada, 
1985. 
19
 As mentioned in the first Chapter, some names, dates and quantities have been 
omitted or changed for security reasons. Alpha aeronautics of country Omega and BLAST 
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Figure 3.1 Project Kilo Initial Organization 
C.        THE SELECTION PROCESS 
After a first round of contacts, negotiations and analysis, the project team obtained 
proposals from both companies. The proposals specified the performance of the systems, the 
price and the delivery schedule. As expected, the performance of both systems was 
equivalent, the promised delivery schedule for the BLAST II system was slightly shorter than 
the other, and the cost of the ALPHA I system was about half of the other. 
At that point, there was clear awareness of the risk involved in each of the proposals, 
especially in the case of ALPHA I. The system was just in the development phase of the first 
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that the degree of maturity was closely related to the risk of obsolescence. While BLAST II 
was soon to be replaced by a new version, ALPHA I was just being fielded. Table 3.1 





COST US$ 200 Million US$110 Million 
PERFORMANCE Equivalent. Equivalent. 
SCHEDULE Four Years. Five Years. 
RISK Low, upgrade of a deployed 
system. 




Good past experience 
with government in performance 
and negotiation. 
Good past experience 
with government in performance. 
Difficult to negotiate with them 
Table 3.1 Comparison Between the Two Systems Offered 
The Project Manager (an Electronic Engineer Commander) prepared the data and 
briefed the board of Admirals on the characteristics of the offers. After a series of meetings 
with the board, they were ready to present a plan to the Commander in Chief, including the 
choice of supplier, quantity of systems, and the budgetary framework. The decision was 
discussed in terms of risk versus price. Considering that there were no short term threats, the 
risk of waiting more than the promised schedule was considered acceptable as a condition 
to get more systems for the same amount of money, and even more if late fees could be 
renegotiated and traded for increases in quantity. 
Finally, ALPHA I, referred to later as the "Kilo Missile System," was selected. The 
systems, once available, were going to be more effective on a collective basis (more units). 
If delays occurred, the Navy could bargain for lower price, increased quantities, or for 
improved features as a compensation. The decision was approved by the Commander in 
Chief for final approval before committing to a contract. 
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D.        THE NEGOTIATION 
Once the decision was approved by the Commander in Chief, the Project Manager 
approached Alpha authorities to set the conditions of the contract. Alpha was the aeronautic 
consortium owned by Omega Government, which would coordinate the efforts of itself and 
the other two government owned companies in the fulfillment of the contract. 
1. First Approaches 
The Project Manager, with the help of the lawyer of the Director General of 
Logistics, created the first draft of the contract. It established the final performance of the 
system, a delivery schedule, and a system of late fees for eventual delays. ALPHA reviewed 
the contract, and proposed a new one. 
2. Negotiation Issues 
The counter proposal of ALPHA set the agenda for the discussions to follow, 
including the following issues: 
a. Late Fees. ALPHA proposal included a very soft arrangement for late 
fees, and clauses that freed ALPHA from responsibilities in several situations (Force 
Majeure). The negotiations to arrive to a definitive contract, conducted by the Project 
Manager, lasted more than six months. Meetings were held in Chile and country Omega, and 
every single clause was strongly discussed. The Project Manager was especially concerned 
about the capacity to deliver on time, and the mechanisms to compensate if delays occurred. 
The Chilean Navy knew that delays could occur, and wanted to have enough bargaining 
power to limit those delays and to take advantage of them, so the limited late fees were not 
at all satisfactory. 
b. Performance Test and Evaluation. There was concern about the 
detailed specifications and test procedures. The expected general performance was clear, but 
changes could occur during the development, as well as the details of installation and 
integration. It was also expected that the development could provide opportunities for 
improvements above the specified features, but the Chilean Navy did not want to become 
captive of an offer impossible to reject and hence quite expensive to afford. 
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c. Risk Sharing. From the beginning the contract was negotiated as a 
firm fixed price type. The option of a cost plus contract was not even mentioned, and it was 
not available either since there was no permanent access to the cost management structure 
of Alpha. Even the access of Chilean Navy inspectors for quality assurance and coordination 
was not accepted easily by Alpha negotiators, since they had classified commitments with 
their government and third countries also. 
Alpha officials were concerned about exogenous variables, like monetary 
changes, interest rates and labor costs. Also, they were not willing to accept indefinite late 
fees that could take away all their profits or even create a loss. 
d. Enforceability. Another concern was the enforceability of the 
contract. If it was signed in the jurisdiction of either of the two parties, the other would be 
at a disadvantage. Even if a third party were selected, a scenario of termination for contract 
breach was not acceptable for either party. This meant that a negotiated solution was to be 
found in such event, so enough bargaining power and backing instruments were necessary. 
e. Financial Arrangements. Alpha wanted a significant payment up 
front (60%) and progress payments as partial deliveries were certified. The Chilean Navy had 
not enough cash availability to pay according to that schema, but could commit resources in 
the long term if there was certainty of the payment schedule. The Project Manager identified 
the dependence from ALPHA for financing as a major limitation in his bargaining power. 
/ Asymmetric Information. Finally there was an issue of asymmetric 
information. Omega government and ALPHA knew that the project was a high priority for 
the Chilean Navy, and that the resources were committed by the Chilean Government. The 
Chilean Navy however had no way to assess the real capacity and commitment of ALPHA 
and Omega government to deliver the system. The only clue was that Omega Navy was 
already involved in the development, although they had not signed a contract yet for the 
production of the system. 
E.        THE CONTRACT 
The culmination of the negotiation process was the Contract enclosed as Appendix 







• The main agreement, for the supply of the weapon system and the payment 
according to the schema proposed by Alpha 
• A financial agreement, which reconciles the payment schema of the main 
agreement with the cash flows available by the Chilean Navy. The difference 
between the two was covered by a loan with a floating rate interest 
The mechanisms devised to overcome the issues mentioned before are explained in 
the following points. 
1. Delivery Uncertainty 
Delivery lots were defined as packages of hardware tested and accepted by Chilean 
Navy inspectors in Alpha facilities. For the installation and integration phases (considered 
only for the first unit) other adhoc milestones were agreed. Late fees were established as a 
0.5% of the value of the package per month, with a maximum of 6% (Article 7). Fees were 
to be charged after a period of grace of 90 days (120 days for the first lot). In case of a delay 
beyond 12 months on a specific subsystem/unit the Chilean Navy had the right to terminate 
the contract for that specific subsystem/unit (Article 9.1). 
2. Detailed Specifications, Test and Improvements 
For the most part, the technical specifications were a description of the system and 
its components, how they related to each other, and what interactions were to be between the 
system and the existing systems on board, including fire control, C3I and other weapons 
systems. The performance specifications included in the contract were most (but not all) of 
those contained in the offer made by ALPHA. Among those not included in the contract, the 
most important was the assertion that the system was completely developed and tested for 
the Navy of OMEGA, which was far from reality. Instead, a tentative program was 
established. Other aspects on performance were stated in the negotiations but not in the 
formal offer. It was stated in the contract (Article 2.2) that manufacturing, assembly, training 
and documentation standards and practices would be those applied for the OMEGA Navy. 
ALPHA had to submit detailed specification and test procedures for approval by 
Chilean Navy inspectors six months prior to a Factory Acceptance Test. In case of 
disagreement, Omega Navy technical authorities would arbitrate. If any improvement was 
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introduced to the system being developed to Omega Navy, ALPHA had to notify the Chilean 
Navy and make the modifications available, subject to approval by the Defense Authority 
(Article 14.1.2). 
3. Enforceability and Bargaining Power 
The contract was signed under the law of the State of New York (Article 18), to 
provide neutral grounds. A mechanism for arbitration was also established under the rules 
of the International Chamber of Commerce (Article 13). One problem not appreciated when 
the contract was signed was that not all of the deliveries were attached to monetary value. 
Documents like detailed specifications and requirements were included in lots with due dates 
but without price, so late fees were not applicable. Besides, the mechanisms to charge the 
late fees were not clearly stated. The maximum late fees that the Chilean Navy could collect 
were less than two million dollars in a contract of over one hundred million. 
Bargaining power for the Chilean Navy was strengthened with the partial termination 
clause (Article 9.1), that allowed the Chilean Navy to terminate the contract for a specific 
subsystem or unit if delayed for over a year. In such case, the Chilean Navy could go for a 
competing contractor or in-house activity to provide that subsystem, while the rest of the 
contract would follow normally. This clause would hardly be invoked, but the consequences 
were very strong for ALPHA. 
The contract was backed by a letter of credit for the full amount of the contract for 
the case of eventual non-compliance. The letter of credit was held by a bank in country 
Omega. 
4. Financial Agreement 
The difference between the cash flow required for payment and the availability of 
funds was bridged by a separate financial agreement, already mentioned. The rate of interest 
was established at a floating rate of LIBOR plus 1.5%. According to the structure of 
payments considering in the main agreement and the delivery schedule, the Chilean Navy 





5. Asymmetry of Information 
The lack of information about the commitment of ALPHA and their technical 
capacity was mitigated somehow by involving Omega Navy as a technical arbitrator. 
Although ALPHA belongs to Omega government, it was expected that Omega Navy would 
play more as a customer of ALPHA, sitting at the same side of the table with the Chilean 
Navy if a conflict arose. 
The access of inspectors to ALPHA facilities, their presence in developmental 
testing, and the obligation of ALPHA to submit information about the advance and 
achievements ofthat development was included also in the contract to increase the level of 
information to the Chilean Navy. 
Other than the mentioned measures, asymmetry was still a complex issue. No one in 
the Chilean Navy team spoke Omega's language, and Omega officials were extremely 
reserved. Commitment was not only unknown, but also variable. Omega Navy was still 
negotiating with ALPHA and its legislature to reach an agreement for production, and the 
international scenario was unstable enough to force ALPHA to suspend project Kilo 
temporarily and give higher priority to other projects for Omega Government. 
F.        AFTER THE CONTRACT 
The signature of the contract marked the end of an intense negotiation process, and 
the beginning of a difficult relationship between the Chilean Navy and ALPHA. The 
following points describe the events and issues during the period from the signature of the 
contract until the present time, when the first system is undergoing final tests at sea. 
1. Organization 
Until one year after the signature of the contract, the Project Manager was still on a 
collateral duty basis, and had other responsibilities at the Naval Weapon Directory. Three 
other projects related to the repowering of the fleet were all handled in the same way. Given 
the relevance of these projects, the Commander in Chief of the Navy appointed an admiral 
with exclusive dedication to them, now grouped under the name of "Program Horizon". Now 
all four Project Managers would have full time dedication to their projects. 
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Horizon Program Director was an admiral renowned for his character, technical 
knowledge, and versatility. He designed a Program Office with no precedent in the Navy. 
All project managers were on the same floor of his office, and could reach him at any time, 
not to discuss problems but rather to brief him about solutions and decisions already taken. 
Basically, he led the team through example and veto power. Under him, but not in the line, 
two commanders were appointed as Program Coordinator and Financial Officer. The 
Program Coordinator helped the Project Managers to plan the activities for the same ships, 
avoiding interferences and duplication of efforts. The Financial Officer handled the accounts 
of all four projects, keeping better control and accuracy. 
The Program Director backed personally the Project Managers in the most important 
negotiations in the projects, and handled situations like those described in this case with great 
flexibility and imagination. In his favor, this Program Director had more autonomy than any 
other admiral in the Navy. His projects were prestigious, the Navy was one hundred percent 
committed, and the government would not interfere with them. 
Naval officers and enlisted specialists were not accustomed to a business 
environment and the relationships with a contractor like ALPHA. Deals were not clear-cut, 
statements made verbally would be denied or ignored if the paper said something different, 
and the contractor would try to blame the customer for any delay or unfulfillment of an 
obligation. Successive Project Managers had to overcome their frustrations and inexperience 
to keep negotiations going and the project advancing. Both of the regular line commanders 
specialized in electronic engineering and weapons engineering were carefully selected by 
their competence. However, they had no business experience, and were fully responsible for 
the project. Learning was intense and fruitful, but painful, according to their on accounts. 
2. Activities in Country Omega 
Two years after the signature of the contract, Omega country appointed a Technical 
Inspector Office to inspect the development tests and to certify the delivery tests. Two years 
later, the Chilean Navy sent three officers and thirty enlisted men to Alpha premises for 
training in installation and maintenance. 
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This group of people gained valuable experience, but due to the delays, most of them 
would not be the actual operators and maintainers of the systems once fielded. The training 
was later repeated in Chile for the actual crews. 
3. Delays and Renegotiations 
Clear signs of delays became apparent three years after the signature of the contract. 
ALPHA reported that most of the components of the first lot would be delivered two months 
late. Presentation of the lot for Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) was eleven months late, and 
some of the units did not receive complete operational testing. The detailed specifications 
submitted by ALPHA before the test were merely a copy of those included in the contract. 
The software that controlled the system was not included at all, and operational tests were 
to be conducted with a developmental software. As the Chilean Navy refused to accept the 
items, ALPHA offered to submit them eight months later, but with improved features 
included for the Omega Navy version. 
Since the Chilean Navy viewed the proposed modifications as satisfactory under the 
circumstances, but far from the schedule of the contract, the Addendum No.220 was agreed 
to update the schedule, to include the new features in exchange for the delays, and to provide 
a separate description and delivery schedule for the software. Throughout the period after 
Amendment No.2 new delays and difficulties to conduct meaningful tests were experienced. 
A military crisis caused a work stoppage for a four-month period. The contract was amended 
three times after the second already mentioned. In each of those amendments, the main issue 
was the renegotiation of the delivery schedule. 
4. Installation and Integration 
The main difficulties were found not surprisingly in the integration phase, to a point 
that delivered items were not put to work for more than 18 months, the expiration period for 
the warranty. Successive delays in the software, failures of the diagnostic system, and 
difficulties in the communication protocols between the existing and the new systems delayed 
the end of the integration of the first system three years after the scheduled date. 
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These delays had an adverse effect on the Chilean Naval planning, since the ship to 
receive the system was held in the shipyard longer than expected outside the planned retrofit 
period. The planned retrofit periods were coordinated with the general refit of several other 
ships, a task involving millions of dollars in the structure of the ships and all its systems. 
Other projects were also tied to these down periods. The result was an over-expenditure in 
the maintenance budget, and the loss of several warranties in the other related projects. 
Another effect, more subtle but not less important, was that the extended period 
caused changes in the project managers of project Kilo and others to be materialized in the 
same ships, with loss of continuity and skills acquired through learning. The Program 
Horizon ameliorated this effect appointing Project Managers with previous experience in the 
project as plant representatives. 
All of these problems and discontinuities amounted to a deterioration of the 
relationships between the Chilean Navy and ALPHA. Each disruption was followed by a 
period of harsh negotiations. ALPHA exploited any subtle weakness of the contract and any 
administrative mistake of the unexperienced and undermanned Chilean Navy team. 
5. Current Situation 
The first system was installed satisfactorily on board four years after the contract 
schedule date. The system required some fine tuning yet to reach the full performance 
expected, and software is still being debugged and documented. The system passed all of the 
Harbor Acceptance Trials, and has recently begun the Sea Acceptance Trials. Those tests 
will include firing one missile. The second system is being installed, and all materials and 
components for all the systems are in place at a Chilean Navy supply center. 
The experience gained with the first system allowed the Navy the convenience of 
extending the participation of ALPHA to the installation and integration of a second ship, 
a process which is still in progress. The extension in ALPHA'S participation was included 
at no cost in the fourth amendment of the contract, as a compensation for rescheduling the 
deliveries. 
The price of the project has not changed throughout this process. Improvements in 
performance and ALPHA'S participation in installation and integration work have been 
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exchanged for late fees. Other savings have been realized in interests. The schedule of 
payments of the finance agreement became closer to the payments due in the main 
agreement, thus reducing the debt level, and the LIBOR rate has been lower than the 
expected. Total savings amount to nine percent of the expected outlays. 
In summary, the Chilean Navy is getting a leading edge missile system, below 
budgeted cost, within performance baseline, but four years behind schedule. Costs incurred 
in the maintenance budget for changes in planned refit periods, warranty coverage loss, and 
other delay-related costs not included in the Project have not been computed. 
6.        Projections for the Future 
What will happen with the second and third systems remains to be seen, but the 
learning process should help to keep the program up to speed. 
Although the original Project Manager and Program Director are no longer in the 
program, they remain in the Navy pursuing successful careers, which is a measure of success 
as perceived by Navy authorities.   They maintain influence over the project from their 
current positions, contributing to its stability. 
G.       SUMMARY 
This third chapter describes the relevant events of this case, from the decision that 
started the project, through the negotiation and design of the contract, to its implementation. 
The project remains active, but the accumulated experience is rich enough for lessons to be 
learned. 
The next chapter contains the case analysis. The issues related to the procurement, 
and particularly the contract, are addressed based on the events just described and the theory 




A.        GENERAL 
The previous Chapter describes the Project Kilo case, from the decision to procure 
the "Kilo" ship missile system through the source selection, negotiation, contracting, 
manufacturing and fielding of the system. This Chapter shows the analysis of the case, using 
the information available in Chapters II and III, and the theoretical framework explained in 
Chapter II. 
1.        Outline of the Analysis 
The analysis identifies the challenges and constraints for Project Kilo, and then 
examines them from different perspectives with the following outline: 
a. General Challenges and Constraints Faced by the Chilean Navy 
when Procuring Weapon Systems 
In this section, the challenges and constraints facing any weapon system 
procurement are identified, as of the period from 1985 to 1988. They include general 
challenges, political-economic constraints, and technical constraints. 
b. Specific Challenges and Constraints for the Procurement of the 
Kilo Missile System 
This section will describe the elements that made the challenges for Project 
Kilo different from those described in the preceding point, including which challenges and 
constraints were not particularly relevant, and what new challenges arose.   It will also 
explore the negotiation position of the parties and the sources of risk for Project Kilo. 
c. Response of the Project Team to the General and Specific 
Challenges and Constraints 
This section will show how the Project Team handled the previously 
identified challenges and constraints, and will cover the following issues: 
(1)       Organization and Manning for the Task.   Project Kilo 
organization will be compared to the typical business organization for projects and to the 
typical U.S. Program Management organization. The models presented in Chapter II, 







be used also to analyze the organization of Project Kilo. 
(2) Uncertainty and Risk Handling. The different elements of risk 
for Project Kilo will be assessed, and also the measures taken by the Project Team to handle 
that risk, including: 
• Procurement Risk: cost, schedule and performance 
• After Sales Support Risk: logistic and technical support 
• Political Risk: government and Navy commitment for the project, and 
political support in contractor's country 
(3) Contract Negotiation. How the project Team interacted with 
the seller to generate the appropriate conditions and relationships necessary for the success 
of the procurement will be analyzed. 
(4) Non-Contractual Means Used: What other means were used 
as leverage in the negotiation process will be identified and evaluated. 
d. Relationship Between the Results of the Project and the Previous 
Analysis 
The actual results of the procurement are compared to the expected results. 
e. Lessons Learned and Implications for Future Procurement 
This section summarizes the findings of the analysis, in terms of what actions 
or situations were relevant for the outcome of Project Kilo, and what conditions could be 
improved to diminish the risk or improve the results of future procurements. 
B.        GENERAL   CHALLENGES   AND   CONSTRAINTS   FACED   BY   THE 
CHILEAN NAVY WHEN PROCURING WEAPON SYSTEMS 
1. Major Challenges 
The following are the major general challenges applicable to any weapon system 
procurement made by the Chilean Navy, as they were seen in the late Eighties. 
a.        Acquiring Effective Weapons Without a Technology Base 
The major challenge faced by the Chilean Navy when procuring a major 
weapon system is the need to obtain leading edge equipment without possessing its own 
technology base, and with severe resource constraints. The Navy must keep control of an 
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enormous maritime territory and maintain a credible deterrence against the threat of 
aggressive neighbors with four times Chile's population and financial resources. Those 
nations already had better and newer weapons, capable of causing severe damage to the 
Chilean Fleet. 
b. Deciding the Appropriate Degree of Maturity of Technology 
The Navy must achieve a high effectiveness-to-cost ratio, and possess weapon 
systems able to deal with current and future threats. When selecting a weapon system to deal 
with a set of threats or missions, the main choices are buying the best system in the 
marketplace at a premium price, or buying systems in development stage with higher risk 
and lower price. Another consideration is that mature systems are often very close to 
obsolescence. 
c. Determining the Appropriate Degree of National Participation 
Secondary choices are the various degrees of national participation, from high 
risk co-development to low risk turnkey procurement. Risk and price are always a subject 
of tradeoff, but national participation can be part of a strategy that goes beyond the particular 
procurement goals. 
d. High Impact of Failure 
Since major projects are infrequent, each of them has a decisive impact on 
defense capabilities. A failure will create a serious shortcoming in the desired level of 
deterrence. For that reason the Navy keeps these projects in a high level of secrecy. High 
secrecy implies that the project has to be handled only with in-house expertise, making 
difficult the possibility of hiring external consultants. 
e. Project Manager Rotation 
Procurement projects usually take more than ten years, but Project Managers 
cannot stay more than three years on the job if they are to follow a regular line career path. 
As a result, as many as five different Project Managers may participate in one procurement 
effort, as do higher authorities dealing with the project. Rotation makes learning and 
experience building difficult, while communications between the Navy and the contractors 
are stressed by changing management styles, goals and policies. 
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h
/ Lack of Experience and Information 
Chile does not have a developed industrial base, so every procurement has a 
major foreign component. Consequently, contracts are usually between the Navy and 
governments or industries of other countries. Foreign weapon systems producers have much 
more experience in negotiation and contracting than the Chilean Navy has. Those companies 
also have a base of technical, business and cost information that is not accessible by the 
Chilean Navy. Low in-house experience due to the low frequency of major contracts makes 
the asymmetry of experience and information a large and unavoidable challenge. 
g.        Maintaining Political Support 
All procurement projects must be supported by the service and a critical mass 
of political authorities to keep the commitment in the long term. Although the Chilean Navy 
has a great deal of autonomy, a commitment for ten years or more requires more than just 
Navy support. Even within the Navy, there might be competing demands for resources in 
the form of other projects, operational requirements or social demands. A project that 
progresses smoothly is not challenged, but if the events depart from the expected, those 
competing demands will see an opportunity to obtain the resources originally assigned for 
the project. In international contracts, political support on the side of the seller is also 
required to ensure the delivery of the system without interference. 
h.        Multiplicity of actors and goals 
Another challenge is the multiplicity of actors striving for different goals. 
The complex environment in which the Project Manager is inserted is described in Chapter 
II. Each actor sees the project from a different perspective, and the measure of success for 
each of them will differ. Some elements of success might converge, such as the delivery of 
the system within acceptable time, schedule and performance limits. Others elements, such 
as profit, cost, risk sharing, and influence, will diverge. 
i. Need for Communication and Negotiation Skills 
The Project Manager needs to understand this complex interaction of 
interests. From this understanding he must create an environment where the customer gets 
its weapon system while all the other actors achieve their goals. The problem is that these 
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competing interests might be not compatible, thus compromising and negotiation come into 
play. The challenge for the Project Manager and his superiors is to create the conditions and 
get the necessary skills to communicate and negotiate successfully with all the stakeholders. 
Getting support from upper level authorities is a constant challenge for the Project Manager, 
especially when those authorities rotate as often as he does. The Project Manager must be 
his project's salesman. 
2. Political and Economic Constraints 
Apart from the mentioned challenges, the Chilean Navy faces certain constraints that 
limit its capacity to obtain the desired solutions. 
a. Political Environment 
The Chilean Navy is subject to the Chilean political and economic system. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the Navy has relative autonomy to define its needs and to 
commit resources in the long term, but those resources are limited. The autonomy enjoyed 
by the Navy was likely to change within the time-frame of the project. A transition to full 
democracy was to begin in 1989, and the political changes would affect the budgetary 
autonomy of the Armed Forces. 
b. Scarce Resources 
The Chilean annual defense budget is close to one billion dollars. Those 
resources are tied to the success of copper exports. About 25% of the budget can be devoted 
to procurement, divided evenly among the three services. This means that the Navy has about 
60 million dollars per year to satisfy all procurement needs. 
The immediate consequence ofthat economic limitation is that no more than 
three major projects can be executed simultaneously, and therefore the base of experience 
and organizational stability for procurement is relatively weak. All program managers for 
major weapon system acquisition are in that position for the first and only time in their 
career. 
c. Need for External Financing 
Another consequence of this low flow of resources is that projects are paid 
in installments over a long time. The contractor usually provides the financing, resulting in 
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a long term relationship. The contractor who provides financial support gets a great 
advantage when it comes to set the conditions of the contract. 
d.        Lack of Cost and Pricing Data 
Another constraint is the lack of experience in dealing with costs in the 
acquisition of missile systems. When the U.S. services procure a new weapon system, the 
program team has abundant data about cost of similar systems. The regulations about cost 
and pricing data21 force the contractors to provide accurate and detailed data about cost. 
Defense Plant Representative Officers and Administrative Contracting Officers have access 
to the information and processes in the contractor's plant. Cost Accounting Standards help 
the government representatives to obtain accurate costing data. 
The Chilean Navy has no access to costing data nor legal authority to enforce 
accounting standards of any kind in foreign countries. There is no cost data on previous 
similar systems, since the Chilean government has no recent experience with similar weapon 
systems, whatever they might be. The only solution is dealing with the market, and obtaining 
prices from different sources, although the sources for equivalent systems are few. An 
independent cost estimation using data from open sources in the U.S. or other countries could 
help, but that estimation requires education and training, or must be hired as consulting 
services. 
3. Technical Constraints 
Technical constraints are not as severe as the economic ones, but they are more 
subtle. The Chilean Navy has highly educated technical officers and enlisted personnel, and 
historically has been able to keep up with new technologies. However, new characteristics 
of technology creates new and different constraints. 
a.        Structure of Technology 
How technology is structured in new systems tends to make it invisible to the 
users. Highly concentrated electronic circuits cannot be understood without the help of 
21
 The Truth in Negotiation Act, as reformed by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act of 1994, requires cost and pricing data for all contracts over US$ 500,000. 
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diagnosis and descriptive software, and dealing with software requires an expertise that 
cannot be acquired in the classroom. New materials cannot be tested and less reproduced 
without expensive specialized metallurgical laboratories. New technology requires proprietary 
information that creates a dependence from the provider. 
b. Technology Transfer 
Acquiring technology now not only requires purchasing the appropriate 
equipment, but also the documentation, software, training and technology transfer means. 
Determining how much of it is necessary, how much it is worth, and how much is the 
provider willing to transfer requires experience and technical skills. On the other hand, 
convincing the authorities that funding for these "soft" goods is indispensable is another 
challenge for the Project Manager. 
4. Immaturity of Contract Management Regulations 
The difficulties found in project management were analyzed in the early Eighties. An 
important effort was made by the General Director for Logistics to improve project 
management. The result ofthat effort was the Navy Project Handbook22, which included a 
well defined decision/approval path from the generation of an idea through the materialization 
of it. Financial control and progress reporting were also standardized. However, the 
particulars of contracting were not included, and the related legal regulations (already 
mentioned in Chapter II) were dispersed across a set of laws and regulations. This situation 
was a reflection of the past history of the Chilean Navy, which had just begun to procure 
major weapon systems independently after a long period when weapon system procurement 
was made through government to government cooperation agreements and second hand ship 
acquisitions. 
5. Summary of General Challenges and Constraints 
In summary, fifteen general challenges and constraints faced by the Chilean Navy 
when procuring weapon systems have been identified: 
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1. Acquiring Effective Weapons Without a Technology Base 
2. Determining the Appropriate Maturity of Technology 
3. Determining Degree of National Participation 
4. High Impact of Failure 
5. Project Manager Rotation 
6. Lack of Experience and Information 
7. Maintaining Political Support 
8. Multiplicity of Actors and Goals 
9. Need for Communication and Negotiation Skills 
10. Scarce Resources; Few Major Projects 
11. Need for External Financing 
12. Lack of Cost and Pricing Data 
13. Structure of Technology 
14. Difficulty of Technology Transfer 
15. Immaturity of Contract Management Regulations 
C.        SPECIFIC      CHALLENGES      AND      CONSTRAINTS      FOR      THE 
PROCUREMENT OF THE KILO MISSILE SYSTEM 
Project Kilo presented the challenge of being the first new major weapon system 
acquisition in the last sixty years. The system was not fully developed, so uncertainty and 
risk were the dominant factors. This section describes the particular characteristics of Project 
Kilo, which created some different challenges and constraints as compared to the general 
ones just described. 
1. Difference between the general challenges and those specific to Project 
Kilo 
a. Organizational Stability 
Some of the fifteen factors mentioned in the general challenges and 
constraints were not particularly relevant for this project. Given the importance of the 
program, the Program Director was given ample authority, and he also gave enough authority 
to the Project Manager to handle his project. During the evolution of the project, the 
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organization evolved to become the first one dedicated entirely to procurement projects. 
Project Managers stayed for an average of five years in the project, starting as plant 
representatives before taking the Project Manager position. 
b. Financing and Political Support 
The Navy was committed to Project Kilo for the long term. It was expected 
that Kilo and the other projects of Program Horizon would be the key to update the 
capabilities of the fleet for a long period. The projects were designed to be paid with the 
procurement funds of the following ten years, so that top level decision makers would not 
face new procurement decisions until well beyond the political transition. 
c. Different Culture 
An unusual challenge for Project Kilo was the need to deal with a different 
culture. For a long time Chile had dealt with the U.S. and UK for most of its foreign 
business, but now they had to deal with Omegan culture. It was not just a matter of language, 
but also a different way to conduct business. 
d. Summary of Different Challenges 
Accordingly, three of the fifteen previously mentioned challenges were not 
particularly relevant in Project Kilo: 
• Multiplicity of Actors and Goals 
• Maintaining Political Support 
• Program Manager Rotation 
And a new factor, in addition to the fifteen general challenges, was identified: 
• Different culture, including business references, language and ethical 
standards 
2. Negotiation Position of the Parties 
The Chilean Navy had to negotiate with ALPHA officials, who were more 
experienced in international business. Both parties had different goals and different strengths 










a. Position of the Contractor 
Alpha had proprietary information about the characteristics and degree of 
development of the system. For them, having an external source of financing and a free test 
bed for its new weapon system was a worthy benefit to seek from the project, despite its 
relative or absolute success. They were trying to ensure Omega Navy commitment, and the 
Chilean Navy contract would help to obtain that commitment. Sharing development cost 
with an external customer, and having the chance to test the system under another customer's 
scrutiny would make the procurement more convenient for Omega Navy. 
b. Position of the Buyer 
For the Chilean Navy, the success of the project within its financial limits 
was crucial for the future strength of the Navy. The only leverage that the Chilean Navy had 
over ALPHA was the prospect of a long term relationship with a loyal customer, and other 
potential customers. ALPHA had performed well so far in other Chilean government 
projects. If the Chilean Navy had become disappointed with ALPHA, Navy authorities 
would look for another provider the next time. Other potential customers would look at the 
Chilean experience very carefully. But the Chilean Navy would not be willing to publicize 
a failure, so ALPHA'S risk was not so apparent. 
The negotiation position of the Chilean Navy was enhanced by putting two highly 
qualified officers in the Project Manager team, having strong technical expertise, English 
language fluency and personal attributes appropriate to deal with the challenges. 
3. Sources of Risk 
Although risk is analyzed in detail on part D.2. of this chapter, its sources are part of 
the context being described in this section of the analysis. What created risks in terms of cost, 
schedule and performance is described as follows: 
a. Cost Risk 
Although the contract was a Firm Fixed Price type, cost risks did exist. A 
variety of events, mentioned in Chapter II, can modify the final price of a fixed price 
contract. In addition, interest rates in the financial agreement and exogenous factors included 
in the price adjustment formula were added to the cost risks of the Chilean Navy. 
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b. Performance Risk 
This risk was a consequence of the early development stage of the system, and 
the uncertainty about the real possibilities and commitment of ALPHA. In a worst case, 
ALPHA might not be able to produce the system at all. 
c. Schedule risk 
This risk was a different face of the same phenomenon. If the chances for a 
successful system were farther away than what ALPHA claimed, only more time would 
allow ALPHA to produce the system. Concurrence was another source of risk. The stage in 
which the contract was negotiated was equivalent to Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development. A single contract provided for the completion of this stage, production and 
after production support, which made the schedule vulnerable to single failures in 
developmental activities. 
D.        RESPONSE OF THE CONTRACTING TEAM TO THE GENERAL AND 
SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS 
According to the challenges and sources of risk already mentioned, the Navy 
Negotiating team would need to: 
• find out if ALPHA was really able to produce the system with the alleged 
performance within a reasonable time; 
• create the conditions to commit ALPHA to the success of the project; 
• identify the risks of failure, and create the conditions to avoid or, in a worst 
case, remedy the consequences of those risks. 
1. Organization and Manning for the Task 
In this section, the analysis shows how the Navy designed and modified the 
organization to perform its task. The Chilean Navy's organization is compared to the U.S. 
Navy typical Program Manager organization and also to a typical private business 
organization dealing with contracts comparable to a weapon system acquisition. 
Although the organization of the Program Director and Project Manager started such 
as that of any other Project in the Chilean Navy at the time, it evolved to become unique, 






negotiation, the Project Team was composed by the Project Manager, an 05 specialist in 
Electronic Engineering and another 05 specialist in missiles and ordinance. Two years after 
the contract began, Project Kilo took its definitive shape under Program Horizon, obtaining 
full time dedication and adding the Plant Representative. The diagram shown in figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1 Organization of Project Kilo under Program Horizon 
a. Comparison   of Project Kilo  to DoD  and Private Business 
Organizations 
Compared to the U.S. organization, project Kilo is much smaller, lacking 
most of the specialized staff and external support in areas such as Test and Evaluation, 
Logistics, Contracting, Systems Engineering, Finance, Quality Assurance and Cost 
Estimation. All these responsibilities lay over the Project Manager and the Plant 
Representative. Figure 4.2 shows a typical U.S. DoD Program manager organization. 
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Figure 4.2 Typical Organization of a DoD Program Manager Office 
Compared to the typical private business organization, the size of Project Kilo 
organization is about the same, but the private business organization has better expertise in 
business and legal aspects. For quality assurance, many private businesses use external 
certification companies, which was not feasible for project Kilo. Another critical difference 
is the number of layers of reporting authority. In a private business, the Project Manager 
reports directly to the CEO or a Vice president. In the Navy, there are three layers over the 
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Project Manager just within the Navy. At least two more may intervene at the political level. 
Figure 4.3 shows a typical private business project organization, as described in the interviews 























Figure 4.3 Typical Organization of a Private Project Manager Office 
b.        Agency Theory 
When the project began, the Project Manager was the only agent of the Navy 
interacting with the suppliers. The Program Director had multiple commitments, so all 
negotiations and decisions were conducted exclusively by the Project Manager. Lately, 
Horizon Program Director assumed as the agent of the Navy, and the Project Manager 
became the agent for the Program Manager. 
(1) Self Interest. The Navy culture and values ensured that the 
Project Manager would faithfully represent the interests of the Navy, which he knew better 
than any other authority in the Navy. From the point of view of the Agency Theory, the 
conflict was between advocacy and balanced risk assessment. Being a highly qualified 
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technical officer, the Program Manager might have looked for higher performance over a 
reasonable risk. In fact, in the interview included in Appendix C, he said that he had no doubt 
about the capacity of ALPHA to succeed, and never thought about an scenario of 
performance failure without a solution based on some more time. Consequently, he 
considered that risk was mostly in the schedule and financial domains. Cost risks were 
supposed to be related to interest rates changes only. Once a full time Program Director was 
appointed, advocacy got some balance with risk. Program Director rewards were related to 
the risk of failure to obtain a working system in a reasonable period of time. His concern to 
avoid high risks for his career was coincident with the Navy's interest to establish a 
reasonable awareness and control of risks. 
(2) Adverse Selection. The small size of the Chilean Navy, with 
less than 1,500 officers, makes adverse selection unlikely, specially for this kind of high 
profile projects. For the same reason, the signalling phenomena, or trying to make an 
impression rather than actual performance, was not expected. 
(3) Moral Hazard. The Project Manager's main incentive was 
professional satisfaction, which made moral hazard not a problem. The Program Director 
had, as mentioned before, more concerns about his career risk, but a poor performance would 
deprive him from the high visibility potential of the project. This different point of view was 
beneficial for the Navy. 
(4) Incentive Schemes. During all periods of the project, the 
rewards for the Project Manager were based on professional satisfaction and the high 
visibility of the project. He was not senior enough to have concerns about his survival in the 
Navy. For the Program Director, the incentive was also professional satisfaction, but the 
influence of the short terms results of the project on his career had also an impact that he 
could not ignore. 
(5) Summary of Agency Theory. Agents were chosen and 
chartered in an appropriate way to represent faithfully the interests of the Navy. During the 
initial and more important period of the project, the Project Manager could have harmed the 
interests of the Navy assuming a too optimistic and/or performance over risk oriented 
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position. The role of the Program Director provided a counterbalance, but it came later than 
it should have. 
c. Information Processing Model 
Since projects deal with a great degree of uncertainty, the information 
processing model should give some insight about how the organization deals with 
uncertainty. 
The information gap to be handled by the organization lies mostly in the legal 
and business expertise, and the knowledge about the real commitment and capabilities of 
ALPHA. The uncertainty reducing strategies suggested by the model were present in the 
organization as follows: 
(1) Slack Resources. One way to deal with uncertainty is to have 
more resources than initially expected to use. In this case, potential resources were time, 
money, information and expert personnel. The only slack resource given to the project was 
time. Budget was established for a long period, and specialized personnel would not be 
available. Information was obtained by the Project Team with no support from other 
organisms of the Navy. Another effect of the lack of extra resources was the difficulty to 
detect and take advantage of opportunities for improvement. Those opportunities are frequent 
in developing projects. 
(2) Self Contained Units. Having all information processing 
needs concentrated in multi-task units helps to process information faster and easier. Project 
Management organization is the kind of self contained unit envisioned by Galbraith when 
he presented this model. Project Kilo was a small and self-contained organization. 
(3) Vertical Information Processing. Uncertainty can be reduced 
by improving the means to acquire information, produce meaningful data, and distribute it 
to the decision makers. These capabilities were not strongly present in the organization. The 
Program Director and Project Manager had to deal with what information they could get 
from the fleet and the providers on request, and the computational means to process that 
information were limited to a basic network of personal computers. 
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(4) New Lateral Relations. At the beginning of the Project, the 
small organization had no means to establish fluid relations with other parallel organisms. 
The task was overwhelming, and the two officers had to spend most of the time analyzing 
and handling their project. 
When the Directorate for Program Horizon was created, its officers were 
drawn from the fleet and from the technical directorates, Weapons and Engineering. They 
were supposed to make full use of the background and technical skills of those directorates. 
However, transferring knowledge and experience is not an easy task. An officer from the 
Directorate of Naval Engineering described this background, experience and collective 
expertise as a "cloud of knowledge,"23 that can not be transferred through documents or 
individuals. 
This new organization blocked the desired horizontal relationships. Program 
Horizon was given better material and human resources than its sister directorates. Horizon 
people viewed themselves as better organized, while the other directorates viewed Program 
Horizon as a threat to their traditional areas of influence. As a result, horizontal relationships 
that could have helped to reduce the degree of uncertainty were severed. 
Within Program Horizon, the situation was completely different. The lean and 
horizontal organization promoted lateral communications. The appointment of a coordinator 
helped to ensure the horizontal relationships. 
(5) Summary of Information Processing Model. The strategies 
suggested by the Information Processing Model to cope with uncertainty at the 
organizational level were not exploited, with the sole exception of the self-contained unit 
strategy, as applied to Program Horizon and Project Kilo organization. 
d.        Interpretivist Model 
According to this model, the organization is classified according to the 
uncertainty of the task, meaning the degree of knowledge on how to perform it, and the 
23
 This expression was coined by Commander Carlos Fanta, and was used by him in 




uncertainty of the goals, or what is to be accomplished through the organization. 
The procurement of the Kilo missile system had a clear set of goals, but there 
was not complete knowledge about how to perform the tasks of the procurement. For this 
kind of situation the model establishes the need for a control system that promotes the debate 
about how to perform the task, and provide data for comparison between multiple 
alternatives. 
The control system in place, directed by the Project Handbook, considered 
a review by the authority chain on the passage from one stage of the project to the other. For 
example, when going from preliminary project to definitive project, a preferred option was 
selected. That decision had to be approved by the Program Director, the General Director for 
Logistics, and the Commander in Chief. Typically, the Project Manager explains and 
advocates the decision he could get working alone, in a part-time situation. Occasionally the 
Program Director arranges a meeting with a panel of experts and users to discuss the project, 
but this is not required. Consequently, the control system promotes data acquisition to 
support the decision process, but does not provide opportunities for debate, although the 
Program Director can encourage that debate despite the control system. 
According to the first Project Manager, he had to work for the most part 
within his team of two officers, himself and the weapons expert, with little input from other 
parties. The Program Director had no opportunity to devote the attention and time he had 
desired, so most decisions were made independently by the Project Manager. 
e. Summary of Organization and Manning. The Chilean Navy was not 
appropriately organized nor manned for the task. The Program Director and Project Manager 
were forced to deal with complex specialized tasks for which they had not enough experience 
nor expertise. However, the Navy was able to learn and evolve in the right direction, 
improving the organization. The following are the critical areas of the organization: 
(1) Legal Support. According to the Project manager, the part- 
time legal support from the lawyer who worked in contracts for the Navy was adequate, but 
ALPHA lawyers had a much better understanding of their production process, cost structure 
and business practices. Those lawyers were skillful negotiators, having a significant 
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advantage over the Project Team. 
(2) Testing and Evaluation. Tests were conducted by the 
contractor and witnessed by the Plant Representative. The Chilean Navy had four months to 
review the description of the components and the test protocols. Instead of having a 
technical staff to revise and evaluate those protocols, the Project Manager and Plant 
Representative had to do it by themselves. 
(3) Part Time vs. Full Time Dedication. At the beginning of the 
project, when the contract negotiation took place, the Project Manager was dedicated part 
time to the project. Their experience conveyed the need to establish a full time Project 
Manager within a Program Office dedicated completely to handling related projects. 
(4) Commitment and Competence. The factor that allowed the 
Navy to achieve a relative success was the commitment and competence of the Project Team 
members. They learned to use their talent and ingenuity to overcome their lack of experience 
and expertise. Another factor of success was the flexibility of the Navy to improve its 
organization as it learned from the accumulated experience. 
(5) Specialized Staff. The project had not enough officers with 
specific responsibilities in Test & Evaluation, Logistics, Configuration Management, and 
Cost Management. It did not have a legal advisor exclusively for the program, nor an 
experienced international business manager. As a result of this lack of specialized staff, the 
level of risk of the project was significantly higher than what it could have been. 
2.        Measure of Success of the Project 
This section addresses different approaches to measure the relative success of the 
procurement. It also outlines the relationship between these variables and the value of the 
weapon system for the Navy. 
(a) Assumptions for Measuring Success. Other than the contract, there 
was no other document where the specific goals of the project were established and given 
relative weight. Acceptable limits for deviations and evaluation for departures from those 
limits were not established either. According to the contract, the information given by the 












to what should have been considered procurement relative success is defined in Table 4.1. 
Any parameter beyond the worst acceptable value is considered a failure. Results 
between the best and worst scenario are considered a relative success. The expected scenario 










Buyer's Gain 52.6% 41.0% 0.0% 
Performance As specified As specified As specified 
Libor Rate 4.5% 5.5% 6.5% 
Cost 88 Million 81 Million 76 Million 
Schedule 
Delay 
0 Years 2 Years 4 Years 
Logistic 
Support 
Excellent Adequate Minimum to keep 
system working 
Political Strong Commitment 
Improved relations 






Table 4.1 Measure of Success for Project Kilo 
Performance is considered an on-off outcome. However, features that can 
extend the tactical useful life have a positive impact in buyer's gain. Cost is evaluated in 
terms of the predicted prices considering interest rates and late fees. Schedule expected 
scenario of two years is consistent with that expressed by the Project Manager. Doubling that 
delay is considered the worst acceptable scenario. 
Logistic support is evaluated in terms of the opinion of the Project Manager, due to 
the lack of objective measures in the contract or other document. There were not figures in 
place to evaluate objectively the impact of logistic support in the life cycle cost and 
effectiveness of the weapon system. Political interference is the effect of the actions of 
political leadership, both in Chile and in Omega, over the outcome of the project. Political 
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interference is also evaluated according to the opinion of the Project Manager, as indicated 
in the table. 
(b)       Models to Assess Relative Success. In Appendix B, two models are 
introduced to evaluate the outcomes of the procurement. 
(1) Tactical Value and Risk Model This model defines the 
outcome for different scenarios in terms of buyer's gain. That gain represents the value that 
the Navy obtains over the worst expected scenario. The value is given by the life cycle cost 
of the weapon system, its tactical value across its useful life, and the probability of being 
required by a conflict. The model captures the effect of delays, variations in price, cost of 
ownership, obsolescence, interest rates, and risk of conflict. This model does not evaluate 
logistic support and political interference. 
This model views a weapon system as an investment that will cost 
some money to the buyer (the government) through its life cycle, which is usually referred to 
as Life Cycle Cost, and will give some value in return year after year, as the weapon system 
performs the task. The value depends mainly on two aspects: 
• .        The capability of the weapon system, or its capacity to perform its missions. 
• The risk of conflict, which makes the weapon system necessary. 
Evaluating the tactical value of a weapon system or the risk of conflict 
in monetary terms is extremely complex. To overcome this difficulty, the model assumes that 
the expected scenarios reflect the range of relative success of the weapon system 
procurement. There has been no risk of conflict between the date of the contract to the 
present. The effect of this lower-than-expected risk, which is out of the control of the Project 
Manager, reduces the value of the system when evaluated against the baseline, since the actual 
need for the system was less than expected. 
According to the model, the final result of the procurement was a 
buyer's gain of 17.4%, about one third of the expected gain. However, if the contract had 
been fulfilled as specified, the lower-than-expected risk had caused a 20% buyer's loss, 
meaning that the Navy had fielded the Kilo system four years early, when there was no risk 





of procurement success. Figure 4.4 shows a summary of the expected scenarios and actual 
results. 
Parameters common for all scenarios: 
Time to Logistic Obsolescence: 
Time to Tactical Obsolescence: 
Initial Cost Of ownership: 
Final Cost of Ownership: 
25 years after fielding 
15 years 
US$880,500 per year 
Discount Rate: 
Confidence level (No Conflict) 
US$ 1761,000 per year 
Libor+ 1% 
~5S% 
Libor Delivery Present value Buyer's Remarks 
rate Delay of payments Gain - 
Worst Acceptable Scenario 6.50% 4 years US$ 75,435« 0.00% 
Most Probable Expected Sc. 4.50% 2 years US$ 83,751 K 41.03% 
Best Expected Scenario 4.50% 0 years US$ 88.073K 52.62% 
Result of the Procurement 4.00% 4 years US$ 79,265« 17.42% Reduced Risk and Increased Tto 











 Worst Most Probable   Best Expected     Result of the    IfCdgmWhad 
Acceptable       Expected Sc.         Scenario        Procurement    Sedfl   OB led 
Scenario ;  
Figure 4.5 Summary of expected Scenarios and Results 
(2) Risk and Damage Reduction Model. An alternative way of 
determining the value of a weapon system is to relate it to the defense strategy of the country, 
in terms of the contribution of the weapon system to reducing the risk of a conflict and its 
subsequent costs. Under a strategy of deterrence, weapon systems are purchased to minimize 
the risks involved in military conflicts. Those risks are related to the uncertainty about the 
probability of conflict, the consequences a conflict, the effect of the system to be procured in 
terms of reducing that risk of conflict, and the effect of the system in reducing the damage 
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of procure ent success. Figure 4.4 sho s a su ary of the expected scenarios and actual 
results. 
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caused in a conflict. The model (as shown in Appendix B) was not actually used in this thesis 
to calculate a specific value, but rather to illustrate the decision making process involved in 
procurement. Obtaining actual values from this model requires information and analysis well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3. Uncertainty and Risk Handling 
As mentioned in Chapter II, in the context of procurement, risk is the result of 
uncertainty about the outcome and the impact of worse than expected results (notice that the 
"expected" is a quite dynamic idea). The analysis of risk focuses on the following three major 
areas as discussed in Chapter II: 




• After sales support risk 
• Political risk 
a. Procurement Risk 
The first and main part of the risk analysis is going to concentrate on 
Procurement Risk, including the risk of having to assign more resources than expected, 
having the system fielded later than expected, and getting a system that cannot do what it was 
expected to do. 
(1) Cost Risk. The contract for the procurement of the "Kilo 
Missile System" was a Firm Fixed Price type, with adjustment for external variables and an 
associated Financial Agreement at a floating interest rate. Part of the uncertainty of cost for 
the Chilean Navy was due to the adjustment variables used and fluctuating interest rates. 
(a) Expected Outcome. The expected results in terms of 
cost were reflected in the payment schedule of the financial agreement as predicted for a two 
year delay: US$ 81 million dollars24 were to be distributed along ten years, with minor 
24
 This value includes only the price to be paid to ALPHA, expressed as present value 








adjustments according to interest rate and wage index. LIBOR rate was expected to be close 
to 4.5%, given a loan interest rate of 6%. 
(b)       Relationship with Schedule Risk. There were two 
mechanisms that tied cost risk with schedule risk: 
• Late deliveries implied later charges associated to those deliveries, hence 
lower debt and less interest payments. 
• Late deliveries also had associated late fees, actually reducing the cost. 
Figure 4.5 shows the potential effect of changes in interest rates and late deliveries 
over the total amount paid. For example, a delay of two years (eight quarters) will decrease 
total payments by 4.9% or $4,321,000 ($88,073,000 - $83,752,000) if LIBOR rate is 4.5%. 
Net Present Value of Total Payments 
Discount Rate = Libor +1% 
DELAY 
QUARTERS 
LIBOR  RATE,% 
4.5 5.5 6.5 
0 $88,073 $85,474 $82,978 
4 $85,128 $82,452 $79,897 
8 $83,752 $80,949 $78,286 
12 $82,461 $79,550 $76,801 
16 $81,249 $78,250 $75,435 
US$ x 1,000 
4 8 12 
DELAY, QUARTERS 
Figure 4.5 Effect of Libor Rate and Late Deliveries Over the Net Present Value of 
Total Payments 
(c)       Factors That Can Increase the Price of a Fixed Price 
Contract. Other cost risk related to fixed Price contracts are analyzed according to the 
framework established in Chapter II. In that chapter a series of possible causes for cost 
installation are not covered by this thesis. 
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overruns in fixed price type contracts were presented. In this analysis each of them is 
considered and assigned a level of risk according to the specific situation of the Project Kilo. 
• The buyer is forced to pay for extra performance because the seller can only 
provide a superior system, while the current system, with the required 
performance, is out of production. 
Article 14.1 of the contract specified that any improvement 
adopted by Omega Navy should be offered to the Chilean Navy, which could acquire the 
parts and services required for the improvement modification at terms and conditions to be 
agreed upon. It did not allow ALPHA to force the adoption of such improvements. The 
possibility was open but restricted to the available funds. 
• The buyer may be tempted to pay for an extra performance offered by the 
seller. 
Similar situation: the Program Manager might be tempted by 
the offer, but if he gets no funds for it, there is no such risk. 
• The buyer is forced to pay for an extra feature, device, service or special tool 
not included in the contract but that turns to be indispensable for the safe 
and/or effective operation of the system. 
Article 14.3 of the contract makes ALPHA responsible to 
provide, at no cost, all elements necessary for safe operation. The specifications for 
compliance were written in terms of effectiveness. Consequently, the risk associated was 
related to the quality of performance specifications. In this case, it means low risk, given by 
those specification not included in the contract. 
• The buyer is forced to pay for a good or service that seemed to be included 
in the contract, but was excluded by some tricky clause. The following are 
examples of those clauses: Force Majeure, Insurance, Taxes, Transportation, 
Storage or Supervision Expenses. 
The risk was high, given by the amplitude provided by Article 
8: "Force Majeure". It is also increased by the lack of control and insurance of the hardware 
from the reception in the factory until its loading in a ship. 
• The buyer is forced to renegotiate the price under pressure by the seller. 










A company owned by the government and committed in the 
same project for its own government will not go out of business for a difference in cost. 
Exogenous variables might have increased the cost through Article 3.2 (Price Adjustments). 
The risk for those variables was explicitly accepted by the Chilean Navy. As compared with 
the total cost and the chances of dramatic changes in the variables considered, the risk was 
moderate. At the same time, having price adjustments avoids the excuse of these factors to 
reopen price negotiations, where the contractor has nothing to lose. 
• The buyer is forced to spend extra money in travel, supervision or other 
expenses because of unexpected conditions. 
The cost of travel and supervision was insignificant when 
compared to the cost of the Project. There is no significant risk associated. 
• The seller refuses to pay late fees or other dues. 
The contract did not include a clear mechanism to make 
effective the late fees. The probability of having to charge late fees was high, as delays were 
expected. However, late fees can only reduce the procurement cost, thus improving the 
outcome from the point of view of cost risk. From the point of view of schedule risk, which 
is analyzed in the following section, the lack of this mechanism increased the risk. The 
structure of the contract created a trade of delay for cost. 
• The buyer is forced to spend money in legal battles with the seller or is 
forced to settle at a disadvantage. 
This  risk pertains  to  the   "unknown  unknowns"   area. 
Everything was provided to settle disputes before reaching legal battles. The chance of 
success in such case is so poor that the probability of expenditures for that reason should be 
low. But the difference in business references, language and ethical standards made the 
"unknowns" a real issue, affecting not only cost but also performance and schedule. 
Consequently, the possibility of legal battles can not be discarded. 
• Cost increases due to changes. 
Changes were not allowed in the contract unless a written 
amendment was signed. In that situation, if the Project Manager had no extra funds assigned, 
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he would not order changes that could increase the cost. Besides, since the system was 
specified in terms of performance, changes were not likely to be asked if the required 
performance was clearly stated. 
(d) Summary of Cost Risk: Cost risk was low, given the 
nature of the agreement (Fixed Price), the provisions of the contract and the commitment of 
ALPHA with its owner, the government. 
(2) Schedule Risk: Schedule risk is the combined effect of the 
probability of not having the system within the expected time, and the consequence ofthat 
delay. 
• Probability vs. Consequence: When assessing this risk, it is very important 
to differentiate between the probability and impact of an adverse outcome.25 
The probability of having a considerable slip on schedule was high, and the 
Project Manager was aware ofthat. A delay of two years was expected, and 
the impact of a delay up to three or four years was not considered important, 
given the strategic situation of the country. (See Chapter II, Strategic 
Environment) 
• Expected and Contracted Delivery: The Program Manager was conscious 
that the delivery would take up to two years longer than the agreed delivery 
schedule, so "expected delivery" means two years beyond the contract 
delivery schedule. 
• Incentives: The major consideration to set some reasonable incentive to limit 
the delay to acceptable terms was established in Article 9.1 (Termination for 
Delay), and Article 7 (Compensation for Delays). These incentives, however, 
had the weakness of being hard to enforce and not significant in dollar value. 
(In the worst case of delay, the total late fees would be less than two million 
dollars, 2% of the price). The Chilean Navy could not afford to terminate a 
contract unless the prospects for success were definitively low and a 
significant amount of money was attached to the delayed subsystems/units. 
However, under such circumstances, the Chilean Navy could use the Letter 
of Credit to recover the money, putting ALPHA in a very uncomfortable 
position. The following step would be selecting a different manufacturer to 
provide the terminated item, probably at a much higher price. 
25
 Equation 2.1 in Chapter II describes risk as the combined probability of an adverse 














• Concurrence: There was a high overlap between development and 
production, which was difficult to assess. The degree of advancement was 
not known before signing the contract. This situation increased schedule risk, 
but there were no means to avoid it given the lack of access of the Chilean 
Navy to ALPHA activities. Signing a first contract for development without 
a commitment for production had increased the cost risk to unmanageable 
levels, and multiple sourcing was not the solution to produce only three 
systems. 
• Summary of Schedule Risk: Although delays were expected and uncertain, 
schedule risk was low given the minor impact of a potential delay. That 
impact was balanced with the trade-off between cost and schedule resulting 
from the late fees mechanism and the reduction of debt for later charges 
associated to deliveries. 
(3)       Performance Risk: As mentioned in the case, ALPHA had its 
system in a development stage, having proven successfully a prototype. 
(a) Expected Results: The Project Manager expected that 
ALPHA was going to deliver the system with the alleged performance. During the 
exploration and negotiation process, the Project Manager approached Omega Navy to obtain 
accurate information about the degree of development of the system. His efforts were not 
successful; Omega Navy authorities demonstrated absolute loyalty to ALPHA, and denied 
any cooperation in that stage. 
Despite the lack of complete information, the Project Manager 
was confident in the capacity of ALPHA to deliver the system with adequate performance, 
although in more time than promised. In the interview conducted in October 1995, the 
Admiral who was then the Project Manager26 said that he never thought about a scenario of 
performance failure. If anything went wrong, he believed it could be solved with time. 
(b) Consequences of failure: This assumption made it 
reasonable that the eventual consequences of such a failure were not fully assessed. 
However, in the same interview, he said that if he had the chance to do it again, he would be 
less naive and more pessimistic in the design of scenarios for negotiation and contingency 
26
 Interviews are included in Appendix C 
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planning. He also mentioned that he would have described the final product more precisely. 
(c) Preparation for Failure: Time has shown that the 
predictions of the Project Manager were accurate. The system performed satisfactorily, but 
it was delivered long after the promised date. However, a more thorough risk analysis, 
stronger incentives and contingency plans for the eventual failure of ALPHA should have 
been considered. If a failure had occurred, the consequences would have been devastating, 
mainly because Project Kilo was not prepared for such event. 
(d) Summary of Performance Risk: It can be concluded 
that performance risk was higher than initially assessed, concentrated more on the 
consequences of a failure than on the uncertainty associated with it. 
(4) Summary of Procurement Risk: Considering the different 
components of risk, Project Kilo had an overall medium risk, with the worst potential 
outcome being the inability of ALPHA to deliver a major component of the system as 
specified. Such a circumstance could have caused the termination of the contract and the 
need to look for an alternate supplier and start the project again. The inclusion of a new 
contractor would have significantly increased the cost and schedule. Even worse, a failure 
could have resulted in the cancellation of the Project. Table 4.2 summarizes the procurement 
risk for Project Kilo in terms of the uncertainty of success and the consequences of failure. 
b.        Logistic Support Risk 
The risk of losing capabilities after the system is fielded because of lack of 
support is related to the characteristics of the system, the scope of the procurement, the 
customer base and the relationship with the contractor. 
This being a new and unique system, the dependence of the customer on the 
contractor is necessarily high. There are means to reduce this dependence through the 
inclusion of maintenance equipment, spare parts and knowledge with the system. When the 
procurement does not includes a significant number of units, such as in Project Kilo, 
transferring all the maintenance capability is too expensive, so an intermediate solution has 






Uncertainty Consequence Component 
Risk 
Cost Low Medium Low 
Schedule High Low Low 





Table 4.2 Procurement Risk 
Involving the users and maintainers early in the definition of the system and 
in the negotiation process would have helped to reduce logistic support risk. However, for 
reasons of secrecy, users were called only occasionally to provide inputs. The Project 
Manager had long experience as a user and maintainer himself, but it is hard to assess to 
what extent his compromised position made possible a fair advocacy for logistic support 
considerations. 
(1) Logistic Support Means Included in the Contract: The 
contract for Project Kilo established the following means related to logistic support: 
• Maintenance training for ship crews at ALPHA facilities 
• Installation of the system in Chilean Navy shipyards with supervision of 
ALPHA 
• Inclusion of test equipment and maintenance documentation into the 
deliverables of the contract 
• Obligation of ALPHA to provide spares parts for ten years at a reasonable 
price 
(2) Measures to Reduce Logistic Support Risk: Several 
contractual provisions are suggested in Chapter II to decrease logistic support risk. Here 
those measures are contrasted with the support means included in Project Kilo. 
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• Provide any spare parts needed for "x" years at reasonable prices. 
Article 12.1 of the contract included the obligation to provide spare 
parts at a reasonable cost for ten years after completion of the Factory Acceptance Test of 
the last system. 
• Provide the test equipment, special tools, software and all elements needed 
for maintenance and logistic support. 
All these elements were included in the description of the system, 
Article 2, of the contract. These included the test equipment necessary for depot 
maintenance. 
• Provide the training, supervision and technical support for in-house 
maintenance. 
Training and supervision were included in the contract. Technical 
support for further in-house maintenance was not mentioned. 
• Provide the documentation and technical data needed for maintenance, 
diagnosis and spare parts identification. 
Documentation and technical data were included, but specifications 
regarding the format and content were not enough to ensure their usefulness. 
• Provide the technical data required for upgrades or integration with other 
new systems. 
Data for integration was provided by the Chilean Navy, and ALPHA 
also provided their interface data. Upgrades were not considered. 
• Use international standards for parts, integration links or modules. 
There was no requirement for standard parts, and the detailed design 
was not accessible to the Chilean Navy. There was, however, an agreement about the 
standard for software and communications, both widely used in defense systems and familiar 
to Chilean Navy technicians. Higher involvement of Technical Authorities would have 
helped to encourage the use of standards for easy access to parts and increased 
maintainability. 
• Use commercially available parts and materials to certain extent. 










• Keep a network of technical assistance, part sales and authorized 
maintenance facilities within or close to the bases where the system is 
maintained, or in certain areas of operation. 
Maintenance and test equipment was purchased with the system, but 
no network was formally established to enhance or update those facilities in the future. 
• Ensure the availability of technical support, parts and services without 
restrictions by the seller (such as exclusive distribution channels) or its 
government (sanctions or embargoes). Otherwise, the capacity to perform in- 
house (or at least in the country) support must be acquired with the system. 
Given the particular characteristics of a missile system, it is highly 
unlikely that spare parts can be found in the general marketplace for all components. As 
such, the technical dependence on ALPHA was unavoidable. In house maintenance was 
considered in the equipment, training and installation of the systems. 
Political interference on technical or logistic support was not 
considered a problem, since Omega had demonstrated its reliability in that matter. 
• Use a language understandable for all parties involved, typically Spanish or 
English. 
The contract and all the documentation was written in English. 
(3) Influence of Chilean Navy in Design: The lack of influence 
of the Chilean Navy in the development process made not possible the adoption of other 
support risk reducing measures such as Form-Fit-Function or P3I design, or higher 
participation in the design by the Chilean Navy. 
However, there were exceptions to this situation. The Chilean Navy 
provided a significant amount of expertise in software design, having adequate control over 
the development and maintenance of software. The same was true for trajectory design, 
where ALPHA modified their specification when Chilean experts demonstrated that they 
could not meet the threat with the original design. 
(4) Customer Base: It was considered that having the Omega 
Navy as a costumer, ALPHA would have spare parts available at reasonable price. The 
contract established such an obligation, but there was no quantified method to establish fair 
price and conditions. The only possible reference would be Omega Navy. 
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(5) Summary of Logistic Support Risk: The success of logistic 
risk management is hard to evaluate at this point. The system is just going through harbor 
and sea trials, so there is not enough experience to judge the effectiveness of the measures 
taken to reduce this risk. From the information available, it can be said that the uncertainty 
about logistic support risk is moderate, and the impact of an eventual failure is high. 
Consequently, logistic support risk was high. 
c.        Political Risk 
When the project was initiated, the political risk was low because of the low 
uncertainty about political decisions and the relative autonomy of the Navy. However, as 
time passed, the political system evolved, civilians are now in power, and the chances of 
having the procurement budget questioned are increasing steadily. The extension of the 
delivery had the effect of exposing the project to controversy. 
The main question was how long it was going to take for the new political 
authorities to get into the budget, and how high was procurement in their priorities. The long 
tradition of respect for international agreements provide a certain tranquility.27 
On the part of the seller, there were also components of political risk. When 
the negotiations took place, Omega Navy had not formalized a contract with ALPHA for the 
procurement of the Kilo system. Chilean Navy negotiators were confident that this would 
happen, but Omega Navy refused to provide any information about the advance of the project 
nor about their commitment to it. Finally, Omega Navy signed the contract (after the 
Chilean Navy did the same), which lifted that component of risk. 
So far, most payments have been made, the equipment has been delivered to 
Chile, and the remaining work is going to be performed by Chilean Navy Shipyards. There 
is no political uncertainty anymore. 
The political risk was low because the high certainty about the commitment 
of resources through an international agreement, although a budget reduction could have had 
27
 Chile was the only country in the southern cone that went through the oil crisis and 
the debt crisis without defaulting any of its international obligations. 
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4. Contract Negotiation. 
The importance of the negotiation process cannot be overemphasized. This section 
analyzes how this process was handled by the negotiation team, composed by the Project 
Manager, his assistant, and the lawyer of the General Logistics Directorate. 
a. Tasks of the Negotiators 
In Chapter II twelve tasks were identified for the negotiators. In this section 
each one of them is explored and evaluated. 
• Develop a deep understanding of each other, its capabilities, constraints, 
priorities, values, language, culture, procedures, methods and any other 
circumstance that can affect the relationship within the parties. 
The culture barrier and lack of international expertise made it impossible to 
achieve   this   point    satisfactorily.    Negotiations    were    usually    complicated   by 
misunderstandings and need for clarifications, which made meetings long and tense. 
• Communicate mutual expectations in a way that both parties understand and 
agree upon. 
Expectations were communicated between the parties in most relevant areas. 
In the case of late delivery, the position of ALPHA communicated implicitly to the Chilean 
Navy that a delay would occur. The acceptance of the conditions by the Project Team 
communicated that some delay would not be a big issue. 
• Make sure that the promises cover all the requirements of both parties, not 
only about the goods or services, but also about how, when and where will 
they be delivered, what will be the future obligations after the delivery, what 
related support is required, what is included in the contract and what is not, 
and what criteria will be used to clarify unexpected doubts. 
This point is more controversial. There were imprecise specifications, 
insufficient time and means to revise test protocols, lack of clear mechanisms for late fees 
collection and vague statements for logistic support. The lack of experience, an appropriate 
technical staff, and expert legal advice made it very difficult to come up with a thorough and 
workable contract. However, the accomplishments were much better than it could be 












• Negotiate conditions that satisfy both parties and that are feasible for both. 
The contract as a whole was fairly reasonable. The commitment of ALPHA 
to a schedule that it was not able to fulfill was the only really problematic issue. 
• Explore all possible cases of non-fulfillment and design incentives or 
remedies to avoid such circumstances. 
This task was poorly handled. As mentioned in the interview with the Project 
Manager, the scenarios were generally optimistic. There were no provisions for a failure in 
performance or an unmanageable cost overrun, putting all the trust in the contractor.  In 
terms of delays, the possibility was acknowledged, but provisions for flexibility were not 
included. The financial dependence on the contractor made it impossible to include stronger 
enforcement measures or incentives. 
• Explore all possible cases of misunderstanding or misinterpretation, and 
design mechanisms to avoid or overcome such events. 
Considering  the   circumstances,   misunderstanding   risk  was  handled 
successfully. The multiple communication channels, openness for renegotiation and 
arbitration clauses provided effective means to deal with any misunderstanding. The situation 
could have been different if Project Managers had been more inflexible in dealing with 
ALPHA'S continuous changes in schedule, or if Navy authorities had not accepted further 
negotiations. The Navy could not afford a complete failure in this project, and ALPHA knew 
it. 
• Determine how the incentives or remedies will be enforced if necessary. 
Determine also other avenues that could be used by each party to ensure 
contract compliance. 
As mentioned before, enforcement was one of the weaknesses of the contract 
due to the particular circumstances at the time. However, the partial termination clause, the 
letter of credit in case of breach, and the pressure of keeping the image of ALPHA as a 
reliable supplier played in favor of the Chilean Navy. As mentioned by professor Mark 
Stone28 in his interview, fluid relationships are the best mechanism to make a contract work. 
28
 The interviews are included in Appendix C 
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• Determine the consequences of a termination for both parties in all 
significant phases of the contract, and ensure that it will always be more 
beneficial to solve the problems rather than terminate the contract. 
Clearly both parties discarded a priori any chance of termination because of 
the importance of the commitments involved. For any of the parties, termination would have 
been catastrophic, although clearly more for the Chilean Navy than for ALPHA.   The 
Chilean Navy had a letter of credit for the full amount of the contract, but it was in a bank 
in country Omega. 
• Relate the current contract with other current or potential commitments; 
determine how important is the contract for both parties relative to those 
other commitments. 
There were no other projects with potential value to move ALPHA to put an 
extra effort for the success of Project Kilo. The Chilean Navy could have used a project for 
the sole purpose of raising expectations, but there was an issue of future credibility behind 
that possibility. 
• Design mechanisms to introduce changes in the contract if agreed to by both 
parties. 
The contract was not as flexible as it should have been. Five amendments are 
a proof of this inflexibility. The willingness to renegotiate replaced, to some extent, contract 
flexibility, but renegotiations are not convenient for the buyer in a fixed price contract. 
• Specify the level of authority that the agents and principals had on both 
parties for the purpose of changes, renegotiation and problem solving. 
This was not a problem during the negotiation. Both sides were responsive 
about the agreements reached by the agents. 
• Determine the relative bargaining power of the parties throughout the 
negotiation process and during the performance of the contract. 
This is perhaps the most relevant part of a negotiation design. During the 
selection process, the bargaining power of the Chilean Navy was very strong due to the 
competition among six potential contractors. As the list was reduced to two (BLAST and 
ALPHA), the bargaining power was reduced. The lowest point was reached after the source 
selection, when ALPHA had been selected, and the contract was being negotiated along with 
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the financial agreement. The financial agreement was tied simultaneously to three other 
projects, which left a very low freedom of action. 
After signing the contract, the situation was more manageable. The Chilean 
Navy was willing to renegotiate the schedule when excessive delays were apparent, and 
ALPHA was willing to accept responsibilities and offer something in exchange, either more 
services, features or quantities. 
b.        Summary of Negotiation Process 
The negotiation process was conducted in the best way allowed by the 
existing circumstances and the means assigned by Navy authorities. To improve the result 
of the negotiation, the following measures should have been taken: 
• Before the end of the source selection, a contract draft should have been 
provided by each of the candidates, and the terms and conditions of those 
drafts included in the final selection. 
• A more complete negotiation team should have been assembled, including 
more technical expertise, business/legal expertise, financial management, and 
people proficient in the languages of all final candidates. Users, Technical 
Authorities and all other relevant actors should have been part of the team. 
• Risk analysis based on worse case scenario, simulations and contract games 
should have been conducted to train the team and explore possibilities in 
order to reduce the "unknown unknowns", or provide strategies to cope with 
them. 
• Financial dependence should have been reduced to a minimum, not beyond 
the upfront payment. Relating the cash flow to actual deliveries would have 
been a strong short term incentive. 
• Delivery and payments should have been tied to complete working systems 
rather than to independent sets of hardware that had not been integrated. 
• All performance test protocols should have been part of the contract and 
subjected to change if agreed to by both parties. 
• The contract should have been more flexible, allowing for different levels of 











• The possibility of a future project should have been explored more 
thoroughly, to create an extra contractual incentive for ALPHA. 
5. Non-contractual Means Used. 
The Navy and other services had a long term relationship with the Omega 
Government and with ALPHA. Without this relationship, no negotiation or contract would 
have been possible. Good relationships and communications between competent people is 
undoubtedly a strong mechanism to get things done. The careful selection of the program 
directors, project managers and plant representatives helped to keep these communication 
channels open despite the difficulties. The prestige of the contractor in the international 
weapons market was another strong incentive. An additional incentive can be the expectation 
of continuing business with the Chilean Government, a small but reliable customer. For 
reasons of secrecy and the lack of future projects of the magnitude of Kilo, neither of these 
two incentives were exploited as well they could have been. 
E.        MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT 
In this section, the results of the project, and the major factors affecting those results 
are summarized. The results are extracted from the information from the case as shown in 
Chapter III, and from the measures of success explained in Section D. 
1. Results 
The procurement of the Kilo Missile System was relatively successful. The Program 
Manager expected a delay of two years beyond the date specified by the contract to have the 
first system fielded. It took finally four years to reach to that point, but now the Navy has a 
leading edge missile system, obtained at a very low price. The trade-off effect between 
schedule and cost, and the lower than expected interest rate, resulted in a final cost 9% lower 
than expected, even lower than the cost specified in the optimistic scenario. The lower than 
expected risk made the extra delay beneficial for the Navy, as shown in the Tactical Value 
and Risk Model in Appendix B. The contractor has provided design improvements and 
extended services to the Chilean Navy, in compensation for the unexpected delays. Those 
improvements may extend the tactical obsolescence point for a period equivalent to the 
delivery delay. 
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The evaluation provided by the Tactical Value and Risk Model shows that the 
procurement resulted in a buyer's gain of 17%, lower than the expected 41%, mainly because 
of the reduction in risk of conflict since the date of the contract, and the reduction in total 
payments. In fact, if the original terms of the contract had been fulfilled the result would have 
been a buyer's loss of 20%. 
In addition, the Chilean Navy was lucky in the sense that the identified risks have not 
materialized so far. Particularly critical was the possibility of even further delays, that could 
have had a political impact, eroding the commitment of the Navy or the government. 
2. Major Factors of Success 
The following factors were judged to be the most significant contributors to the 
relative success of project Kilo. 
(a) Competence of the Main Actors. The complexity of the task required 
extremely competent and versatile people. The Navy has been wise to give high priority to 
professional education for a long time. That commitment allowed the Navy to have competent 
and well prepared officers to handle the project.29 
(b) Risk Assessment and Prediction of Outcomes. The Proj ect Manager 
predicted accurately the outcome of the project. Performance and cost, where risk were 
considered lowest, were not a problem. Schedule, where uncertainty was high although its 
impact was minor, was the only area where predictions were too optimistic. The Navy was 
prepared to take advantage of these delays, and it did to some extent with cost reductions. 
Although the analysis of this thesis shows that performance risk was 
underestimated, the experience and perspicacity of the initial project manager was proven 
right. This does not mean that a more thorough risk prevention effort would not have been 
highly beneficial. Had Omega Navy not committed itself to buy the Kilo system, the 
probability of a breach of contract had increased dramatically. 
(c) Absence of Political Risk Project Kilo enjoyed a permanent 
commitment within the Navy, and had no political interference. The Navy was consistently 
29' 
'TheProgram Director, Project Manager and Assistant Project Manager graduated 
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supporting the project, putting the best people on it, and assuring the budget for a long 
period. Without political risk, the Project Manager had more freedom of action to handle the 
project. The Omega political system did not interfere with the project, since its results were 
important to ALPHA, a state owned corporation, and to Omega Navy. 
(d) Predominance of Win- Win Criteria in Negotiations. Throughout the 
negotiation and renegotiation processes, solutions that were favorable for both parties were 
achieved. Direct confrontation and attempting to harm the other party as compensation for 
the difficulties caused by the delays could have destroyed the relationships between the 
parties. 
F.        LESSONS      LEARNED     AND     IMPLICATIONS      FOR     FUTURE 
PROCUREMENT 
1. Long Term Commitment to Education is Essential for Successful Project 
Management 
Weapon System procurement is a difficult and risky undertaking, one that requires 
the best people and support to be successful. The Chilean Navy's long term commitment to 
high level professional education in technology areas was a factor in the success of this 
project. Focusing efforts in negotiation and communication skills will improve not only 
project management capabilities, but also the ability to interact in a more complex strategic 
and political environment. 
2. Teams with Multiple Skills and Adequate Resources are Needed to 
Handle a Project 
Procurement Negotiation Teams with operational, technical, logistic, cost estimation, 
business, financial, and legal skills should be assembled for each project. To interact 
effectively, all team members need to understand the processes, needs, priorities, challenges 
and constraints of the Navy.  They also need time, space, money, access to information, 
cooperation from other Navy organizations, and authority in order to negotiate with better 
chances of success. 
86 





3. Long Term Commitment Make Big Projects Possible with Scarce 
Resources 
Budget stability and trust in long term decisions are crucial to make possible efficient 
procurements. The capacity to commit resources to a long term project allowed the Navy 
to purchase the Kilo weapon system. 
4. Participation of Relevant Actors Improves Decision Making and 
Communications 
Representatives from the fleet, technical authorities and operational experts could 
have been invited to provide input to the decision making and control process through 
regular committee sessions.   This activity would have improved lateral relationships, 
increased information availability and handling, and promoted a rich debate and comparison 
of choices. 
5. Risk  Analysis   and  Negotiation   Training  Improves   Procurement 
Negotiation Process 
Risk analysis using simulation, cost estimation, technological investigation and 
negotiation games shall be conducted to prepare the project teams for the negotiation 
process. The committee mentioned in the previous point should also participate in this 
activity. A core of people educated to conduct this training is necessary to keep procurement 
capacity in the future. 
6. Communications and Cooperation are Powerful Means to Improve 
Results and Reduce Risk 
Fluid communications, open relationships between the parties, and concern of the 
seller about its prestige and future business are very important non-contractual means to 
enhance the chances of success.    Having more early involvement of Chilean Navy 
technicians in the development activities of the system would have helped to improve 
relationships, get a better and more timely assessment of the difficulties, provide a better 





7. Experienced   and   Skillful  Teams   Can  Take  Best  Advantage  of 
Competitive Procurement 
Competition is the strongest incentive to obtain favorable proposals from potential 
suppliers. The difficult part is determining if the suppliers are able to deliver what they 
promise, and if their commitment will endure beyond the beauty of the initial proposals. 
This is where technical skills, cost estimation, business experience, risk analysis, legal 
expertise and, more than anything, experience, are needed to arrive at a sound source 
selection decision. 
8. Depending Financially on the Contractor is a Weakness and Should be 
Avoided 
Financial dependence is a weakness inherent to a country the size of Chile, and 
constitutes a complete area for management and risk analysis. This dependence should be 
reduced as much as possible, and isolated from the area of influence of the contractor. In 
Project Kilo, the financial agreement should have been used only to cover the upfront 
payment. 
9. Measurable Requirements are Necessary to Ensure Compliance 
System requirements should have been written in a testable and measurable fashion. 
Milestones and payments could have been tied to development accomplishments and 
delivery of integrated and tested systems rather than pieces of hardware. Performance test 
protocols should have been included in the contract. 
10. High Involvement and R&M Requirements Reduces Logistic Support 
Risk 
Logistic support risk could have been reduced with increased involvement, and with 
the inclusion of Reliability and Maintainability specifications, related to the equipment 
provided for test and maintenance, and the spares sold with the system. A long term 
verification of the accuracy of R&M performance and adequacy of the spares list could have 
been included, tied to some form of warranty or compliance clause. 
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11. Opportunities Found in Developing Projects can be Exploited with Extra 
Resources 
Slack resources in the form of money and expert personnel should have been assigned 
to the project to give it more freedom of action to take advantage of the opportunities 
provided by a weapon development effort. 
12. Defining   and   Preparing   for   Eventual   Failures   Reduces   Their 
Consequences 
Criteria for defining a failure situation and ways to exit the contract with the least 
possible harm should have been designed. Even the most promising ventures can be faced 
with failure, and defining early warnings and measures to reduce the consequences are 
necessary to prevent failure and reduce the associated risk. 
13. Negotiators that Look for Win-Win Conditions Have Better Chances for 
Success 
Negotiation for a contract and for the multiple events that appear after it can be an 
intense and frustrating effort.   Negotiators must contain their frustration and look for 
favorable conditions for both sides. This win-win effort requires ingenuity, flexibility and 
communication skills. 
14. Non Contractual Means are Powerful and Necessary Complements in 
Negotiations 
It is impossible to include all aspects of a procurement in a contract. The bargaining 
power of the parties to handle contingencies depends heavily on non contractual issues, such 
as the quality of the relationships, the concern of the contractor about its prestige and the 
prospects of further business. 
G.       SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IV 
This chapter contains the analysis of Project Kilo Procurement, as outlined in its first 
section. It identifies the challenges faced by the Project team and the way those challenges 
were met, using the theoretical tools explained in Chapter II. In the next chapter, the 







This chapter presents the conclusions derived from the different sections of the 
analysis. These conclusions are the synthesis of the complete experience of the procurement 
of the Kilo Missile System. They help to define the results of the project, explain why things 
happened, and what could have happened. 
The conclusions form the basis for the answers to the Research Questions included 
in Appendix D. They will also be reflected in the recommendations suggested in Chapter VI. 
B. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The procurement of the Kilo Missile system through a contract with ALPHA 
Industries presented complex challenges for the Chilean Navy. Without enough experience 
and expertise, and with an inadequate organization facing high risk, the Project team was 
able to achieve a successful procurement. 
The success of the project was due to the competence of the successive Project 
Managers and their teams, the consistent support from Navy authorities, the capacity to 
commit resources in the long term and the good relationship between ALPHA and Project 
Kilo. 
C. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
The following specific conclusions provide the details for the general conclusion 
stated in the previous point. They are derived from the analysis of the case: 
1. Major Challenges for the Project Kilo Team 
The major challenges faced by Project Kilo team members were: 
a. Acquiring an effective missile system without a technology base and limited 
resources, which forced the Navy to take the choice of a high risk immature 
system. 
b. Making decisions and negotiating with expert businessmen with different 
business references, language and ethical standards. Project team members 
had to perform these tasks without adequate guidance, support, experience 
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and expertise for successful completion, while being exposed to the high 
impact of a possible failure. 
c. The lack of resources, allowing ALPHA to take an advantaged position as 
contractor and lender. 
d. The incorporation of a new kind of technology with a structure that impedes 
technology transfer. 
2. Favorable Factors for the Project Team 
Some challenges that are usually present in procurements were not so for Project 
Kilo. Because of its magnitude and importance, the project enjoyed strong and consistent 
political support from the Navy, while avoiding high level interference. Because of this 
support, the Navy kept Project managers in the organization for a longer period of time than 
normal. 
3. Lack of External Expert Advice 
The secrecy of the project deprived the Navy from getting external expertise in the 
legal and international business areas. 
4. Organizational Limitations and Improvements 
The creation of Program Horizon improved the organization by providing full time 
dedication and better coordination. However, it failed to bring aboard the cooperation, 
experience and expertise of the Technical Directorates. 
5. Negotiation Position of the Parties 
By selling the Kilo system to the Chilean Navy, ALPHA and the Omega Navy would 
benefit from an external source of financing and a free test bed for its new weapon system. 
ALPHA knew that the Chilean Navy would suffer serious consequences from the termination 
of the contract. The leverage for the Chilean Navy was ALPHA'S prospect of a long term 
relationship with a loyal customer, and other potential customers. 
6. Cost and Schedule Risk 
Cost and schedule risks associated with the contract were low, given the structure of 
the contract and the strategic situation. The provisions of the contract created a tradeoff 
mechanism between schedule and cost: The longer the delay, the lower the cost.   Cost 
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savings were a high priority and made the schedule delays acceptable. 
7. Performance Risk 
Performance risk was high because Kilo was developmental system and the project 
lacked contingency plans for hardware failure. 
8. Logistic Support Risk. 
Logistic support risk was high. A strong Logistic Support system needed to be 
established since the Chilean Navy in-house capability for this system was inadequate. 
Involving the users, maintainers and technical authorities early in the definition of the system 
and in the negotiation process would have helped to reduce Logistic support risk. 
9. Political Risk. 
Political risk was low because the resources had been committed through an 
international agreement. On the seller's side, Omega had a good record of restraining 
political interference from its companies' businesses. If the Omega Navy had not committed 
itself to buy the Kilo system, the risk would have increased dramatically. 
10. Measures to Improve Contract Negotiation. 
Contract negotiation could have been improved by: 
Including contractual terms and conditions in the source selection. 
Having a comprehensive and expert negotiation team. 
Including all relevant actors in decision making. 
Assessing risks, defining worse case scenarios, and establishing contingency 
plans for failure. 
Ensuring participation of the Omega Navy before committing to a contract. 
Reducing the financial dependence to only to the upfront payment rather than 
the whole procurement. 
Relating outlays to concrete development achievements and deliveries of 
integrated working subsystems. 
Including performance test protocols in the contract and allowing for minor 
changes if agreed to by the parties. 
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• Exploring the possibility of a future project with ALPHA as an incentive. 
11. Project Results. 
The project was successful in providing a leading edge weapon system at low cost. 
The only poor result was the delay in system delivery, which had no negative consequences. 
Further delays, however, could have had a negative political impact. 
12. Factors of Success. 
A competent and committed Project team, a good prediction of the outcome, the lack 
of political risk, and good relationships were all essential elements to the success of the 
project. 
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This chapter contains the recommendations for future procurements, which are 
derived from the conclusions of Chapter V and the lessons learned presented in Chapter IV. 
They project the conclusions and lessons learned from the Kilo project to future weapon 
acquisition, policy making and Project Manager training. 
These recommendations are oriented primarily to the Chilean Navy, but they are also 
useful for the Chilean defense industry, defense contractors and other weapon system buyers, 
including the U.S. Armed Forces. 
B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations, if implemented, should improve the results of 
future procurement processes: 
1. Keep the Navy's Long Term Commitment to Education, and Extend it 
to Negotiation and Communication Skills 
The Navy's long term commitment to high level professional education in technology 
areas was a factor in the success of Project Kilo. In addition to the new and renovated efforts 
toward technology, education should be extended to negotiation and communication skills. 
Such efforts will improve not only project management capabilities, but also the ability to 
interact in a more complex strategic and political environment. 
2. Maintain the Capability to Put Together Teams with Multiple Skills 
Procurement Negotiation Teams with operational, technical, logistic, cost estimation, 
business, financial and legal skills are needed to handle a project. Some of those skills, like 
international business expertise, might not be available in the Navy. In such a case, expert 
advice should be obtained as a consulting service after the necessary security clearance 
process. 
Risk analysis using simulation, cost estimation, technological investigation and 
negotiation games are needed to train project teams for negotiation. To assemble and train 






in negotiation and contracting issues. Those skills should be included in the professional 
profile of officers that are going to be Project Managers. 
3. Ensure Long Term Budgetary Commitment to Make Big Projects 
Possible 
Budget stability and trust in long term decisions are crucial to make procurements 
possible and efficient. Few firms will be willing to deal with a government that cannot 
commit the necessary resources to finish a project. If a firm does so, it will charge a big 
premium for the associated risk. Navy authorities have to make their case if the political 
system restricts their ability to commit resources for long term projects. 
4. Involve all Relevant Actors in Decision Making 
The final user of the system, technical authorities and operational experts, should all 
provide their points of view in the decision making and control process through regular 
committee sessions. This involvement will improve information handling and reduce risks. 
5. Recognize the Power of Non-Contracting Means in Negotiations 
Although a contract is the cornerstone of the buyer-seller relationship, non 
contractual means are also important. Fluid communications, open relationships between the 
parties and concern of the seller about future business can be important means to enhance the 
commitment of the contractor. Continuing involvement and cooperation with the contractor 
are also ways to enhance the relationship with the contractor. It also helps to have timely and 
accurate information about the progress of the project. 
6. Be Wise and Cautious in the Use of Competition 
Competition is the strongest incentive to obtain favorable proposals from potential 
suppliers. The hard part of it is finding out if the offerors are willing and able to deliver what 
they promise. Technical skills, independent cost estimation, risk analysis, business 
experience, legal expertise and project experience are necessary to arrive at a sound source 
selection decision. 
7. Reduce Financial Dependence from the Contractor 
Weapon procurement made by small countries like Chile are usually financed with 
loans provided by the contractor or its government. These loans create a financial 
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dependence that weakens the position of the buyer, and requires careful management and risk 
analysis. This financial dependence should be reduced as much as possible, and isolated from 
the area of influence of the contractor. 
8. Write Measurable Requirements that Ensure Performance and 
Supportability 
System requirements have to been written in a testable and measurable fashion early 
in the negotiation, so that delivery can be established in a meaningful way. Performance test 
protocols should be included in contracts in accordance with the requirements. 
9. Consider High Involvement of Navy Personnel in Contractor Activities 
and Comprehensive R&M Requirements to Reduce Logistic Support 
Risk 
Logistic support risk can be reduced with   increased involvement, and with the 
inclusion of Reliability and Maintainability specifications. Those specifications may be 
associated with the following, among others: 
• Contractor's Technical Representative 
• Logistic Support Contract 
• Equipment provided for test and maintenance 
• Training and documentation 
• Spares sold with the system 
• Adequacy of spares list 
• Long term verification of R&M performance 
10. Provide Flexibility and Resources to Take Advantage of Development 
Opportunities 
Procurement projects have always some degree of uncertainly, which can be a factor 
of risk but also an opportunity for performance and logistic enhancement. Slack resources 
in the form of money and expert personnel should be assigned to the project manager. Those 
resources will give him more freedom of action to detect and take advantage of the 













11. Define Areas of Uncertainty and Prepare Contingency Plans for Possible 
Failures in Order to Reduce Risk 
Every project has risk, and consequently the possibility of failure. Criteria for 
identifying and defining a failure situation and ways to terminate the contract with the least 
possible harm must be designed. It is necessary to define early warnings and measures to 
reduce the consequences of failure. Those warnings and alleviating measures will help to 
reduce the risk of failure. 
12. Negotiate to Obtain Win-Win Conditions in Order to Have Better 
Chances for Long Term Success 
Negotiators must overcome the anxiety arising from the intensity of the negotiation 
process and look for favorable conditions for both sides. This win-win effort requires 
ingenuity, flexibility and communication skills. If a negotiator realizes that he has settled 
on unfavorable conditions, he will try to assign the losses to the other party at the first 
opportunity. This situation makes it impossible to keep good relationships. 
13. Conduct Further Research in the Areas of Weapon Procurement Risk, 
Negotiation and Project Management 
This thesis has shown how difficult it is to assess risk, considering the interrelation 
between the components of risk, the "unknown unknowns," and the relevance of individual 
actors in the outcome of a procurement project. The experience of other countries can 
provide some hints about how to manage risk. However, the challenges and constraints are 
specific for a country and time period. Additionally, the results obtained by some countries 
in terms of risk handling have not been always successful. Studies made for the Chilean 
Navy, using tools ranging from game theory and simulation to behavior science, can enhance 
the chance for success of future projects. 
14. Provide Better Training and Guidance to Project Managers 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, Project Managers for major procurements do so only 
once in their career, so there is little chance for previous experience building. The most 
relevant activities in a project occur at its beginning, when Project Managers are just 
learning. Systematic knowledge and expertise should be kept in the form of guidance 
documents, experience records, previous cost estimations, past performance records for 
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various contractors. Using that knowledge in formal training courses and have it available 
to the Project Manager should accelerate the learning process. 
15.      Promote Information Sharing with Local Defense Industry, Foreign 
Contractors and Foreign Government Officials 
Mutual understanding and cooperation are crucial for the success of the risky venture 
of weapon procurement.   Information   and experience gained by the Navy, like that 
contained in this thesis, should be shared with the other actors involved in the process. A 
shared base of knowledge will improve communications and understanding between the 
Navy and the other actors involved in procurement. 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF THE CONTRACT 
A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
For security reasons, the original contract cannot be disclosed. This summary is 
written for the purpose of this thesis and includes all the information needed for the analysis 
of contracting practices. Consequently, some technical details, dates and names have been 
omitted, modified or described in general terms. 
This contract was signed between the Chilean Navy and the firm "ALPHA "30, which 
would supply the Chilean Navy with all the equipment, documentation, training, supervision 
and support needed to install three missile systems type "KILO". "ALPHA" was an 
aeronautical manufacturer, owned by the government of country "OMEGA ". "ALPHA" 
itself was going to have a minor direct participation as a supplier. Most of the equipment and 
services were going to come from its subsidiaries: "ELECTRONICS", "MISSILES", and 
"TECHSERVICES". 
The contract was negotiated, designed and managed by the Project Manager for 
Project "Kilo"31, and signed by the General Director of Logistics. 
The installation on board was going to be performed by Navy Shipyards in Chile, 
under the supervision of ALPHA. Navy Shipyards had no contract with the Chilean Navy 
for this purpose. The work was included in the Five Year Ship Maintenance Plan, and the 
resources to deal with the Shipyard were assigned to Project "KILO". 
B. THE CONTRACT 
Definitions: 
Customer/Buyer: The Chilean Navy 
Seller/Vendor/: "OMEGA ALPHA AERONAUTICS, hereinunder 
ALPHA." 
30
 This and other names in this paragraph (which appear in italics) are used instead 
of the real ones throughout this thesis. 
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31
System: "Kilo" Mk 1 Missile System. 
Subsystems and Units: Parts of the System.(Description omitted.) 
Test Equipment: Missile Shore Test Equipment, Missile Simulator and 
Control System Test Equipment. 
Equipment: System and test equipment. 
Ships: The three ships in which the system is to be installed. 
NPRO: Navy representative in country OMEGA for this 
contract. 
EDC: Effective date of the contract. 
Agreement: 
Whereas ALPHA and its subsidiaries are developing the Kilo Mk 1 missile system 
for the Government of country OMEGA and the Chilean Navy seeks to purchase 
from ALPHA, and ALPHA has agreed to sell to the Chilean Navy the Kilo Mk 1 
missile system, as well as documentation, test equipment, technical assistance, 
supervision and training the parties hereto has agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 OBJECT OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
ALPHA undertakes to sell and deliver to the Chilean Navy and the Chilean Navy 
undertakes to purchase, receive and pay for the Equipment, Documentation and 
Services detailed in Article 2, in accordance with the terms, price, conditions and 
procedures set forth in this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EQUIPMENT. DOCI MENTATION AND 
SERVICES. 
2.1 Three Kilo Mk 1 missile systems, composed by: 
Radars, Control Systems, Launchers, Missiles, Test Equipment, Training for 
operation and maintenance, Documentation, Supervision for installation performed 
by the Chilean Navy and Setting to Work performed by ALPHA. (Details omitted) 
2.2 Technical specifications for the system, subsystems and units, hereto and herein "the 
equipment" are included in exhibit "2A" (Omitted). 
Manufacturing, assembly, inspection, quality control, training and documentation 
will be performed under the same standards and practices applied by ALPHA in the 
manufacturing, assembly, training and documentation of the same or similar 
equipment for the Navy of country OMEGA. 
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2.3 Kilo Mk 1 missile system is a stand alone system and operates in an integrated and 
automated manner. It does not require external sensors or input data other than those 
listed in exhibit "2B" (Omitted) 
ARTICLE 3 PRICES32 
3.1 In consideration for ALPHA'S undertaking under this contract, except where a 
separate consideration is otherwise provided for, the Chilean Navy shall pay ALPHA 
for the equipment as described in Article 2 as follows: 
3.1.1 Control Systems: 
For each one of the systems: US$ 26,396,000 
Total for the three systems: US$79.188.000 
3.1.2 Missiles: 
For each missile: US$    216,000 
Total for 72 missiles US$ 15.552.000 
3.1.3 Simulators: 
For each simulator: US$   100,000 
Total for three simulators: US$   300.000 
3.1.4 Launchers: 
For each launching system US$     422,000 
Total for three systems US$ 1.266.000 
US$ 3.564.000 





 Prices and quantities have been changed for security reasons. 
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3.1.4 Test Equipment: 
Total for test equipment 
3.1.5 Training: 
Total for training 
3.1.6 Documentation: 
Total for documentation 
3.1.6 Supervision Services 






  79, ,










Note: All prices for the equipment are Ex-Factory prices. 
3.2 In addition to the Total Consideration, the Chilean Navy shall pay to ALPHA price 
adjustments in accordance with the price adjustment formula set forth in exhibit "3 A" 
hereto. 
It is agreed that the price adjustment on any item of Equipment which is delayed as 
defined in Article 7 will be frozen on the date at the end of the period of grace as 
defined in said Article 7. 
3.3 For a period of one year after EDC, the Chilean Navy shall have the option to place 
an order for additional Equipment at the unit prices set under Sub-Article 3.1 above, 
as adjusted under the price adjustment formula herein. 
The times for payment and delivery schedule, as well as any additional service (such 
as interfacing) will be as separately negotiated by the Parties. 
All of other terms and conditions of this agreement relating to Delivery and the 
Equipment (i.e., Article 2, 6-10, 13, 15-22 and 24) shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
such order. 
ARTICLE 4 TERMS OF PAYMENT AND FINANCING 
4.1       Terms of Payment 
4.1.1 Sixty percent of the total consideration set forth in article 3.1 above i.e. the sum of 
US$ 61,863,600 shall be paid by the Chilean Navy to ALPHA as follows: 
(a) Five percent (5%) of the Total Consideration i.e., 
US$ 5,155,300, as a non-refundable deposit upon the Effective Date of this 
Contract; 
(b) Nine percent (9$) of the Total Consideration i.e. 
US$ 9,279,540 , within 12 months of the Effective Date; 
(c) Twenty-one percent (21%) of the Total Consideration i.e., US$ 21,652,260, 
within 24 months of the Effective Date; 
(d) Eighteen percent (18%) of the Total Consideration e.L, US$ 18,559,080 , 
within 30 months of the Effective Date; 
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(e)       Seven percent (7%) of the Total Consideration i.e., 
US$ 7,217,420 , within 36 months of the Effective Date; 
4.1.2 The balance of the forty percent of the Total Consideration set forth in Article 3.1 
above, e.L, the sum of US$ 41,242,400 , shall be paid by the Chilean Navy to 
ALPHA as follows: 
(a) The balance of the 40% of the price of each Subsystems/Unit (other than Kilo 
Mk 1 missiles and Test Equipment) shall be paid as follows: 
(1) 30% upon Delivery of said Subsystem or Unit. 
(2) 5% upon completion of the Harbour Acceptance Tests defined on the 
SOW on the ship containing said Subsystem or Unit. 
(3) The remaining 5% upon completion of the Sea Acceptance Tests 
defined in the SOW on the ship containing said Subsystem or Unit. 
(b) The remaining 40% of the price of each Kilo Mk 1 missile upon delivery of 
said missile. 
(c) The remaining 40% of the price of the Test Equipment shall be paid as 
follows: 
(1) 30% upon delivery of said Test Equipment. 
(2) 10% upon completion of the Harbour Acceptance Tests as defined on 
the SOW on the first ship containing the System. 
(d) The remaining 40% of the price of the Training shall be paid as follows: 
(1) 30% upon the commencement of the first Training course. 
(2) 10% upon completion of the last Training course. 
(e) The remaining 40% of the price of the Documentation shall be paid as 
follows: 
(1) 30% upon the commencement of the delivery of the Documentation. 
(2) 10% upon completion of the delivery of the Documentation. 
(f) The remaining 40% of the price of the Supervision services shall be paid as 
follows: 
(1) 30% upon completion of the Sea Acceptance Tests of the first ship. 
(2) 10% upon completion of the Sea Acceptance Tests as defined on the 








Note: In the event that Factory, Harbor or Sea Test or Inspection of the second or third ship 
is postponed (not due to fault of ALPHA), for a period greater than 90 days, the 
Chilean Navy shall pay to ALPHA the payments as set forth in 4.1.2(a)(2); 
4.1.2(a)(3) and 4.1.2(f)(2). 
These payments shall be due 90 days after the dates defined in the Test 
Detailed Program provided in exhibit "4A"(Omitted). 
4.2. Amount due in respect of price adjustment under Article 3.2, shall be paid by the 
Chilean Navy together with the respective payment of the Total Consideration to 
which such price adjustment relates. ALPHA shall forward to the Chilean Navy its 
invoice for each payment due hereunder prior to the applicable payment date. 
4.3. Financing : The total amount payable under Article 4.1.1 (a) to (e) and 4.1.2 (a) to 
(f) above (e.i., US$ 103,106,000)as well as the amounts payable for price 
adjustments under 4.2 above shall be financed in accordance with the finance 
agreement entered into between the Chilean Navy and ALPHA. 
4.4 All payments hereunder shall be effected in net, freely transferable United States of 
America Dollars, free of any income, withholding or other taxes (other than 
ALPHA'S income taxes), levies, duties or assessments which may be imposed by any 
government or governmental body or authority. 
ARTICLE 5 DELIVERY AND PROGRAM SCHEDULE 
5.1 The Program Schedule shall be as set forth in detail in exhibit "5A" hereto with 
Sellers first significant program milestone being presentation for FAT of the first 
KILO Mk 1 Weapon System at 36 months after the EDC. 
5.2 The Delivery due dates will be determined as follows: 
For the equipment: Upon signature of the respective Certificate of Acceptance. 
For Miscellaneous Installation Material: Upon shipment. 
For Documentation:   Upon signature of the applicable Certificate for the 
Documentation delivered. 
For Training: Upon signature of the Certificate of Completion of Training. 
For Supervision and Technical Support Services: Upon completion of said tasks. 
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5.3 Delivery Summary: In exhibit "5A". 
5.4 ALPHA may make partial deliveries within lots for purposes of this Article 5 and 
Article 4 above. 
ARTICLE 6 ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 
6.1 OBJECT 
The object of the Acceptance/Inspection tests are to verify ALPHA'S compliance 
with the technical specifications of the Equipment. There will be three types of tests: 
- Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) / Inspection. 
- Harbour Acceptance Test (HAT) for first ship. 
- Sea Acceptance Test (SAT) for first ship. 
The HAT and SAT for the remaining two ships shall be performed by the Chilean 
Navy with the supervision of ALPHA. 
6.2 Factory Acceptance Test and Inspection 
6.2.1 Upon completion of the manufacture and assembly of a Subsystem (or Unit thereof) 
of the Equipment (except for the miscellaneous installation equipment), ALPHA 
shall present that Subsystem or Unit for FAT at ALPHA or its subcontractors plants 
in country OMEGA. 
The FAT procedures, as well as general description and the technical characteristics 
(mechanical or electrical) of the Equipment to be tested, shall be provided by 
ALPHA to the Chilean Navy not later than 6 months before the delivery due date 
specified in Article 5 above for the first of each Subsystem/Unit of said Equipment. 
The Chilean Navy shall provide to ALPHA its comments within 2 months following 
receipt of said procedures. 
Should ALPHA and the Government fail to agree in the FAT procedures, then the 
parties shall submit the dispute issue to technical arbitration in accordance with Sub- 
Article 13.3. 
6.2.2 ALPHA shall give the Chilean Navy 20 days prior notice in writing of the date and 
place for the presentation of each Subsystem/Unit for FAT in order to enable the 
Chilean Navy to dispatch its NPRO to observe the FAT, and ALPHA undertakes to 
present that subsystem/Unit for FAT and to commence the FAT on the date specified 











6.2.3 Upon satisfactory completion of the FAT, ALPHA or its subcontractor shall sign, 
together with the NPRO present, if any, a Certificate of Acceptance confirming that 
the Subsystem/Unit has satisfactorily passed the FAT, thereby testifying that such 
Subsystem/Unit has been delivered and accepted by the Chilean Navy. 
6.2.4 It is hereby agreed by the parties that, should the Chilean Navy notify ALPHA in 
writing that the Chilean Navy shall not exercise its right to observe any FAT, or 
should the NPRO fail to be present at the FAT on the date specified or within 10 days 
thereafter, through no fault of ALPHA, the sole signature of the Certificate of 
Acceptance by ALPHA shall be conclusive evidence that the Subsystem/Unit has 
satisfactorily passed the FAT and was delivered and accepted by the Chilean Navy. 
In such case, ALPHA shall forward to the Chilean Navy a copy of the Certificate of 
Acceptance. 
6.2.5 The miscellaneous installation material (MIM) shall be presented for Inspection 
pursuant to ALPHA'S subcontractor's standard procedures for Inspection. Upon 
satisfactory completion of Inspection in respect of a MIM set, ALPHA shall issue an 
"Inspection Certificate" confirming that the MIM has passed the Inspection, thereby 
testifying that such MIM has been delivered to and accepted by the Chilean Navy. 
6.2.6 Upon signature of the Certificate of Acceptance/ Certificate of Inspection in 
accordance with the provisions of 6.2.3, 6.2.4 or 6.2.5 above, title and risk of loss of 
the respective Subsystem/Unit shall pass to the Chilean Navy (hereinafter 
"Delivery"). 
6.2.7 The cost of performing the FAT and Inspections in country OMEGA shall be borne 
by ALPHA. Should any Subsystem or Unit of the Equipment fail its FAT or 
Inspection, ALPHA will conduct repeat FAT or Inspection at ALPHA'S expense. 
The cost and expenses of the NPRO participating in the FAT shall be borne by the 
Chilean Navy. 
6.3       Harbour Acceptance Tests f"HAT"^ and Sea Acceptance Tests ("SAT") 
6.3.1 ALPHA will forward to the Chilean Navy, 6 months prior to the start of the HAT of 
the first ship, the procedures for the HAT and SAT. The Chilean Navy shall forward 
to ALPHA its comments within 2 months of following receipt of said procedures. 
Should ALPHA and the Chilean Navy fail to agree on the said procedures, then the 
Parties shall submit the dispute issue to technical arbitration in accordance with Sub- 
Article 13.3. 
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6.3.2 It is agreed by the Parties that should repeat HAT or SAT be require, then each Party 
shall, at its own expense, perform its respective tasks and furnish the equipment, 
manpower, facilities and services necessary for such repeat tests. Each Party further 
agree not to claim any compensation from the Party causing such repeat tests. 
6.3.3 Upon satisfactory completion of the HAT and SAT respectively ALPHA shall sign 
together with the Chilean Navy representative a Certificate of HAT completion and 
SAT completion in the form set out in hereto (hereinafter "Certificate of 
Acceptance"). 
ARTICLE 7. COMPENSATION FOR DELAYS 
Should ALPHA fail, other than for reasons set forth in Article 8 below, to Deliver 
any Subsystem/Unit of the Equipment on the date specified in Sub-Article 5.3. 
above, ALPHA shall pay to the Chilean Navy, as and for liquidated damages 
(whether in the contract or law) suffered by the Chilean Navy, for the delay in 
Delivery of such Subsystem/Unit, a sum calculated at the rate of 0.5% of the price 
of the Subsystem/Unit so delayed per month of delay beyond a grace period of: 
(i)        For lot No.l under Sub-Article 5.3, 120 days. 
(ii)       For other lots under Sub-Article 5.3, 90 days up to a maximum of 6% of the 
price on any such delayed Subsystem/Unit. 
ARTICLE 8. FORCE MAJEURE 
8.1 ALPHA shall not be held responsible for any delay or failure in the performance of 
its obligations under this Agreement, when the delay or failure arises from a cause 
which is beyond the control of ALPHA or which arises without ALPHA'S fault or 
negligence and affects the execution of this Agreement. 
8.2 The causes referred to in Par. 8.1 include, but are not limited to, any one of the 
following: 
Acts of God, fortuitous cases, war or state of war, insurrections, riots, any act of 
government (including such act which concerns any type of priorities, assignments 
or social disorders), accidents, fire, explosion, inundations, natural violent 
phenomena, catastrophes, epidemics, quarantine, meteorological condition which do 
not allow the execution of the tests or other obligations hereunder. 
8.3 An event under 8.2 affecting the ALPHA subcontractors of any tier will be deemed 












8.4 ALPHA shall inform the Chilean Navy within 3 0 days from the day such case occurs 
and ALPHA becomes aware of the same, describing the antecedents on which it 
bases its claim and indicating the known effects of the case on the Contract 
execution. 
8.5 The Party affected by the Force Majeure will do everything possible to minimize the 
delays and continue to carry-out the Contract until the elimination of the cause of the 
delay. 
ARTICLE 9. TERMINATION 
9.1 Should a delay in delivery of any Subsystem/Unit of the Equipment exceed twelve 
months beyond the grace period under Article 7 above (for reasons other than Force 
Majeure), the Chilean Navy shall have the right, in respect of such Subsystem/Unit 
which ALPHA has failed to deliver, to notify ALPHA of the cancellation of the 
purchase of said Subsystem/Unit under this Agreement, in which event ALPHA 
shall, as the Chilean Navy sole remedy, return to the Chilean Navy all of the 
amounts paid in respect of said Subsystem/Unit.) as escalated in accordance with 
Exhibit "3 A" hereto to the date of payment by ALPHA. 
9.2 Should, as a result of a Force Majeure affecting ALPHA, a delay in Delivery for any 
Subsystem/Unit of equipment exceed 12 months beyond the grace period under 
Article 7 above, the Chilean Navy shall have the right, in respect of that 
Subsystem/Unit that ALPHA has failed to deliver, to notify ALPHA of the 
cancellation of the purchase of said Subsystem/Unit under this Agreement, in which 
event, the Chilean Navy shall be required to pay to ALPHA an amount equal to 
ALPHA actual costs expended, incurred or committed in connection with such 
cancelled Subsystem/Unit. Should the Parties fail to agree on the amounts of said 
actual costs of ALPHA, the issue in dispute may be submitted for resolution to 
arbitration under Sub-Article 13.2 below. 
ARTICLE 10 WARRANTY 
10.0 ALPHA thereby warrants that, at the time of Delivery, the Equipment will be free 
from defects in materials and workmanship. 
10.2 With respect to each item of Equipment sold hereunder, ALPHA shall repair or 
replace, at ALPHA premises in country OMEGA any defective part(s) of the item 
which is/are demonstrated to ALPHA satisfaction to have been defective at Delivery, 
provided that: 
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10.2.1 In respect of the System, (except missiles), such defect in material and workmanship 
is discovered within 18 months from completion of FAT or 1 year after completion 
of HAT whichever comes earlier; and 
10.2.2 In respect of Test Equipment, and KILO mk 1 Missiles, such defect in material and 
workmanship is discovered within 18 months of delivery of the same; and 
10.2.3 The Chilean Navy gives ALPHA written notice within 30 days of the discovery of 
such defect and within the limit as aforesaid; and 
10.2.4 In respect of the KILO Mk 1 missile, the missile has not been fired. 
10.3 ALPHA shall have no obligation unless the item and/or the defective part(s), as the 
case may be, has/have been installed, operated, handled, maintained, stored and 
repaired in accordance with the current recommendations of ALPHA as stated in its 
manuals and/or other written instructions, and provided that said item and/or 
defective part(s) has/have not been subject to accident, abuse, misuse or 
misapplication. 
10.4 At ALPHA'S request, the Chilean Navy will ship the defective part(s) to a location 
designated by ALPHA; it being understood that the Chilean Navy shall bear the 
shipping costs for defective part(s) to country OMEGA and ALPHA shall pay for the 
return shipping cost to Chile of the repaired or replaced part(s) which qualify for 
warranty repair/replacement hereunder. Any part which is replaced will become 
property of ALPHA. The provisions of this Warranty shall apply to the replacement 
repaired part(s) for the unexpired portion, if any, of the applicable time period set 
forth in 10.2 above. Life limited items shall be warranted on a pro-rata credit basis. 
10.5 ALPHA warrant that the Documentation shall be complete and up-to-date to the time 
of Delivery. ALPHA shall, during a period of 12 months from Delivery of any 
Documentation, correct or complete such Documentation if it does not conform to 
the above warranty. 
10.6 THIS WARRANTY IS EXHAUSTIVE AND EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF ALL 
OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 
EXCLUDED. ALPHA SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES AND/OR LOSSES AND THE EXTENT OF ALPHA'S LIABILITY 
SHALL NOT EXCEED THE COST OF REPAIRING OR REPLACING (AT 















ARTICLE 11 DOCUMENTATION 
11.1 ALPHA undertakes to supply to the Chilean Navy the documentation at the times set 
forth in exhibit "5A", as follows: 
Operator Manuals 
Technical Manuals including: 
- Technical Description 
- Diagrams 
- Maintenance Manuals 
- Parts Catalogues 
Test Equipment Manuals 
11.2 In addition to the documentation set forth in 11.1 above, ALPHA will supply 
software documentation at the times set forth in exhibit "5A". 
11.3 In addition to the documentation set forth in 11.1 and 11.2 above is herein referred 
as the "Documentation". The Documentation shall be in English language. 
11.4 Upon delivery by ALPHA to the Chilean Navy of the first set of any Documentation, 
the Chilean Navy shall sign and deliver to ALPHA a certificate of commencement 
of Documentation Delivery (hereinafter referred as to "Certificate of Commencement 
of Documentation Delivery"). Upon delivery by ALPHA to the Chilean Navy of 
additional Documentation (but not the final Documentation), the Chilean Navy shall 
sign and deliver to ALPHA a "Certificate of Receipt of Documentation". 
11.5 Upon delivery by ALPHA to the Chilean Navy of the last of the Documentation, the 
Government shall sign and deliver to ALPHA a "Certificate of Receipt of Entire 
Documentation". 
11.6 ALPHA undertakes to provide the change pages to the Documentation supplied 
under this contract to accommodate the modification(s) as stated in Article 14. 
11.7 The Documentation is given solely for the installation, operation, maintenance and 
repair of the Equipment by or for the Chilean Navy, and rights of manufacture or 
otherwise are not granted hereunder. 
11.8 All the Documentation shall be in English Language, and in the format set forth in 





ARTICLE 12 SPARE PARTS. TRAINING. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND 
OTHER SUPPORT 
12.1 SPARE PARTS 
12.1.1 ALPHA will provide to the Chilean Navy, within 10 months of the EDC, a list of 
spare parts for the KILO Mk 1 Weapon System. Said list shall list will be divided 
into on-board and depot spares and shall detail the manufacturers part number, 
NATO/Federal Stock number (if available to the seller) prices recommended 
quantities for a two year period of Equipment operation, which shall have aggregated 
price, based on accepted standards, of approximately 10% the price of the Equipment 
ordered hereunder. ALPHA shall, in the preparation of the list, take into account its 
experience in manufacturing naval systems, the maintenance concept and the 
operational profile of the equipment (to be provided by the Chilean Navy 6 months 
after the EDC). 
12.1.2 ALPHA undertakes, for a minimum period of 10 years from the date of completion 
of the FAT on the last System, to supply to the Chilean Navy Equipment spare parts 
at prices and upon other conditions to be mutually agreed upon by the Parties. Such 
prices must be fair and reasonable taking into account quantities, lead time, terms of 
payment, etc. 
12.1.3 Those Spare Parts that require programming or software loading will be supplied 
with such programming or software loading, after been tested by ALPHA. 
12.2 TRAINING 
12.2.1 ALPHA shall provide the Chilean Navy, in country OMEGA and in Chile, with 
training courses for the Chilean Navy's personnel. All courses will be in English 
language. 
12.2.2 A detailed description of the aforementioned training courses, the commencement 
dates and duration thereof, and the number and qualification of the trainees 
designated by the Chilean Navy to participate therein, are set forth in exhibit " 12 A" 
(Omitted) attached hereto. 
12.2.3 Upon commencement by ALPHA of the first course of the Training, the Chilean 
Navy shall sign and deliver to ALPHA a "Certificate of Commencement of 
Training". 
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12.2.4 Upon completion of the last training course, the CHILEAN Navy shall sign and 
deliver to ALPHA a Certificate of Completion of Training. 
12.2.5 All expenses and costs of the Chilean Navy's trainees in country OMEGA, including 
but not limited to salaries, travel and transportation expenses, per diem, living 
expenses, and social security, medical and other insurance costs, shall be borne by 
the Chilean Navy. 
12.2.6 All expenses and costs of ALPHA'S instructors in Chile, included to salaries, travel 
and transportation expenses, per diem, living expenses, and social security, medical 
and other insurance costs, shall be borne by ALPHA. 
12.2.7 If requested by the Government, ALPHA shall provide to the Chilean Navy, at prices 
and upon terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon by the Parties, the 
following additional support. 
(i)        Extension of training courses and/or additional training courses for 
the engineers and/or technicians of the Chilean Navy. 
(i)        Additional   technical   assistance   in   respect   of the   operation, 
maintenance and support of the Equipment purchased hereunder. 
12.3 SHIP SURVEY. ICIT. AND TEST EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION TASKS 
12.3.1 Ship Survey and ICIT (Installation. Check-out. Integration and Test). 
(1) ALPHA and the Chilean Navy shall perform the survey of the ships and the 
ICIT, including HAT and SAT of the KILO Mk 1 Weapon System on board 
the three ships selected for that purpose, all as set forth in the Statement of 
Work attached hereto as Exhibit "12B" (the "SOW"). 
(2) The Chilean Navy and ALPHA undertake to carry out their respective tasks, 
as set forth in Exhibit "12B" and the Program Schedule as established 
thereunder. 
(3) Upon completion by ALPHA of its tasks in respect of the ICIT of each ship, 
ALPHA shall sign and deliver a "Certificate of Completion of ICIT Task". 
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12.3.2 Test Equipment Installation Tasks 
(1) ALPHA and the Chilean Navy shall at the times specified in the Program 
Schedule perform the tasks as described in the SOW for the installation and 
check out of the KILO Mk 1 Missile Test Equipment. 
(2) Upon completion by ALPHA of its tasks in respect of the KILO Mk 1 
Missile Test Equipment, ALPHA shall sign and deliver to the Chilean Navy 
a "Certificate of Completion of KILO Mk 1 Missile Test System Tasks". 
12.3.3 Chilean Navy Support and General 
(1) In order to enable ALPHA to perform properly its undertakings under 12.3.1 
and 12.3.2 above, the Chilean Navy undertakes, upon ALPHA'S request, and 
at no charge to ALPHA, 
(a) To provide the necessary work permits, entry and residents visas 
(including for members of their families) and security clearances for 
all the ALPHA and its subcontractor's personnel in order to enable 
said personnel to commence their work on time and to continue such 
work for as long as required; 
(b) To provide suitable manpower, equipment, tools and facilities as 
described in the SOW, in order to assist and support ALPHA in the 
performance of its obligations and undertakings under this Article; 
provided that none such Chilean Navy supplied manpower shall for 
any reason be deemed employees, agents or contractors of ALPHA. 
(c) To provide ALPHA with office accommodations, telephone (local 
calls only), and telex services. 
(d) To cause to be issued all of the necessary exemptions and/or permits 
and/or other documents required in order to exempt the said ALPHA 
and its subcontractor's personnel from any and all Chilean income 
and other taxes (federal, state and municipal); and 
(e) To make its best efforts to provide ALPHA with all such other 
assistance as shall be required by ALPHA for its performance 
hereunder. 
(2) Except as stated in (2) (a) below, all travel and transportation costs, living 
expenses, per diem, salaries, medical expenses and insurance of said 







(a) In the event that any ALPHA/subcontractor personnel hereunder is 
required, in order to render services pursuant to this Agreement: 
(i) If the person must travel within different cities within Chile 
out of his/her city of residence, the Chilean Navy shall 
provide, at no charge to ALPHA, airline tickets or other 
suitable means of transportation, as well as lodging, food and 
reasonable travel expenses for the duration of his/her travel. 
It is understood that ALPHA will determine the original place 
of residence of the personnel in consultation with the Chilean 
Navy. 
(ii) To change his town of residence within Chile, the Chilean 
Navy shall provide him/her, at no charge for ALPHA, with 
airline tickets or other suitable means of transportation to 
such new place of residence, and the Chilean Navy shall 
reimburse ALPHA for all dislocation and relocation costs 
(inclusive of the costs of transporting personal effects and 
cancelling of housing leases, if applicable). 
(b) The living expenses and dislocation/relocation expenses referred to 
in (2) (a) above shall be paid by the Chilean Navy to ALPHA within 
30 days of the Chilean Navy's receipt off the invoice therefor. 
12.3.4 It is understood and agreed that each of ALPHA subcontractor personnel: 
(a) Shall not be obliged to work more than 8 hours per day on Monday 
through Friday inclusive; and 
(b) Shall not work on Saturdays, Sundays and on OMEGA's national 
holidays. 
12.3.5 The Chilean Navy undertakes to use its best efforts to facilitate the removal by 
ALPHA from Chile of all ALPHA and its subcontractors owned equipment utilized 






ARTICLE 13 ARBITRATION 
13.1 The parties shall endeavor to settle in a direct and friendly manner any difficulty, 
controversy, or lack of agreement which may arise in connection with this 
Agreement. 
13.2 Subject to 13.3 below, if said difficulties cannot be settled in said manner, they shall 
at the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration in front of two arbitrators, one 
selected by ALPHA, and the other by the Chilean Navy (provided said individuals 
shall have necessary security clearance). If the arbitrators can not reach a decision 
due to lack of agreement, they will by mutual agreement select a third arbitrator who 
will resolve only the issues in dispute. The arbitration will be administered in 
accordance with the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the International 
Chamber of Commerce and will be held at a location agreed upon by the arbitrators 
(or if they do not agree, in Geneva Switzerland). 
The arbitration will be held in the English language. The arbitrator's decision shall 
be final and binding on the Parties hereto. 
13.3 In the technical matters set forth in the Articles 6.2 and 6.3 which are in dispute 
between the Parties, ALPHA agrees that such disputes shall be referred to for 
decision to a technical arbitrator appointed by the Commander of the OMEGA Navy. 
ARTICLE 14 KILO MK 1 WEAPON SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND 
TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS 
14.1     Technical specifications 
14.1.1 The prices appearing in this Agreement are for the supply of the Equipment, services 
and Training according to the Technical Specifications attached to this Agreement 
which are defined as on the date of the signature of this Agreement. The changes (if 
any) resulting from the development tests as well as from the sea tests planned for 
July 19N2 (precise date omitted), in order to meet the specifications herein, shall be 
introduced at no cost to the Chilean Navy. 
14.1.2 ALPHA undertakes, subject to the Defense Authority (DA) of country OMEGA 
approval, to notify the Chilean Navy of the modifications that have been introduced 
to equipment identical to the Equipment supplied under this Agreement and make 
available to the Chilean Navy (if and when the Chilean Navy requests, at terms and 
conditions to be agreed upon and subject to DA approval), the parts and the services 
necessary to introduce the said modifications to the Equipment. 
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14.1.3 ALPHA undertakes to include without any additional cost to the Chilean Navy 
modifications which according to ALPHA will be necessary for safety reasons. 
14.2    KILO Mk 1 Weapon System Development 
14.2.1 To meet the requirements to keep the Chilean Navy informed and updated on the 
progress of the development of the KILO Mk 1 Weapon System being carried out by 
ALPHA under Agreement with the DA, ALPHA agrees as follows: 
(1) ALPHA agrees that the Chilean Navy is entitled to have its representative 
present to witness several important events in the development trials and tests 
of the KILO Mk 1 Weapon System, subject to coordination with DA. The 
current development Program includes the following trials/tests series: 
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE (subparagraphs omitted) 
The Chilean Navy is entitled to witness one major event in each of the above 
series. 
(2) ALPHA shall notify the Chilean Navy of any changes in the tentative 
schedule and the develop of the trial/test program. 
(3) ALPHA shall notify the Chilean Navy, at least 30 days prior to 
commencement of the trial/test event to be witnessed, of its date, location and 
program. 4 days prior to the date, ALPHA will confirm to the Chilean Navy 
the final schedule for the event. 
(4) ALPHA shall submit to the Chilean Navy a summary report of the trial/test 
event witnessed by the Chilean Navy within three months after performance 
of same. 
(5) The cost and expenses of the Chilean Navy representative participating in the 
said trial/tests shall be borne by the Chilean Navy. ALPHA shall bear no 
responsibility or obligation for any expense incurred by the Chilean Navy 
resulting from delay, cancellation, or any other change in the trial/tests. 
14.2.2 In the event that (due to major delays or failures in the development trial/tests 
program caused by ALPHA'S fault) it becomes apparent that ALPHA will be delayed 
in the delivery of the first KILO Mk 1 Weapon System to the Chilean Government 
by more than 16 months, the Chilean Navy will be entitled to require ALPHA to 
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submit a proposed equitable solution to the anticipated delay. Should the Parties, 
after reasonable efforts, fail to reach mutual agreement on such an equitable solution, 
the Chilean Navy will be entitled to terminate part or all of the deliverables hereunder 
in accordance with Sub-Article 9.1 above. 
ARTICLE 15 PACKING 
15.1 Upon the delivery to the Chilean Navy, of each Subsystem/Unit of the Equipment, 
ALPHA or its subcontractors shall properly pack such Subsystem/Unit for 
maritime/air shipment and shall, if requested by the Chilean Navy and at the Chilean 
Navy's risk and expense, ship same to Chile. The Chilean Navy shall be responsible 
for insuring such shipments (if such insurance is deemed necessary by the Chilean 
Navy). 
15.2 Notwithstanding the provision of 15.1 above, ALPHA undertakes to transport the 
Equipment, at ALPHA'S risk and expense, to a country OMEGA's port of exit. 
ARTICLE 16 LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES 
16.1 The Chilean Navy shall, whether in contract, law or otherwise, have no recourse 
against ALPHA and shall defend, and indemnify and hold ALPHA harmless against 
any claims for any loss (inclusive of personal injury or death), liability, damage or 
cost which may at any time be suffered or incurred by the Chilean Navy and/or third 
party by reason or consequence of, or in connection with the sale and/or purchase 
and/or handling and/or maintenance of the Equipment supplied hereunder and/or use 
and/or other services performed by ALPHA incident hereto. 
16.2 The Chilean Navy shall have no liability whatsoever for any damage to either 
ALPHA or ALPHA'S personnel as a consequence of the Chilean Navy's use, handling 
and/or maintenance of the Equipment supplied under this Agreement. 
16.3 As used in 16.1 and 16.2 above, the term "Chilean Navy" shall mean the Chilean 
Navy, its contractors, and their respective personnel, agents, officers, employees, 
suppliers and subcontractors; and the term "ALPHA" shall mean ALPHA, its 
subsidiaries, and their respective personnel, agents, officers, employees, suppliers 
and subcontractors. 
ARTICLE 17 LICENSES AND TAXES 
17.1     Licenses 
17.1.1 ALPHA shall be liable for and undertake, at its sole expense and responsibility, to 








permits from all the competent authorities of the Government of OMEGA for the 
implementation of ALPHA'S obligation hereunder and/or for the export from country 
OMEGA of the Equipment sold hereunder. 
17.1.2 The Chilean Navy shall be liable for and undertake, at its sole expense and 
responsibility, to deal with all the formalities required and to procure all the required 
licenses and permits from all the competent authorities of all other countries, 
including the Republic of Chile, for the implementation of Chilean Navy's obligation 
hereunder and/or for the import of the Equipment into the Republic of Chile. 
17.2    Taxes 
17.2.1 ALPHA shall be liable and pay all taxes, levies, duties, and assessments imposed by 
the Government of country OMEGA on the export from OMEGA of the equipment. 
17.2.2 All other taxes, levies, duties, and assessments imposed on the equipment after their 
delivery, inclusive of those imposed in transit and/or their import into the Republic 
of Chile, shall be borne by the Chilean Navy. 
ARTICLE 18 APPLICABLE LAW 
This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the law of the 
state of New York. 
ARTICLE 19 SECURITY AND CLEARANCE 
19.1 Both Parties undertake not to divulge to any third party any information with regard 
to this Agreement or contained herein, nor to disclose the existence of this 
Agreement, except to their employers, contractors or subcontractors to the extent as 
may be necessary for the performance of this Agreement. 
19.2 Any representative Nominated by the Chilean Navy for the performance of its 
undertakings or the exercise of its right under this Agreement in country OMEGA, 
shall be subject to prior security clearance by the security authorities of the 
government of country OMEGA. 
19.3 In the same manner, any representative nominated by ALPHA for the performance 
of its undertakings or for the exercise of its rights under this Agreement in Chile shall 
be subject to prior security clearance by the security authorities of the government 
of Chile. 
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ARTICLE 20 LIMITATIONS OF USE AND END USER RESTRICTIONS 
20.1 Limitations of Use 
The Chilean Navy hereby acknowledges and declares that it is purchasing the 
Equipment and Documentation solely for its own use and that it will be the sole end 
user of the Equipment. Accordingly, the Chilean Navy undertakes that it will not, 
either directly or indirectly, sell, assign, transfer, convey, or in any manner dispose 
of the Equipment and Documentation, or any part thereof, to other person, company, 
entity, government, state or other party. 
20.2 End User Restrictions 
20.2.1 ALPHA declares that the Equipment (and Subsystem/Unit thereof), as well as Spare 
Parts under 12.1.1 above, sold hereunder to the Chilean Navy do not require approval 
of any government, other than the government of country OMEGA. 
20.2.2 ALPHA further declares that the government of country OMEGA has approved the 
sale of the Equipment hereunder to the Chilean Navy. 
ARTICLE 21 ASSIGNMENT 
Neither party shall have the right to assign or otherwise transfer its rights or 
obligations under this Agreement without the written consent of the other Party. 
ARTICLE 22 NOTICES AND CORRESPONDENCES 
22.1 Any notice required to be given by either Party to the other hereunder shall be in 
writing and shall be delivered personally, or by registered or certified mail, or by 
facsimile or telex, to the other Party. Notice shall be deemed effected upon receipt 
of said of said written notification by the Party to whom the notice is sent, or, in the 
case of mailing, within 15 days after the mailing of the same. 
22.2 All notices shall be effected as follows: 
To the Chilean Navy : (Addresses in Chile and in country OMEGA omitted.) 
To ALPHA : (Addresses in Chile and in country OMEGA omitted.) 
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ARTICLE 23 ON SITE REPRESENTATIVES. VISITS AND PROGRESS 
REVIEWS 
23.1 On site Representative fNPROI 
23.1.1 The Chilean Navy shall have the right to station at ALPHA'S premises a 
representative to monitor the progress of the work under the Agreement, including 
quality control activities (hereinafter referred to as "Navy Plant Representative 
Officer", or "NAPRO"). 
23.1.2 ALPHA shall provide said representative, at no cost to the Chilean Navy with office 
space, telephone (local calls only), telex and secretarial services. 
23.1.3 The Chilean Navy shall notify ALPHA four months in advance of the arrival of the 
NAPRO of the name and details of its proposed representative, in order to enable 
security and administrative clearance and arrangements. 
23.1.4 The representative shall perform his functions on a non-interference basis and shall 
be subject to the security regulations of the government of country OMEGA and 
ALPHA. 
23.1.5 All salary, travel, per diem, insurance and other costs and expenses of the NAPRO 
shall be borne by the Chilean Navy. 
23.2 Visits 
23.2.1 The Chilean Navy shall have the right to have a reasonable number of its 
representative/s visit ALPHA'S premises for limited periods of time in order to 
observe the progress of the work. Such visits shall be coordinated in advance with 
ALPHA. 
23.2.2 The provisions of 23.1.4 and 23.1.5 above shall apply to such visits and 
representatives. 
23.3 Program Progress Reviews 
23.3.1 The Parties agree to hold periodic program progress reviews approximately every 6 
month or as otherwise agreed to by the Parties. The program reviews shall be held 
alternately in country OMEGA and in Chile. 
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23.3.2 Each Party shall bear the costs and expenses of its participants in such program 
reviews. 
ARTICLE 24 MISCELLANEOUS 
24.1 Non waiver 
The failure of either Party to insist in any or more instances upon strict performance 
of any of the terms of this Agreement or to exercise any rights conferred herein shall 
not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment to any extent of either Party's right to 
assert or rely upon any such term or right on any future occasion. 
24.2 Language 
All correspondence, information, specifications, reports, notices and any other 
written or oral communication between the Parties shall be in English or Spanish. In 
technical matters English will be used. 
24.3 Captions 
The title heading of the Articles hereof are intended solely for convenience of 
reference and are not intended and shall not be construed for any purpose whatever 
as in any way limiting or extending the language of the provisions to which the 
captions refer. 
24.4 Reciprocal Assistance 
Each Party shall assist the other Party's personnel performing services and/or 
exercising rights in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement in the opposite 
Party's country, in obtaining lodging, internal transportation and food, and in dealing 
with other reasonable requirements of such personnel. 
24.5 Entire Agreement 
The terms and conditions of this Agreement constitute the entire Agreement between 
the Parties hereto and shall supersede all previous communications, representations 
or agreements, whether oral or written, between said Parties, with respect to the 
subjects matter hereof. Any amendment to this Agreement must be in writing and 
signed by both Parties. 
123 
.3.2 ach arty s all ear t e c sts a  e enses f its articipants i  s ch rogra  
r VIews. 
I   I  
.   i r 
 f il  f it r rt  t  i i t i   r r  i t s  tri t rf r  
f  f t  t r  f t i  r t r t  r i   ri t  f rr  r i  ll 
t  t    i   li i t t   t t f it r t '  i t t
t r l     t r  r i t   i . 
.   
, ,   
    
  
ti  . 
 




j tt .  t  t i  i  it  
i ti . 
12  
ARTICLE 25 EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Agreement shall enter into effect upon the date of the last of all of the following 
effects, provided that all such events occur by no later than 31 October 19N0 
(Precise date omitted). 
a.-       Approval of the Agreement by a "Decreto Supremo" of the government of 
Chile. 
b.-       Signature of the Agreement by both Parties. 
c-       The Finance Agreement has entered and remains into effect. 
d.-       Receipt by ALPHA of the Down payment, according to Sub-Article 4.1 of 
the Finance Agreement. 
e.-       Receipt by ALPHA of the Notes provided for in the Finance Agreement. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, the Parties hereto have signed this Agreement on the date first 
hereinabove recited. 







Name: __________ _ Name: __________ _ 
EXHIBIT 3 A 
PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
The following Price Adjustment will apply to each Payment referred to in Sub-Article 3.2 
of this Agreement. 
D = Px(0.4W"/Wo+0.6MlVMo) 
Where : 
P =      is the Payment amount due under this Agreement. 
D =     is the price adjustment due in respect of each basic Payment. 
W = is the U.S. Index "Average Hourly Earnings - Production Workers (Sic 372 - Aircraft 
and Parts)" as published in the U.S. Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
M = is the U.S. Index "Producer Price Index for Industrial Commodities" as published in 
the U.S. Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Wo =  is the index "W" relating to November 1986 (i.e. US$ 13.11). 
Mo =   is the index "M" relating to November 1986 (i.e. 309.8, where 1967 average = 100). 
Wn = is the index "W" relating the month which is four months prior to the date upon each 
Payment is due according to the provisions of this Agreement. 
Mn = is the index "M" relating the month which is four months prior to the date upon each 
Payment is due according to the provisions of this Agreement. 
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LOT QUARTERS PRICE 
NUMBER AFTER E.D.C. QUANTITY ITEMS INCLUDED US$x1000 
Ship Installation: 













4 18 12 Missiles $2,592 
5 21 24 Missiles $5,184 
6 28 12 Missiles $2,592 
7 30 24 Missiles $5,184 
Simulators: 
8 15 Simulator #1 $100 
9 18 Simulator #2 $100 
10 21 Simulator #3 $100 
Test Equipment: 
11      |            16 Test Equipment $3,564 
Supervision: 
12 3 Supervision: Survey Report 
13 3 Supervision: Requirements Report 
14 6 Supervision: Installation Control Document 
15 4 Supervision: Interface Design Specification 
16 6 Supervision: Comments on Chilean Navy Design 
17 13 Begin Instalation Supervision 1st Ship 
18 17 End Instalation Supervision 1st Ship 
19 21 End Instalation Supervision Ships 2 & 3 
20 12 Installation Requirements for Test Equipment 
21 18 Begin Installation Supervision Test Equipment 
22 19 End Supervision Test Equipment $1,122 
Documentation: 
23 4 Recommended Spare Parts List 
24 12 Begin Delivery of Documentation 
25 20 Complete Delivery of Documentation $1,414 
Training: 
26 11 Begin Training 
27 16 Complete Training $700 
TOTAL: $103,106 
Note:   Alpha may make partial deliveries within lots for purposes of this 
Article 5 and Article 4 above 
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EXHIBIT "12 B" 
STATEMENT OF WORK "S.O.W." 
OMMITED 
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AMENDMENT No. 2 TO AGREEMENT 
DATED JULY 24 19N0 BETWEEN 
THE CHILEAN NAVY AND OMEGA ALPHA AERONAUTICS LTD. 
FOR THE KILO Mk 1 WEAPON SYSTEM. 
JULY 26, 19N4 
SUMMARY: 
ANNEX 1 (TECHNICAL) 
ANNEX 2 (SCHEDULE) 
ANNEX 3 (SOFTWARE PHASES) 
ANNEX A (OMEGA NAVY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM) 
This amendment No. 2 is entered into by and between the Chilean Navy (the 
"Buyer") and OMEGA ALPHA AERONAUTICS LTD. (the "Seller") on this 26 day of July 
19N4. 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, the Parties entered into an Agreement dated July 24 19N0 for the purchase by 
the Buyer from the Seller, inter alia, of the KILO Mk 1 Weapon System (the "System") 
which was being developed by the Seller for and in coordination with OMEGA Navy (O.N.) 
(hereinafter the "Basic Agreement"), which Basic Agreement was previously amended by 
Amendment dated October 2, 19N2 for the purchase of additional KILO Mk 1 missiles 
(hereinafter referred to as "Amendment No. 1 to the Basic Agreement"); and 
WHEREAS, during the Seller's aforesaid development program a number of changes and 
improvements to the originally defined System were and are being implemented by the Seller 












WHEREAS, as a result, inter alia, of the above implementation activity, the aforesaid 
development program schedule has been extended and consequently the deliveries and 
schedule of the Basic Agreement have been delayed; and 
WHEREAS, the Seller and the Buyer desire to amend and update the Basic Agreement in 
accordance with the terms of this Amendment No. 2 hereinafter set forth, 
NOW THEREFORE the Parties agree as follows : 
Section 1.       Definitions 
All terms used herein which are defined under the Basic Agreement shall have the same 
meaning hereunder as under the Basic Agreement, subject only to any modifications thereto 
under terms of this Agreement. 
Section 2. Description of the Fire Control System and Fire Control Radar Subsystems 
Omitted. 
Section 3.       Terms of Payment 
3.1 The terms of payment under Sub-Article 4.1.2 of the Basic Agreement shall be 
modified only as set forth below. The term price as used hereinbelow shall mean the 
price under the Basic Agreement, subject to any adjustments applicable thereto under 
the terms of the Basic Agreement. 
3.2 The following payment terms will apply to the balance of the 40% of the price of the 
Fire Control Systems (FCS) of lot No. 1 (described in Sub-Article 5.3) described in 
said Sub Article 4.1.2 of the Basic Agreement: 
3.2.1 15% of the price of said FCS upon Delivery (as defined in the Basic Agreement) of 
same; 
3.2.2 10% of the price of said FCS, upon delivery of the Block A software (as defined 
hereunder); 






3.2.4 5% of the price of said FCS, upon completion of the Harbour Acceptance Tests 
defined in the SOW on the ship containing such Subsystem. 
3.2.5 The remaining 5% of the price of said FCS, upon completion of the Sea Acceptance 
Tests defined in the SOW of the ship containing said Subsystem. 
3.3 The following payment terms will apply to the balance of 40% of the price of the 
FCS of lots Nos. 2 and 3 (described in Sub-Article 5.3 of the Basic Agreement) 
described in said Sub-Article 4.1.2 of the Basic Agreement: 
3.3.1 25% of the price of the FCS of each lots Nos. 2 and 3, upon Delivery (as defined in 
the Basic Agreement) of the respective FCS; 
3.3.2 5% of the price of the FCS of each of said lots Nos. 2 and 3, upon Delivery of the 
Block B software (as defined hereunder); 
3.3.3 5% of the price of the FCS of each lots Nos. 2 and 3, upon completion of the H.A.T. 
defined in the SOW on the ships containing the respective FCS; and 
3.3.4 The remaining 5% of the price of the FCS of each of said lots Nos. 2 and 3, upon 
completion of the S.A.T. defined in the SOW of the ships containing the respective 
FCS. 
3.4 The following payment terms will apply to the balance of 40% of the price of the Fire 
Control Radar (FCR) of lots Nos. 1 and 2 (described in Sub-Article 5.3 of the Basic 
Agreement) described in said Sub-Article 4.1.2 of the Basic Agreement; 
3.4.1 28.5% of the price of said FCR, upon delivery of the same. 
3.4.2 1.5% of the price of said FCR, upon delivery of the FCR software supplement (as 
defined hereunder); 
3.4.3 5% of the price of the FCR, upon completion of the Harbour Acceptance Tests 
defined in the SOW for the ships containing said Subsystems; and 
3.4.4 The remaining 5% of the price of said FCR, upon completion of the Sea Acceptance 
Tests defined in the SOW for the ships containing said Subsystems. 
Section 4.       Delivery and Program Schedule 
4.1 Exhibit "E" of the Basic Agreement shall be amended by the updated Exhibit "E" set 
forth as Annex "2" of this Amendment No. 2. Any milestones under the original 
Exhibit "E" which are not dealt with under the updated Exhibit "E" shall remain as 
set forth under the Original Exhibit "E". 
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Section 5        Acceptance Test/Inspection 
The following will apply to the delivery of the FCS of lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3: 
5.1.1 The seller will according to para. 6.2 of the Basic Agreement and as amended 
hereunder, carry out the Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) on the FCS of lot No. 1 
without the Block A and Block B software installed. Upon completion of said FAT, 
a Certificate of Acceptance, identifying the missing features of Block A and Block 
B software, shall be signed in accordance with Sub-Article 6.2.3 of the Basic 
Agreement. 
5.1.2 The Seller will carry out the Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) on the FCS of lots Nos. 
2 and 3 without Block B installed. Upon completion of said FAT, a Certificate of 
Acceptance, identifying the missing features of Block B software, shall be signed in 
accordance with Sub-Article 6.2.3 of the Basic Agreement. 
5.2 The Seller will carry out the Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) on the FCR of lots 
Nos. 1 and 2, without the software supplement installed. Upon completion of said 
FAT a Certificate of Acceptance, identifying the missing features of the software, 
shall be signed in accordance with Sub-Article 6.2.3 of the Basic Agreement. These 
features will be added at the time set forth in the modified Exhibit "E" attached 
hereto as Annex "2" to this Amendment No. 2. 
5.3 Upon the signature of the Certificate of Acceptance under Sub-Sections 5.1 and 5.2, 
as well as upon the signing of the Certificate of Acceptance for the other 
Subsystems/Units of Lots Nos. 1,2 and 3, in accordance to the Basic Agreement, the 
FCS/FCR/other Subsystems/Unit will be deemed Delivered to Buyer in accordance 
with Sub-Article 6.2.6 of the Basic Agreement, provided however, that in the event 
of a termination by Buyer under Sub-Section 6.2 below, buyer will be entitled to 
retransfer title and return said FCS/FCR/other Subsystem/Unit to the Seller in 
accordance to the terms of said Sub-Section 6.3 below. 
5.4 Seller shall perform the HAT and SAT on the first ship after the Delivery of both the 
Block A software and the FCR software supplement, in accordance with the 
procedures to be defined under Sub-Article 6.3.1 of the Basic Agreement. Upon the 
Delivery of the Block B software, Seller shall carry out on the first ship an 
integration and test in respect of the Block B software in accordance with procedures 
to be defined by Seller, in consultation with Buyer, specifically for this Block B 
software activity. 
5.5 Upon the Delivery of the Block C software, Seller shall carry out on the first ship an 
integration and test in respect of the Block C software in accordance with to be 
defined Seller, in consultation with Buyer, specifically for this Block C software 
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5.6 Except as specifically set forth above, all provisions of Article 6 of the Basic 
Agreement shall remain unchanged. 
Section 6        Delays. 
6.1 The updated Exhibit "E" attached hereto as Annex "2" shall be the applicable 
Delivery/Program Schedule for all purpose of the Basic Agreement, including 
without limitations the provisions of Articles 3.2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14. 
6.2 The last five lines of Sub-Article 7(i) and (ii) of the Basic Agreement shall be 
modified as follows: 
"(i)      For Lot No. 1 under Sub-Article 5.3, 60 days. 
"(ii)     For other lots under Sub-Article 5.3, 60 days. 
up to a maximum of 6% of the price of any such delayed Subsystem/Unit." 
6.3 Sub-Article 14.2.2 of the Basic Agreement shall be replaced with the following (it 
being understood that all reference in the following new 14.2.2 is to the provisions 
of the Basic Agreement, as amended under this Amendment No. 2): 
" 14.2.2 In the event that Seller fails to complete the Delivery of Block B software at 
the FAT of the Lot No. 4 FCS within 8 months after the grace period under 
Sub-Article 7(ii) for the performance of said FAT in accordance with Exhibit 
"E" (as such date shall be extended due to causes under Article 8), the 
Chilean Navy will be entitled to require ALPHA to submit an equitable 
solution to the delay. Should the Parties, after reasonable efforts, fail to reach 
mutual agreement on such an equitable solution, the Chilean Navy will be 
entitled to terminate part of all of the deliverables hereunder in accordance 
with Sub-Article 9.1, and will be entitled to return any previously delivered 
System/Subsystems/Units to Seller against a complete refund of any amount 
paid therefor as its sole remedy. Upon the successful completion of the FAT 
for the lot No. 4 with the Block B software installed therein, the provisions 
of this Sub-Article shall no longer apply and the Chilean Navy shall have no 
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Section 7        Warranty 
7.1 Delete Sub-Article 10.2.1 and replace the wording of Sub-Article 10.2.1. 
"10.2.1 In respect of the second and third Systems (except missiles), such defect in 
material and workmanship is discovered within 18 month from completion 
of FAT of the last Subsystem of that particular System or 1 year after 
completion of the HAT, whichever comes earlier." 
NOTE: In order to assure proper maintenance of the Subsystem that have completed 
their FAT in accordance with the schedule and prior to their shipment which 
shall be performed at the same time as the said last Subsystem of a particular 
System, the said Subsystem shall be retained after Delivery in Seller's 
premises and Seller shall be responsible for performing the maintenance 
activities at no additional cost to the Buyer. 
7.2 The following shall be added as Sub-Article 10.2.5 : 
"10.2.5 In respect of the first System, such defect in material and workmanship is 
discovered by the earlier of 12 months after the SAT on the ship containing 
said first System or December 19N6" 
Section 8        Other terms of Basic Agreement and Amendment No. 1 to Basic Agreement. 
Except as specifically set forth in this Amendment No. 2 to the Basic Agreement, all of the 
terms and provisions of the Basic Agreement and Amendment No. 1 to the Basic Agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
Section 9        Effective date of this Amendment. 
This Amendment No. 2 will become effective on the last to occur of the following: 
(i)        the signature hereof by the Seller; 
(ii)       the signature hereof by Buyer; and 
(iii)     the signature by both parties of Amendment No. 1 to the Finance Agreement 











IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Buyer and Seller have signed this Amendment No. 2 
through their respective duly authorized representatives on the day and year first 
hereinabove written. 
THE CHILEAN NAVY OMEGA ALPHA AERONAUTICS 
By:       By:       
Name:  Name:  




Name: __________________ __ Name: __________________ _ 
FINANCE AGREEMENT33 
The Finance Agreement is made on the 25th of July of 19N0 between The Chilean Navy and 
ALPHA AERONAUTICS. 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS the Chilean Navy has purchased equipment and services from ALPHA, 
hereinafter referred as the "Seller"; and 
WHEREAS, the Sales Agreement provides that payment by the Chilean Navy to the Seller 
shall be financed pursuant to a separate finance agreement; and 
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to set forth the terms and conditions governing said financing; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 SCOPE OF AGREEMENT34 
1.1 This Finance Agreement covers the financing of equipment and services purchased 
by the Chilean Navy to ALPHA Aeronautics under the Agreement signed on July 25, 
19N0 
ARTICLE 2 TOTAL CONSIDERATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT 
2.1 The total consideration for the Sales Agreement is US$ 103,106,000. 
2.2 This Total Consideration excludes any amount for price adjustments under terms of 
the Sales Agreement. 
2.3 The prices and terms of payment are set forth in the Sales Agreement. 
33
 Names, dates and technical details are modified or omitted for security reasons. 
"ALPHA", "OMEGA" and other names related to the manufacturer are used instead 
of the real ones. 
34
 This Agreement included other minor purchases. Paragraphs and information 









2.4 The Total Consideration and the amounts due for price adjustment under the Sales 
Agreement shall be effected pursuant to the terms of the Finance Agreement, in 




In addition to the Total Consideration and the amounts due to Price Adjustments, the 
Chilean Navy will pay interest on the deferment of payments from the dates set for 
payment under the Sales Agreement to the dates of actual payment under this 
Finance Agreement. 
3.2      The term of the Finance Agreement will be divided into consecutive 6 month 
periods, the first period beginning on the date of the last to occur of: 
(i)       Receipt by ALPHA of the US$ 7.1 million downpayment under Sub-Article 
4.1 (1) 
(ii)      Receipt by ALPHA of the notes hereunder. 
The Chilean Navy will pay interest to the Seller for each 6 month period during the 
term of this Finance Agreement at the 6 month US dollar LIBOR rate per annum as 
quoted in the MIDLAND BANK London, on the last banking day immediately 
preceding such period, plus a margin of 1.5% as specified in Annex "1" hereto. 
ARTICLE 4 
4.1 
PAYMENT BY THE CHILEAN NAVY 
The Chilean Navy will make the following payments on account of the equipment 
and services, price adjustments, and interest thereon: 
(1) US$ 3.1 Millions within 30 days of the effective date of this Agreement. 
(2) The following amounts will be due on the specified dates: 
PAYMENT    AMOUNT      DATE 
No. (US$ Mill.) (M/D/Y) 
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/ 11  / 11  
/ 11  / 1  
. / 01   . / 11  
. /311   . /301  
PAYMENT  AMOUNT DATE No.         (US$ Mill.) (MfD/Y) 
No. OJS$ Mill.) (M/D/Y) 21                   3.0 7/31/N9 
15 2.0 8/31/N8 22                  3.5 8/31/N9 
16 3.0 9/30/N8 23                  6.0 9/30/N9 
17 2.0 10/31/N8 24                  5.0 10/31/N9 
18 5.0 3/30/N9 25                  5.0 3/31/N10 
19 5.0 4/30/N9 26                   DIFF* 5/30/N10 
20 3.0 3/31/N9 TOTAL:        126.6   (+/-DIFF) 
* Pay total due or refund excess. 
4.2      Promissory Notes 
(a) The Chilean Navy shall, within 30 days of the Effective Date of this 
Agreement, deliver to ALPHA promissory notes (the "Notes") for each 
payment set forth in 4.1 (2), in accordance to the schedule of Notes listed in 
Annex "2" hereto. 
Each said Note shall be payable to ALPHA or its order at OMEGA COMEX 
BANK, New York NY, U.S.A. 
(b) The Notes shall be paid in lawful money of the United States of America and 
without set off or counterclaim, free and clear of and without deduction for 
any present or future taxes, assessments withholding, restrictions or 
conditions of any nature. 
(c) The Chilean Navy shall be responsible to pay any fee or duty in connection 
with the issuance, delivery and payment of the Notes and shall duly stamp 
and register the Notes as required under the laws of the Republic of Chile. 
(d) Should the Chilean Navy default in the payment of any of the Notes, all the 
remaining notes shall immediately become due and payable. 
(e) The Chilean Navy hereby represents and warrants to each Note that: 
(1) The Chilean Navy has full power, authority and legal right to execute, 
deliver and perform its obligations under the Note, and has taken all 
necessary legal actions required to authorize the execution, delivery 












(2) The Note constitutes a legal, valid and binding of the Chilean Navy, 
enforceable in accordance with its terms, and is a fully negotiable 
instrument. 
(3) The execution and delivery of the Note and the Chilean Navy's 
performance of its obligation under the Note does not violate any 
provision of any law or regulation binding upon it; and 
(4) All permits and licenses required in connection with the execution, 
delivery and performance of the Note have been obtained and are in 
full effect. 
(f) Any amount under this Finance Agreement unpaid on its due date shall bear 
interest from the due date until the actual date of payment at the 6 month US 
dollar LIBOR rate per annum, plus 3%, quoted by Midland Bank, London, 
at the beginning of each 6 month period commencing on the due date of the 
respective payment, compounded semi-annually. 
(g) ALPHA undertakes not to sell to a third party any of the Notes listed in 
Annex "2" until the Delivery to the Chilean Navy of the last item of Lot No. 
1 under Sub-Article 5.3.1 of the Sales Agreement, after which time ALPHA 
may sell to any third party those Notes whose payment date is prior to June 
30, 19N8. 
After the Delivery of the last item of Lot No. 2, ALPHA may sell to any third 
party those Notes whose payment date is prior to April 30, 19N9. 
After the Delivery of the last item of Lot No. 3, ALPHA may sell to any third 
party those Notes whose payment date is prior to October 31, 19N9. 
For the sake of clarity, notwithstanding the above, ALPHA may present the 
Notes, and the Chilean Navy shall pay same, upon their due date or any time 
thereafter. 
(h) ALPHA agrees that, in regard to Notes still in their respective possession at 
any time, should the Chilean Navy desire to purchase any or all of said Notes, 
they will enter into good faith discussions with the Chilean Navy in an 













4.3 The payment of US$ 7.1 Million referred to it in Article 4.1(1) above will be made 
upon submission of a Guarantee/s issued by the Bank of Omega in the aggregate 
amount of US$ 7.1 million. The amount of the Guarantees shall be reduced in an 
amount equal to the value of the goods delivered by the Sellers under the Sales 
Agreement. 
ARTICLE 5 FINAL ADJUSTMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
5.1 ALPHA will, at the end of each year, forward to the Chilean Navy a statement of the 
outstanding credit balance on account of the Total Consideration, interest and price 
adjustment calculated according to Annex "2" hereto. 
5.2 Prior to May 19N10, ALPHA will submit to the Chilean Navy a calculation of the 
outstanding credit balance on account of the Total Consideration, price adjustment 
and interest, calculated according to Annex "2" hereto, showing any aggregate net 
excess or shortfall in Chilean navy payments which will occur by May 31,19N10 as 
compared to the amounts listed in Sub-Article 4.1 above. In May 31 19N10 the 
Chilean Navy will pay said aggregate shortfall to ALPHA against an invoice 
presented by ALPHA. Any excess in favour of the Chilean Navy shall be refunded 
onMay31, 19N10. 
Notwithstanding the above, the amount to be paid by the Chilean Navy shall not 
exceed US$ 43.5 million. Any additional amount due to ALPHA, together with 
interest thereon shall be paid on March 31 19N11. 
5.3 Each Payment made by the Chilean Navy shall be applied in the following order: 
(a) First, Interest accrued until the date of payment. 
(b) Second, Total Consideration including price adjustment. 
ARTICLE 6 ADMINISTRATION OF THIS AGREEMENT 
6.1 ALPHA shall notify the Chilean Navy of any sale of Notes by ALPHA. 
6.2 ALPHA agrees that prior to consumating the sale of Notes to a third party, it shall, 
upon the Chilean Navy's request, enter into discussion with the Chilean Navy for the 
sale of such Notes to the Chilean Navy, provided that the undertaking hereunder to 
refrain from consumating a sale shall only apply for a period of two weeks beginning 
upon the notice by ALPHA to the Chilean Navy of its intention to sell such Notes 









6.3 and 6.4 Omitted. 
ARTICLE 7 DECRETO SUPREMO35 
The Chilean Navy undertakes that the decreto Supremo that will bee issued shall meet the 
legal requirements necessary to make the Sales Agreement, this Finance Agreement, and the 
Notes effective and valid, shall be issued under the Reserved Laws Nos. 15.126 and 3.564 
as established in the Decree Laws Nos. 1.235 (1979) and 2.456 (1984), shall authorize the 
name and title of the persons signing the above documents (including the Notes), and shall 
be signed by the President, Ministers of Defence and Finance of the Republic of Chile. Upon 
issuance of the Decreto Supremo, the Chilean Navy shall deliver copies of the same to 
ALPHA. 
All the Notes will be issued in accordance with the present Agreement and the payment to 
be made will be effected in accordance with the Decreto Supremo. 
ARTICLE 8 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
8.1 The Parties shall endeavor to settle in a direct and friendly manner any difficulty, 
controversy, or lack of agreement which may arise in connection with this 
Agreement. 
8.2 If such difficulties cannot be settled in said manner, they shall, at the request of either 
Party, be referred to arbitration in front of two arbitrators, one selected by ALPHA 
and the other by the Chilean Navy (Provided said individuals shall have necessary 
security clearance). If the two arbitrators fail to resolve an issue, they shall mutually 
agree upon a third arbitrator who will then resolve only in the unresolved issue. The 
arbitration will be administered in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration and 
Conciliation of the International Chamber of Commerce and will be held at a location 
agreed upon by the arbitrators (or if they do not agree, in Geneva, Switzerland). The 
arbitration will be held in the English language. The arbitrators' decision shall be 
final and binding on the Parties hereto. 
8.3 In the event of doubt or disagreement with regard to the applicable law, the 
controversy shall be resolved in equity, the arbiter being bound only to the general 
principles of law recognized both by the legislation of country OMEGA as well as 
that of the Republic of Chile. 
35
 Decree issued by the President. 
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ARTICLE 9 EFFECTIVE DATE 
9.1 This Agreement shall enter into effect upon the occurrence of the last of the 
following two events, provided that both events occur no later than October 31, 
19N0: 
(a) Signature by both Parties of the Sales Agreement; 
(b) Issuance of the signed Decreto Supremo authorizing the signature and 
funding of the Sales Agreement, this Finance Agreement and the Notes. 
9.2 If the following two events do not occur within 30 days of the Effective Date of this 
Agreement (or such extended period granted by ALPHA in writing), then this 
Finance Agreement shall automatically terminate: 
(a) Receipt by ALPHA of all the Notes provided for in Sub-Article 4.2 (a) above; 
(b) Receipt by ALPHA of the US$ 7.1 million under 4.1(1) above. 
ARTICLE 10 MISCELLANEOUS 
10.1 Non-Waiver: The failure of either Party to insist in any or more instances upon strict 
performance of any of the terms of this Agreement or to exercise any rights conferred 
herein shall not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment to any extent of either 
Party's right to assert or rely upon any such term or right on any future occasion. 
10.2 Captions: The title heading of the Articles hereof are intended solely for 
convenience of reference and are not intended and shall not be construed for any 
purpose whatever as in any way limiting or extending the language of the provisions 
to which the captions refer. 
10.3 Notices and Correspondence : 
(a) Any notice required to be given by either Party to the other hereunder shall 
be in writing and shall be delivered personally, or by registered or certified 
mail, or by facsimile or telex, to the other Party. Notice shall be deemed 
effected upon receipt of said written notification by the Party to whom the 
notice is sent, or, in the case of mail, within 15 days after the mailing of the 
same. 
(b) All Notices shall be effected as follows : 








(c) All correspondence, information, specifications, reports, notices and any 
other written or oral communications between the Parties shall be in English 
or Spanish, preferably in English. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, the Parties hereto have signed this Finance Agreement one the date 
first hereinabove recited. 





Name: ____________________ _ Name: ____________________ _ 
ANNEX 1 
ADJUSTMENT 
For the purpose of this Annex 2 the following denotation shall be used: 
t = The month index where 0 is the month of the Effective Date of this Agreement, 1 is 
one month after the Effective Date of this Agreement, and F the month of May 
19N10. 
Dt = The amount payable on month t under the terms of payment of the Sales Agreement, 
including price adjustment. 
P, = The amount actually paid in month t on account of the Total Consideration and price 
adjustments against presentation of Promissory Notes under the terms of this Finance 
Agreement. 
P0 =     The first payment under this Finance Agreement, in the amount of US$ 7.1 million. 
Ct = The outstanding credit balance on account of the Total Consideration and price 
adjustment in month t. 
The formula for calculating C, is: 
Ct = Ct_! + Dt - Pt fort>l 
C0 = D0 - P0 for t = 0 
Li = The annual interest rate to be applied on the outstanding credit balance. Li shall be 
the six-month LIBOR rate, as defined in Article 3.2 of this Agreement, plus a margin 
of 1.5% for outstanding monthly credit balances. 
Nt = The amount actually paid in month t on account of interest, against presentation of 
Promissory Notes, under the terms of this Finance Agreement. 
The formula for calculating Nt is: 
Nt = V,2ICiLi fori=j->t-l 
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APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS 
Any amount actually paid in month t under the terms of this Financial Agreement will be 
divided into 2 parts, Pt and Nt, where any amount paid will be initially used to cancel 
accrued interest and only remaining balances will be applied against principal. If on any 
particular payment date the amount of interest due exceeds the total payment, the unpaid 
amount of interest will be capitalized and henceforth treated as an additional price 
adjustment. 
FINAL ADJUSTMENT PAYMENT 
The final Adjustment Payment to be made to ALPHA will be calculated as follows: 
CF-PF 




APPENDIX B. MODELS AND SCENARIOS USED TO EVALUATE 
THE RESULT OF THE PROCUREMENT 
A.        TACTICAL VALUE AND RISK MODEL 
The purpose of this model is to evaluate the effects of changes in cost, schedule and 
performance in the value received by the buyer of a weapon system, and also to evaluate the 
outcome of the procurement after the fact. 
This model looks at a weapon system as an investment that will cost some money to 
the buyer (the government) through its life cycle, which is usually referred to as Life Cycle 
Cost, and will give some value in return year after year, as the weapon system performs the 
task. The value depends mainly on two aspects: 
• The capability of the weapon system, or its capacity to perform its missions. 
• The risk of conflict, which makes the weapon system necessary. 
If these two aspects are evaluated for the future years, the resultant is a curve of 
yearly value of the system. 
Evaluating the tactical value of a weapon system or the risk of conflict in monetary 
terms is extremely complex. To overcome this difficulty, the model assumes that the 
negotiated conditions or the baseline set by the Project Manager reflects the fair value of the 
system. Then it looks at departures from the negotiated conditions and assess their impact 
based on that initially established "fair value". 
1. Tactical Value 
A system has a high initial tactical value when it is fielded. Then its tactical 
value decreases as countermeasures and more demanding threats are developed, until the 
weapon system becomes tactically obsolete. At that point, the system becomes a secondary 
or "backup" weapon system with a roughly constant low value. Finally, due to logistic 
obsolescence, the system is decommissioned. Upgrades or modifications to overcome 
tactical or logistic obsolescence might be considered from the beginning as cost of ownership 
if planned at that stage. Otherwise, they become a different project. 
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The result of this concept is a shape that describes the tactical value of a weapon 
system along its life cycle. That shape depends on the time it takes to reach tactical 
obsolescence, the decrease in tactical value beyond that point, and the time to decommission 
due to logistic obsolescence. 
The typical shape of tactical valuethrough the life of the system is shown in figure 
B-l. 
TACTICAL VALUE OF A WEAPON SYSTEM 
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Figure B.l Tactical Value Through the Life of the System 
2.        Risk Factor 
Risk of conflict, and consequently the need for the weapon system is a function of 
the international strategic situation as related to the national interests and national security. 
Risk is a function of uncertainty about the future and the consequences of not having the 
system if required. 
If there is not information about the potential cost of not having the system, 
uncertainty can be used as a measure. If we know that we do not face immediate risk of 
conflict, but we are not 100% certain of the future, we can assume that as time doubles, our 
certainty decreases to a certain rate, which is named here "Confidence level". If time is made 
very large, Rfn will tend to 1, meaning maximum risk. The expression for the risk factor 
"Rfn" as a function of the year "n" and confidence factor "C" is: 
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Rfn= 1 - n (- log C / log 2) q 
Shapes of risk factors for different confidence levels are shown in figure B-2. 









Figure B.2 Risk Factors for Different Confidence Levels 
3. Evaluation 
To compare the value of the system along its lifetime with the price paid for it, the 
value for different periods are converted in present value using a discount rate. That rate 
represents the opportunity cost of money for the government, which lays between the 
prevailing loan rates and the return of the most profitable forgone project, if profit can be 
measured. 
To determine the shape of the Life Cycle Value of the System, the following 
variables shall be known or estimated: 
P:        Price, expressed as the present value of total payments 
Q:       Number of systems fielded. 
Bg:     Buyers gain: the difference between the value of the weapon system for the 
government and the price paid for it. 
Tto:    Time until the weapon system becomes tactically obsolete. 
Tlo:     Time until the system becomes logistically obsolete, so that it cannot be 
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Tvi: Tactical Value of the system on the schedule date of fielding. 
Tvb: Tactical Value of the system beyond logistic obsolescence. 
dr: Tactical value decrease rate, Tvi/Tvb. 
Rfn: Risk factor for period "n" 
k: Discount rate 
Cn: Cost of ownership for period "n" 
CO: Overall Cost of Ownership, present value of all Cn. 
Vn: Value of the system for period "n" 
Cd: Cost of disposal 
Vs: Salvage value 
The basic assumption of this model is that the negotiators were wise enough to settle 
for a price lower than the expected value of the system minus the ownership costs of it 
through its useful life. The Buyer's gain can be estimated according to the available options, 
the difference between the worst and best case scenario expected by the buyer, or valued in 
terms of cost of satisfying the same needs with other means. The following expressions put 
this assumption in a workable equation form: 
Life Cycle Value = Life Cycle Cost + Bg (Eq B.2) 
Life Cycle Cost = P + CO (Eq B.3) 
Replacing Eq B.2 into B.l and rearranging the terms: 











4.        Evaluation for Project Kilo 
Based in the information available For Project Kilo, the following data will be 
used: 
P: US$ 85,474,000 present value of payments according to the contract at a 
discount rate of 5.5% 
Q:       according to the delivery schedule and assumed Tlo 
Bg: Determined as the diference between the worst and best case scenario. Zero 
gain is assumed for the worst case scenario. 
Tto: 15 years, assumed according to experience with similar systems 
Tlo: 25 years, assumed according to experience with similar systems 
dr: 3 times, assumed 
Rfn: according to a confidence level of 95%, based in the strategic scenario 
k: 5.5%, typical rate of international loans as of the date of the contract 
Cn: US$ 880,500 for year, based in cost of personnel and maintenance. This cost 
increases gradually until doubling at the end of the system's useful life. The 
determination of this value is shown in figure B.3. 
CO:     what results from Cn 
Cd:     not significant 
Vs:      not significant 
All other variables are going to be determined from the model. The yearly weapon 
system values calculated with the given variables for a worst case represent the reference 
value. Further changes in schedule are introduced assigning values 0 to 3 to the variable Q 
(the number of systems), keeping the same yearly annual values for each system. Figure B.4 














6 crew members per ship 
3 ships 
25 people in logistic chain 
Total Personnel 
Unit Personnel Cost: 
43 
13500 
Total Personnel Cost: 580500 
Total Ownership Costs 
Personnel 




Figure B.3 Initial Annual Cost of Ownership of Kilo Missile System 
EFFECTS 
OF 
PRICE DECREASED 10% 11.11% 
DISCOUNT RATE DECREASED 1% 15.77% 
CONFIDENCE FACTOR DECREASED 1% 20.17% 
Tto REDUCED 2 YEARS 8% 





PRICE DECREASED 10% 
10% 15% 
INCREASE IN BUYER'S GAIN 
20% 25% 
Figure B.4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Model 
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The following tables are used to calculate the value of the system being period "0" 
the date of the contract in the following order: 
Figure B.5 Summary of Expected Scenarios and Results 
Figure B.6 Worst Expected Scenario (Data and Graphs) 
Figure B.7 Best Expected Scenario (Data and Graphs) 
Figure B.8 Most Probable Expected Scenario (Data and Graphs) 
Figure B.9 Results of the Procurement (Data and Graphs) 
Figure B. 10 What if the Contract Had Been Fulfilled (Data and Graphs) 
Parameters common for all scenarios 
Time to Logistic Obsolescence: 25 years after fielding 
Time to Tactical Obsolescence: 15 years 
Initial Cost Of ownership: US$880,500 per year 
Final Cost of Ownership: US$ 1761,000 per year 
Discount Rate: Ubor+1% 
Confidence level (No Conflict 95% 
Libor Delivery Present value Buyer's Ftemarks 
rate Delay of payments Gain 
Worst Acceptable Scenario 6.50% 4 years US$75,435K 0.00% 
Most Probable Expected Sc. 4.50% 2 years US$83,751K 41.03% 
Best Expected Scenario 4.50% 0 years US$88,073K 5262% 
Ftesult of the Procurement 4.00% 4 years UB$79,265K 17.42% Fteduced Rskand hcreasedTto 










, Worst       Most Probate a^Bpaateof Result of the K\ 
Acceptable     Expected Se.       Scenario      Procurement 
"Scenario-      '     ' ~ ~~ 
Figure B.5 Summary of Expected Scenarios and Results 
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VALUES FOR THE THREE SYSTEMS INPUT OUTPUT 
Tvb: Value beyond tactical obsolescence (US$x1,000)= $55,232.59 
Tto: Time to Tactical Obsolescence (years) = 15 
Tlo: Time to Logistic Obsolescence (years) = 25 
Initial Cn: Cost of Ownership (US$x1,000) = $880.50 
P: Price, present value of payments = $75,434.89 
Bg: Buyer's gain = 0.00% 
k: Discount rate = 7.50 
Delivery Delay (Years) = 4 
Life Cycle Value of the System, P+Bg 75,434.89 
C: Confidence level 95% 
Q Rf Cn Tv Vn Period Net 
Value PERIOD Values in US$x 1,000 
0 0 0.000 ($75,435) Net Present 
Value@k% 
($0.00) 
1 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
2 0 0.050 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
3 0 0.078 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
4 0 0.098 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
5 0 0.112 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
6 0 0.124 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
7 1 0.134 $310.60 $40,504 $5,432 $5,121 
8 1 0.143 $315.84 $38,049 $5,427 $5,111 
9 3 0.150 $965.30 $106,783 $16,024 $15,059 
10 3 0.157 $985.20 $99,419 $15,576 $14,590 
11 3 0.163 $1,007.18 $92,054 $14,967 $13,960 
12 3 0.168 $1,031.26 $84,690 $14,225 $13,194 
13 3 0.173 $1,057.44 $77,326 $13,368 $12,311 
14 3 0.177 $1,085.71 $69,961 $12,412 $11,326 
15 3 0.182 $1,116.07 $62,597 $11,367 $10,251 
16 3 0.185 $1,148.52 $55,233 $10,245 $9,097 
17 3 0.189 $1,183.07 $55,233 $10,447 $9,264 
IS 3 0.193 $1,219.72 $55,233 $10,636 $9,416 
19 3 0.196 $1,258.46 $55,233 $10,814 $9,555 
20 3 0.199 $1,299.29 $55,233 $10,982 $9,683 
21 3 0.202 $1,342.21 $55,233 $11,142 $9,799 
22 3 0.204 $1,387.23 $55,233 $11,293 $9,906 
23 3 0.207 $1,434.35 $55,233 $11,437 $10,003 
24 3 0.210 $1,483.55 $55,233 $11,575 $10,092 
25 3 0.212 $1,534.85 $55,233 $11,707 $10,172 
26 3 0.214 $1,588.25 $55,233 $11,833 $10,245 
27 3 0.216 $1,643.74 $55,233 $11,954 $10,310 
28 3 0.219 $1,701.32 $55,233 $12,070 $10,369 
29 3 0.221 $1,761.00 $55,233 $12,182 $10,421 
30 3 0.223 $1,822.77 $55,233 $12,290 $10,467 
31 3 0.224 $1,886.64 $55,233 $12,394 $10,508 
Figure B.6 Worst Expected Scenario (Data) 
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VALUES FOR THE THREE SYSTEMS INPUT OUTPUT 
Tvb: Value beyond tactical obsolescence (US$x1,000)= $55,232.59 
Tto: Time to Tactical Obsolescence (years) = 15 
Tlo: Time to Logistic Obsolescence (years) = 25 
Initial Cn: Cost of Ownership (US$x1,000) = $880.50 
P: Price, present value of payments = $88,072.92 
Bg: Buyer's gain = 52.62% 
k: Discount rate = 5.50 
Delivery Delay (Years) = 0 
Life Cycle Value of the System, P+Bg 134,416.29 
C: Confidence level 95% 





PERIOD Values in US$x 1,000 
0 0 0.000 ($134,416) 
1 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
2 0 0.050 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
3 1 0.078 $297.73 $50,323 $3,929 $3,632 
4 1 0.098 $301.01 $47,868 $4,667 $4,366 
5 3 0.112 $915.72 $136,240 $15,297 $14,381 
6 3 0.124 $931.22 $128,876 $16,003 $15,072 
7 3 0.134 $949.53 $121,512 $16,296 $15,347 
8 3 0.143 $970.66 $114,147 $16,280 $15,310 
9 3 0.150 $994.61 $106,783 $16,024 $15,030 
10 3 0.157 $1,021.38 $99,419 $15,576 $14,554 
11 3 0.163 $1,050.96 $92,054 $14,967 $13,916 
12 3 0.168 $1,083.37 $84,690 $14,225 $13,142 
13 3 0.173 $1,118.59 $77,326 $13,368 $12,250 
14 3 0.177 $1,156.62 $69,961 $12,412 $11,255 
15 3 0.182 $1,197.48 $62,597 $11,367 $10,170 
16 3 0.185 $1,241.15 $55,233 $10,245 $9,004 
17 3 0.189 $1,287.64 $55,233 $10,447 $9,159 
18 3 0.193 $1,336.95 $55,233 $10,636 $9,299 
19 3 0.196 $1,389.08 $55,233 $10,814 $9,425 
20 3 0.199 $1,444.02 $55,233 $10,982 $9,538 
21 3 0.202 $1,501.78 $55,233 $11,142 $9,640 
22 3 0.204 $1,562.36 $55,233 $11,293 $9,731 
23 3 0.207 $1,625.76 $55,233 $11,437 $9,812 
24 3 0.210 $1,691.97 $55,233 $11,575 $9,883 
25 3 0.212 $1,761.00 $55,233 $11,707 $9,946 
26 3 0.214 $1,832.85 $55,233 $11,833 $10,000 
27 3 0.216 $1,907.52 $55,233 $11,954 $10,046 
28 0 0.219 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
29 0 0.221 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
30 0 0.223 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
31 0 0.224 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
Figure B.7 Best Expected Scenario (Data) 
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VALUES FOR THE THREE SYSTEMS INPUT OUTPUT 
Tvb: Value beyond tactical obsolescence (US$x1,000)= $55,232.59 
Tto: Time to Tactical Obsolescence (years) = 15 
Tlo: Time to Logistic Obsolescence (years) = 25 
Initial Cn: Cost of Ownership (US$x1,000) = $880.50 
P: Price, present value of payments = $83,751.51 
Bg: Buyer's gain = 41.03% 
k: Discount rate = 5.50 
Delivery Delay (Years) = 2 
Life Cycle Value of the System, P+Bg 118,112.14 
C: Confidence level 95% 





PERIOD Vali jes in US$x 1,000 
0 0 0.000 ($118,112) 
1 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
2 0 0.050 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
3 0 0.078 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
4 0 0.098 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
5 1 0.112 $303.57 $45,413 $5,099 $4,795 
6 1 0.124 $307.99 $42,959 $5,334 $5,026 
7 3 0.134 $939.68 $121,512 $16,296 $15,356 
8 3 0.143 $957.80 $114,147 $16,280 $15,322 
9 3 0.150 $978.33 $106,783 $16,024 $15,046 
10 3 0.157 $1,001.28 $99,419 $15,576 $14,574 
11 3 0.163 $1,026.65 $92,054 $14,967 $13,941 
12 3 0.168 $1,054.43 $84,690 $14,225 $13,171 
13 3 0.173 $1,084.62 $77,326 $13,368 $12,284 
14 3 0.177 $1,117.23 $69,961 $12,412 $11,294 
15 3 0.182 $1,152.26 $62,597 $11,367 $10,215 
16 3 0.185 $1,189.70 $55,233 $10,245 $9,056 
17 3 0.189 $1,229.56 $55,233 $10,447 $9,217 
18 3 0.193 $1,271.83 $55,233 $10,636 $9,364 
19 3 0.196 $1,316.52 $55,233 $10,814 $9,497 
20 3 0.199 $1,363.63 $55,233 $10,982 $9,618 
21 3 0.202 $1,413.15 $55,233 $11,142 $9,728 
22 3 0.204 $1,465.08 $55,233 $11,293 $9,828 
23 3 0.207 $1,519.44 $55,233 $11,437 $9,918 
24 3 0.210 $1,576.20 $55,233 $11,575 $9,999 
25 3 0.212 $1,635.39 $55,233 $11,707 $10,071 
26 3 0.214 $1,696.99 $55,233 $11,833 $10,136 
27 3 0.216 $1,761.00 $55,233 $11,954 $10,193 
28 3 0.219 $1,827.43 $55,233 $12,070 $10,243 
29 3 0.221 $1,896.28 $55,233 $12,182 $10,286 
30 0 0.223 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
31 0 0.224 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
Figure B. 8 Most Probable Expected Scenario 
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VALUES FOR THE THREE SYSTEMS INPUT OUTPUT 
Tvb: Value beyond tactical obsolescence (US$x1,000)= $55,232.59 
Tto: Time to Tactical Obsolescence (years) = 19 
Tlo: Time to Logistic Obsolescence (years) = 25 
Initial Cn: Cost of Ownership (US$x1,000) = $880.50 
P: Price, present value of payments = $79,265.63 
Bg: Buyer's gain = 17.42% 
k: Discount rate = 5.00 
Delivery Delay (Years) = 4 
Life Cycle Value of the System, P+Bg 93,070.37 
C: Confidence level 95% 





PERIOD Values in US$x 1,000 
0 0 0.000 ($93,070) 
1 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
2 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
3 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
4 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
5 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
6 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
7 1 0.000 $310.60 $43,605 $0 ($311) 
S 1 0.050 $315.84 $41,667 $2,083 $1,767 
9 3 0.078 $965.30 $119,186 $9,306 $8,341 
10 3 0.098 $985.20 $113,372 $11,054 $10,069 
11 3 0.112 $1,007.18 $107,558 $12,077 $11,069 
12 3 0.124 $1,031.26 $101,744 $12,634 $11,603 
13 3 0.134 $1,057.44 $95,930 $12,865 $11,808 
14 3 0.143 $1,085.71 $90,116 $12,853 $11,767 
15 3 0.150 $1,116.07 $84,302 $12,651 $11,535 
16 3 0.157 $1,148.52 $78,488 $12,296 $11,148 
17 3 0.163 $1,183.07 $72,674 $11,816 $10,633 
18 3 0.168 $1,219.72 $66,861 $11,230 $10,011 
19 3 0.173 $1,258.46 $61,047 $10,554 $9,295 
20 3 0.177 $1,299.29 $55,233 $9,799 $8,499 
21 3 0.182 $1,342.21 $55,233 $10,030 $8,688 
22 3 0.185 $1,387.23 $55,233 $10,245 $8,858 
23 3 0.189 $1,434.35 $55,233 $10,447 $9,012 
24 3 0.193 $1,483.55 $55,233 $10,636 $9,152 
25 3 0.196 $1,534.85 $55,233 $10,814 $9,279 
26 3 0.199 $1,588.25 $55,233 $10,982 $9,394 
27 3 0.202 $1,643.74 $55,233 $11,142 $9,498 
28 3 0.204 $1,701.32 $55,233 $11,293 $9,592 
29 3 0.207 $1,761.00 $55,233 $11,437 $9,676 
30 3 0.210 $1,822.77 $55,233 $11,575 $9,752 
31 3 0.212 $1,886.64 $55,233 $11,707 $9,820 
Figure B.9 Results of the Procurement (Data) 
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VALUES FOR THE THREE SYSTEMS INPUT OUTPUT 
Tvb: Value beyond tactical obsolescence (US$x1,000)= $55,232.59 
Tto: Time to Tactical Obsolescence (years) = 15 
Tlo: Time to Logistic Obsolescence (years) = 25 
Initial Cn: Cost of Ownership (US$x1,000) = $880.50 
P: Price, present value of payments = $88,072.92 
Bg: Buyer's gain = -19.98% 
k: Discount rate = 5.00 
Delivery Delay (Years) = 0 
Life Cycle Value of the System, P+Bg 70,480.16 
C: Confidence level 95% 





PERIOD Values in US$x 1,000 
0 0 0.000 ($70,480) 
1 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
2 0 0.000 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
3 1 0.000 $297.73 $50,323 $0 ($298) 
4 1 0.000 $301.01 $47,868 $0 ($301) 
5 3 0.000 $915.72 $136,240 $0 ($916) 
6 3 0.000 $931.22 $128,876 $0 ($931) 
7 3 0.000 $949.53 $121,512 $0 ($950) 
8 3 0.050 $970.66 $114,147 $5,707 $4,737 
9 3 0.078 $994.61 $106,783 $8,338 $7,343 
10 3 0.098 $1,021.38 $99,419 $9,693 $8,672 
11 3 0.112 $1,050.96 $92,054 $10,336 $9,285 
12 3 0.124 $1,083.37 $84,690 $10,517 $9,433 
13 3 0.134 $1,118.59 $77,326 $10,370 $9,252 
14 3 0.143 $1,156.62 $69,961 $9,978 $8,822 
15 3 0.150 $1,197.48 $62,597 $9,394 $8,196 
16 3 0.157 $1,241.15 $55,233 $8,653 $7,412 
17 3 0.163 $1,287.64 $55,233 $8,980 $7,693 
18 3 0.168 $1,336.95 $55,233 $9,277 $7,940 
19 3 0.173 $1,389.08 $55,233 $9,549 $8,160 
20 3 0.177 $1,444.02 $55,233 $9,799 $8,355 
21 3 0.182 $1,501.78 $55,233 $10,030 $8,528 
22 3 0.185 $1,562.36 $55,233 $10,245 $8,683 
23 3 0.189 $1,625.76 $55,233 $10,447 $8,821 
24 3 0.193 $1,691.97 $55,233 $10,636 $8,944 
25 3 0.196 $1,761.00 $55,233 $10,814 $9,053 
26 3 0.199 $1,832.85 $55,233 $10,982 $9,149 
27 3 0.202 $1,907.52 $55,233 $11,142 $9,234 
28 0 0.204 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
29 0 0.207 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
30 0 0.210 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
31 0 0.212 $0.00 $0 $0 $0 
Figure B.10 Wl tiatlftheC ontract Hs id Been Fu filled (Dati ») 
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B.        RISK AND DAMAGE REDUCTION MODEL 
An alternative way of determining the value of a weapon system is to relate it to the 
defense strategy of the country, in terms of the contribution of the weapon system to 
reducing the risk of a conflict and its subsequent costs. Usually, nations determine the need 
to perform or impede certain operations (mission need), and then look for the most cost 
efficient way to accomplish that mission. The decision makers must ask themselves the 
following questions: 
• What is the opportunity cost of being able to perform the mission? 
• Is the cost of the system (material, personnel, and support) lower or at least equal to 
that opportunity cost? 
Under a strategy of deterrence, weapon systems are purchased to minimize the risks 
involved in military conflicts. Those risks are related to the uncertainty about the probability 
of conflict, the consequences a conflict, the effect of the system to be procured in terms of 
reducing that risk of conflict, and the effect of the system in reducing the damage caused in 
a conflict. This model deals with all these uncertain variables, in an attempt to reach the 
value of a system across its life cycle. Finally, the yearly values are converted into net 
present value to determine what is the acceptable price of the system, with no relation to the 
cost of it. 
All the variables that are going to be used in this model are expressed as a single unit: 
monetary value. Although it may seem inapropriate to do so, there is no other way to find 
how much is a weapon system worth. The model was not actually used in this thesis to 
calculate a specific value, but rather to illustrate the decision making process involved in 
procurement. Obtaining actual values from this model requires information and analysis 
well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1. Variables Involved 
Risk of Conflict (R.C.) based on: 
• Probability of Conflict P(c) 
• Cost of a Conflict Cc 






     
  
Risk of Damage (R.D.) based on: 
• Probability of Damage P(d) 
• Cost of Damage Cd 
• Reduction in P(d) due to the system 
Components of Cost of Damage (Cd) are: 
• Human life losses Cdl 
• Material losses Cdm 
• Strategic Losses Cds 
• Strategic Gains Gds 
2. Evaluation of the Variables 
(a) Risk of Conflict (R. C.) Risk is a function of the probability of an 
adverse event and the impact ofthat event. Risks differs with uncertainty in two ways: First, 
it deals only with the negative side of a probability distribution, and second, it takes into 
account the cost or impact of an uncertain event. In this particular case, Risk is expressed 
as the potential cost associated to a conflict, and the probability of such conflict in the future 
years. 
(b) Probability of Conflict (P(c)). This variable is a function of time, 
is probabilistic, and should be determined by intelligence specialists. During periods of low 
tension, it is fair to assume that the probability depends on the long term trends of the 
international relations. It is also generally safe to assume that uncertainty tends to increase 
with time. 
(c) Cost of Conflict (Cc). The cost of a conflict is the result of the loss 
of lives, loss or gain of strategically valuable territory, use of economic resources, loss of 
business opportunitties, and all other potential consequences of a military conflict. It must 
be considered, however, that a conflict can have positive outcomes also, that should be 
deducted from the costs. Those outcomes are related to strategic achievements and the 
historic impact of military victories. Those potential positive outcomes are usually the 
motivation for war, and they must be reduced as much as possible for potential 
adversaries. 
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Another important aspect in this variable is that war is not a zero-sum game. 
Usually the overall losses of the parties are much greater than the achievements. Thus, a loss 
caused to the enemy is not necessarily a gain for us. Given the complexity of this variable, 
it is not wise to attempt a subdivision at this point between components of cost. 
(d) Reduction in P(c) Due to the System. This variable relates to the 
very purpose of procurement under a deterrence strategy. Each system contributes to 
neutralize strengths of potential adversaries, thus reducing the benefits of initiating a conflict. 
This has to do with the perceived effectiveness of the system, and the importance of the 
strength being neutralized in the adversary's strategy. This variable is also probabilistic and 
variable across time. Systems tend to have a high impact when they are fielded which 
decreases with time as countermeasures and new strengths are developed. 
(e) Risk of Damage (R.D.). Analogue to Risk of Conflict, Risk of 
Damage is the combination of the probability of damage caused by the system or to our side 
by the enemy, and the impact ofthat damage. 
(f) Probability of Damage (P(d)). If deterrence fails and conflict 
happens, the interaction between the parties will cause damage. The probability of suffering 
damage or causing damage to the enemy given a conflict is evaluated in terms of probability. 
This must be done by intelligence, tactical and engineering experts, through wargaming 
and other simulation techniques. At this stage, only the damage caused or avoided by the 
weapon system under analysis is relevant. By definition, P(d) is a conditional probability, 
since it will only exist if a conflict occurs. 
(g) Reduction in P(d) Due to the System. The purpose of a weapon 
system is to maximize damage caused to the enemy and/or minimize damage caused to us 
by the enemy. The effectiveness of the weapon system can be evaluated as the probability 
to produce and/or avoid damage with the system. The model to use will depend on th type 
of weapon, either defensive, offensive or both. 
(h) Cost of Damage (Cd). If damage occurs, its consequences are to be 
assessed in terms of human, material and value independent of its probability. Those losses 
will be also probabilistic in nature, since the same successful attack can have widely different 
consequences. When assessing the cost of damages caused to the enemy, only the strategic 
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component is relevant for the purpose of our calculations, since the material and human 
losses will be of no benefit for us. It can even be beneficial to avoid human and long term 
material losses on the enemy's side, which is part of the strategic impact 
evaluation. 
(1) Human Life Losses (Cdl). Although it may sound cruel to put 
a "price tag" on human lives, it is a necessary and usual practice. Insurance companies, safety 
agencies and health specialists deal with this challenge everyday. In the case of the military, 
loss of lives has costs related with the replacement of the dead and injured, the sycological 
impact over the rest of the fighters, and the logistic impact of evacuating and treating the 
injured. There is also an effect over the necessary personnel to accomplish the missions 
required by the effort of the conflict, but that is part of the strategic losses, and shall not be 
accounted for in this category. Above all the previous components, lives lost have an impact 
over the families and the society at large. 
(2) Material Losses (Cdm). A successful attack will damage 
military equipment, reducing its effectiveness or rendering it useless. It might also damage 
civilian equipment or installations. The probable material cost of a successful attack should 
be estimated as a probabilistic value. 
(3) Strategic Losses (Cds). Probably the most complex part of 
determining the cost of a successful impact is determining the strategic effect in terms of the 
impact of the attack in the achievement of the strategic goals. That impact is related to the 
reduction of military power and commitment due to damages and the efforts drained from 
the core missions to cope with the damages and its consequences. It is evaluated in terms of 
the expected cost of not achieving the strategic goals given a succesful attack. Only expert 
estimation and wargaming can provide an insight about this variable. 
(4) Strategic Gains (Gds). The damages inflicted on the enemy 
will benefit our strategy. That benefit should be subtracted from the losses mentioned in the 
previous point. 
3.        The Model 
This model is a comparative risk analysis in a situation with uncertain variables and 
conditional probabilities. It goal is to evaluate the value of a weapon system for each future 
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period in terms of the expected cost of not having the system. The following probability trees 
in figure B.l 1 show the interaction of the variables for a particular period: 
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Figure B.ll Probability Trees for Risk and Damage Reduction Model 
The outcome is determined as: 
Expected Cost = PCc) X Cc + P(c) X Pfdl X Cd 
Expected Value of the System = Exp. Cost Without the System - Exp. Cost with the System 
Notice that the variables have not discrete values, but actually probability 
distributions, so the outcome can be found through simulation. As an example, the following 
table shows values for simulation using a Beta distribution. 
An important remark also is that the probability distributions of the different 
variables must be determined independently for the two scenarios, with and without the 
system, as shown in figure B.12. This is important since the behavior and strategies of our 
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WITHOUT SYSTEM 
Optimistic Most Likely Pessimistic Predicted 
P(c) 0.00% 1.50% 4.00% 3.00% 
Cc $0.00 $3,000.00 $25,000.00 $10,000.00 
P(d) 0.00% 10.50% 45.00% 2.50% 
Cd 
Cdl $0.00 $15.00 $85.00 $20.00 
Cdm $2.00 $25.00 $150.00 $85.00 
Cds $0.00 $20.00 $300.00 $100.00 
Gds ($100.00) ($20.00) $0.00 ($35.00) 
EXPECTED COST US$ Millions : $300.15 | 
WITH SYSTEM 
Optimistic Most Likely Pessimistic Predicted 
P(c) 0.00% 1.30% 3.50% 2.50% 
Cc $0.00 $3,000.00 $25,000.00 $10,000.00 
P(d) 0.00% 6.50% 25.00% 1.50% 
Cd 
Cdl $0.00 $15.00 $85.00 $20.00 
Cdm $2.00 $25.00 $150.00 $85.00 
Cds $0.00 $20.00 $300.00 $100.00 
Gds ($100.00) ($20.00) $0.00 ($35.00) 
EXPECTED COST (US$ Millions): $250.06 | 
EXPECTED VALUE OF THE SYSTEM FOR YEAR 2003 (US$ Millions): $50.09 
P(c)   Probability of Conflict 
Cc     Cost of Conflict 
P(d)  Probability of Damage given a Conflict 
Cd   Cost of Damage 
Components of Cost: 
Cdl    Cost of Human Lives and Injuries 
Cdm Cost of Material and Resources 
Cds   Strategic Cost 
Gds  Strategic Gain 
Using simulation, this exercise can be repeated enough times to obtain 
the probability distribution for the value of the sytem. 
Figure B.12 Example of Calculation of System Value 
C.        CASH FLOW SCENARIOS 
This section shows the cash flows as determined by delivery schedule of the contract 
and the possible variations in interest rate and delays. Figure B.13 summarizes the delivery 
schedule and predicted cash flows. Figure B.14 shows how changes in interest rates and 
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QUARTER PAYMENT DUE, US$ x 1000 DUE PAYMENT DIFF 
J .~---AFTEREDC 60% LOT# DELIVERY LOT # DELIVERY LOT # DELIVERY LOT # DELIVERY LOT # DELIVERY QUARTER ACUM AGREED ACUM 
0 5155.30 5155.30 5155.30 3100 3100 2055.30 : 
1 0.00 5155.30 0 3100 2055.30 
2 0.00 5155.30 0 3100 2055.30 
3 0.00 5155.30 0 3100 2055.30 ! 
4 9279.54 9279.54 14434.84 0 3100 11334.84 
~ 5 0.00 14434.84 6000 9100 5334.84 
.... 
~ 6 I 0.00 14434.84 0 9100 5334.84 
= '1 ~ 
7 0.00 14434.84 0 9100 5334.84 
8 21652.26 I 21652.26 36087.10 0 9100 26987.10 I 






10 18559.08 I i i i 18559.08 54646.18 0 19100 35546.18 
11 26 210.00 I ! i 210.00 54856.18 0 19100 35756.18 
12 7217.42 1 I 8045.40 24 424.20 ! I 15687.02 70543.20 0 19100 51443.20 ; I 




14 I I I I I 0.00 70543.20 0 31100 39443.20 I 
15 2 I 8045.40 I I 8045.40 78588.60 0 31100 47488.60 I 
Q., 16 8 I 30.00 I 30.00 78618.60 0 31100 47518.60 




18 I 12>19 I 336.60 1 ! 2639.60 1 42.20 3018.40 82776.20 10000 41100 41676.20 I 
~ 
~ 




= = Q., 
~ 
= '<  
~ 
= 
19 3 ! 8045.40 4 I 1036.80 9 I 30.00 I I 9112.20 91888.40 5000 46100 45788.40 
20 ! 22 I 356.40 I 356.40 92244.80 0 46100 46144.80 
21 I 12>19 I 112.20 25 I 141.40 253.60 92498.40 7000 53100 39398.40 
22 5 I 2073.60 2>3 5279.20 2>3 84.40 10 I 30.00 9>10 i 30.00 7497.20 99995.60 5000 58100 41895.60 I 
23 I I I 0.00 99995.60 0 58100 41895.60 
24 I I ! I 0.00 99995.60 0 58100 41895.60 
25 I I I 0.00 99995.60 7000 65100 34895.60 i 
26 I 0.00 99995.60 0 65100 34895.60 I I 
27 I I 0.00 99995.60 0 65100 34895.60 
28 6 1036.80 I 1036.80 101032.40 0 65100 35932.40 I I 
29 i I I i 0.00 101032.40 9000 74100 26932.40 I 
30 7 I 2073.60 I I 2073.60 103106.00 0 74100 29006.00 I 
31 I 0.00 103106.00 0 74100 29006.00 
32 I 0.00 103106.00 0 74100 29006.00 
33 I 0.00 103106.00 5000 79100 24006.00 
-
fI> 34 I 0.00 103106.00 5000 84100 19006.00 
~ 35 0.00 103106.00 5000 89100 14006.00 
= ~ 36 I 0.00 103106.00 2000 91100 12006.00 37 I 0.00 103106.00 5000 96100 7006.00 
38 0.00 103106.00 8000 104100 -994.00 
39 I 0.00 103106.00 12500 116600 -13494.00 
40 ! 0.00 103106.00 5000 121600 -18494.00 
41 61863.60 I 0.00 103106.00 5000 126600 -23494.00 I 
TOTAL PAYMENTS, US$ x 1000 
DELAY 
QUARTERS 
LIBOR  RATE.% 
6.5 5.5 4.5 
0 134,151 128,797 123,975 
4 127,302 122,816 118,787 
8 123,774 119,884 116,381 
12 120,629 117,281 114,251 
16 117955 114991 112317 
Net Prese nt Value <g gUbor+1% 
DELAY 
QUARTERS 
LIBOR  RATE,% 
6.5 5.5 4.5 
0 82,978 85,474 88,073 
4 79,897 82,452 85,128 
8 78,286 80,949 83,752 
12 76,801 79,550 82,461 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Interviews are among the most important information sources for this thesis. All the 
sequence of events of the Project Kilo case, and the reasons behind those events were 
collected from interviews. The understanding of Private business practices was also obtained 
from interviews to real world business managers. This appendix shows the relevant portions 
of those interviews. 
B. INTERVIEWS WITH ACTORS ON THE CASE 
The following three interviews were the basis to understand the issues of the case, 
being a strong complement to the contract itself and previous reports. The interviews were 
conducted in Spanish and translated by the author. 
1. Rear Admiral AAA36 
Admiral AAA was an 05 when he was appointed as Project Manager for the 
materialization of a recommendation of the Fleet Repowering Study. An Electronic 
Engineer, with a Master degree from a prestigious institute in the U.S.A. and an outstanding 
career on the fleet, Commander AAA was the right person for the job. He led all the 
procurement process, from the source selection to the signature of the contract, and had all 
the responsibility for that contract. 
In this interview, he explained the position of the Chilean Navy and himself during 
the source selection and contract negotiation process. 
The following is an extract from a telephone interview conducted on October 2,1995. 
- Admiral, what was your position during the negotiation process, and what 
percentage of your time was devoted to this project? 
I was the Operations Officer at the Weapons Directory, and I had Project Kilo as a 
part time assignment. However, it soon took hundred percent of my time, as it became more 
complex and important. All my tasks at the Weapons Directory were delegated to other 
36




/your time was devoted to this project? 
36
officers. 
- What legal, financial, business, language or other support did you receive, and 
from whom? 
Legal support was provided by Captain LLL, the lawyer for the General Logistics 
Directory, and was pretty helpful. However, he had many other commitments, so I could not 
count on him all the time. Limited financial advise was provided by a consultant when the 
interest rates and the price adjustment formulas were being discussed. All the rest was 
handled by the project team, consisting only in Commander GGG and me. 
- Was the help from non-Navy experts considered for the negotiation team? 
No, it was not possible because of the high classification of the project. As mentioned 
before, advice was considered for specific matters, without giving access to classified 
information to outsiders. 
- Which was the hardest point to negotiate? 
The financial aspects were the more complex, because we were forced to get financial 
support from them, and the financial agreement involved several other procurements besides 
the Kilo system. We had very little room for maneuver, and we could not put stringent 
demands on them. Flexibility was limited also, in the sense that any change for project Kilo 
would involve the other procurements as well. 
- Was a "worst case scenario" considered in terms of cost, schedule or 
performance? 
No, the negotiations were approached as fixed price, and we expected variations only 
from interest rates or price adjustments. In terms of schedule, we did not have a formal 
appreciation about how much could the deliveries be delayed, but we had the feeling that the 
promised three years to have the first system fielded were ambitious for the degree of 
matureness of the system. We would not be surprised with a year or two of delay. With 
respect to performance, we were pretty impressed by the performance obtained by the 
prototype tested by ALPHA. We were confident in the capabilities of ALPHA, and we did 
not consider a scenario of failure. If difficulties were to be solved, it would be a matter of 
some extra time. 
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-Did you have information about past performance of ALPHA? 
We have been informed by the Air force that they had performed well with them 
before. Their reputation with previous system was solid, but we also had been told that they 
were not easy in negotiations. 
- Was there a contingency plan in case of failure of ALPHA to deliver? 
Actually not, as I said before, we were confident about them and we did not thought 
about that possibility. However, a termination clause was included to put pressure on them 
in case of excessive delays. In our selection process we had discarded other systems that cost 
much more than ALPHA'S one, and being more mature were also getting obsolete, unless 
they introduced major changes. We knew that we had no choice other than ALPHA. 
- The contract refers to standards of Omega 's Navy. Did you have access to those 
standards? 
That was a generic statement. We had no access to Omega's Navy, and they were 
completely loyal to ALPHA. Omega's Navy had not signed yet the contract for the Kilo 
system. We had though some personal contacts among Navy officers that were very helpful, 
but they were not going to put pressure on ALPHA on our behalf. 
- The contract included a Force Majeure clause, relieving ALPHA from 
responsibilities under "acts of government". Considering that ALPHA was owned by the 
government, was such clause considered legitimate? 
We were concerned about it, but the lawyer studied it and concluded that it was 
normal practice in such circumstances, and that the clause could not be abused by ALPHA. 
- The contract warranty covered materials and workmanship. What would happen 
in case of a failure due to design problems? 
The specifications were written in terms of performance. If any subsystem failed to 
perform in the tests, it would have been a non-compliance situation rather than a warranty 
issue. We could reject the system and request ALPHA to fix it. 
- According to the contract ALPHA was obliged to provide spare parts at a 
reasonable price for ten years. How was the reasonableness assessed? Was there an 
alternative provider? 
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Kilo system was different from anything else in the marketplace. Spare parts were 
going to be needed, and the only reference we could have were prices offered to Omega's 
Navy, if we could get access to them. 
- The amendment number 3 of the contract refers to software among other issues. 
Did you have the knowledge and the necessary access to the software development and 
documentation? Were there areas where you lacked the necessary expertise? 
Software was one of our strong sides. We arrange with ALPHA to use a language 
accessible to us and known internationally. We even provided parts of the software, 
developed by my assistant project manager. He also detected a shortage in thrust in the 
original engine according to the trajectory requirements, and worked with ALPHA in 
correcting that shortage. I think that we were strong enough in the technical side. 
- How was their negotiation capacity compared to the project team? 
They were very skillful and tough negotiators. Their lawyers had a complete 
knowledge of the processes at ALPHA, so they could handle any demand knowing its effect 
in the legal, financial and production side. They also hired an attorney from new York, 
because New York State law would be applicable to the contract. 
- If you had the chance to start the process again, what would you improve? 
First, I would define better the final product. I had also got rid of the ties with other 
procurements, to get more freedom of action to handle this one. Finally, I had consider what- 
if kind of analyses for the case of extreme delays or other unexpected events. 
To cope with that kind of situation I would have provided more flexibility to the 
contract, avoiding the need for renegotiation. 
- Do you think that having more people in your team would have helped? 
I don't think it wold have been relevant. We were strong enough in the technical side. 
Our weaknesses were a related to the lack of financial independence. 
- What other experience do you think is interesting to mention? 
An important experience was the use of competition. We were able to obtain a lot of 
information and to drive prices down significantly while we kept three potential suppliers 
involved in negotiations. This was the first project of this kind that enjoyed the benefits of 
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competition, and the results of it were very favorable for us. Other projects ofthat period 
were tied from the beginning to specific suppliers, and they had much more difficulty in 
getting what they wanted in their negotiations. 
2. Lieutenant Commander CCC 
Lt CDR. CCC is the current Project Manager. As Admiral AAA and his predecessor 
at project Kilo, he is an Electronic Engineer. He has also advanced studies in missiles. 
Before becoming Project Manager he was Inspector at ALPHA facilities, and now 
he has completed two years at the head of the project. 
From the beginning of this research, Lt CDR CCC has been quite helpful and 
interested in it. While most Project Managers could feel reluctant to have their territory 
scrutinized by an outsider, he has shown particular interest in the learning and experience 
building that can be achieved in a critical review of the project. 
Since the contact has been very frequent and in several different occasions between 
January and November, 1995, this section will reproduce a synthesis of the main issues 
discussed with him. 
- How was the decision to procure a missile system like Kilo taken? 
The operational need was defined in a study made by the Navy General Staff. Several 
methods were considered to meet that need, and finally a missile system was selected, since 
it provided a better response. One year after that decision the contract was signed. 
- What was the critical factor for selecting ALPHA among the potential offerors? 
The main factor was price. ALPHA system had almost half of the price of the closest 
competitor. 
- How were the specifications for the system defined? 
The system was required to satisfy the tactical requirements both individually and as 
a set of systems on board two and three ships, according to the characteristics and number 
of simultaneous targets. 
- The contract was signed with ALPHA, but three other companies were involved. 
What kind of relationships did the Project Team had with them? 
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ALPHA and its subsidiaries conformed a close network of prime and subcontractors. 
Technical matters were discussed directly with the subcontractor involved, but financial or 
contractual issues were treated exclusively with ALPHA. 
- What is your opinion of the contract? 
In general is a good contract, specially for the termination clause, which provides a 
reasonable leverage. It has though certain weaknesses, which are: 
a) Hard to manage because of the ambiguity of some of its terms. 
b) The reception of fragmented subsystems after factory tests does not ensure the 
functioning of the system once installed and integrated. 
c) The up front payment of 60% of the price and 30% on Factory Acceptance left only 
a 10% for installation and integration. 
- What do you think were the reasons for these weaknesses? 
I think it was mainly good faith and trust in ALPHA. The Project Manager was also 
under pressure for the demands of the Navy and the potential contractors, and for the lack 
of financing. 
Another problem was the lack of experts in business and weapon procurement with 
long permanence in the Navy. The legal department composed by only one lawyer was 
insufficient to provide due attention to the negotiation process. 
3. Commander NNN 
Commander NNN had been just promoted to Lieutenant Commander when he was 
appointed as the Project Manager for Project "Lima". That project was related to C3I 
capabilities in the fleet, and like Project Kilo, was the materialization of one of the 
recommendations of the Fleet Repowering Study. Although his Project was smaller than 
Project Kilo, he had the chance to follow the events that led to the creation of Program 
Horizon, and became the coordinator for the Program.37 Although Lt CDR NNN had not the 
academic background of his Kilo counterpart, he had great experience at fleet tactical issues. 
The interview referred here was conducted in June 1995. 
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- Commander, what was the origin of Program Horizon? 
Program Horizon started two years before it was formalized as such. After the 
FALKLANDS War, The Navy General Staff conducted the Fleet Repowering Study. That 
study gathered the experiences of the war, which showed several weaknesses that had to be 
overcome if a similar conflict was to be faced with certain chance of success. The 
recommendations of the study triggered four different projects, among them Kilo and Mike. 
Each project had its own dynamics and was subordinated to different Program Managers. 
Most of the contracts, including the one with ALPHA, were negotiated under those 
circumstances. The contracts had their own time baseline and milestones, and it was soon 
realized that coordination was going to be a major problem during the installation and 
integration phases. Project Managers were all part-time, and it was very hard to stay in touch 
with the other Project Managers, attend the requirements from our regular jobs, and keep up 
with our own projects. 
One of the Program Managers promoted the centralization of the projects under one 
program, which the Commander in Chief considered appropriate. Program Horizon became 
a reality. It was a lean organization, with all four Project Managers working with great 
autonomy. The program provided administrative support, centralized accounting control and 
coordination of activities. Movements of funds between projects were used to get more 
flexibility in dealing with changes in the projects. 
- Some of the projects suffered important changes or delays. Was the program 
prepared for those events? 
All the projects, and Kilo was not the exception, had very stringent requirements in 
terms of performance and schedule. Horizon Program Manager, Admiral JJJ, knew that it 
was not probable that all the contractors fulfilled their contracts completely. The strategy was 
to be alert for the events, and try to take advantage of the weakness of the contractors 
obtaining concessions from them. 
- What was your position at Program Horizon, and how did it work out? 
I was named coordinator of the Program. My task was to keep track of the planned 










place at the same time, and that what one project does do not interfere with the other. I also 
tried to optimize the use of time coordinating simultaneous activities with two or more 
projects. I had no formal authority over the Project Managers, my job was a staff work for 
the Program Manager and in support of the Project Managers. 
- How were the interactions within Program Horizon organization? 
There were only two levels of authority in the organization: The Program Manager 
and the Project managers, who reported directly to him. Admiral AAA had a truly open door 
policy with the Project Managers. They could drop off by his office at any time, but Admiral 
AAA demanded from them initiative and leadership. He expected to be informed about 
solutions already being implemented rather than being asked to authorize determined courses 
of action. He acted mostly as a strategist, ensuring the budgetary health of the program, 
handling relationships between different projects, and guiding negotiations where the really 
big and complicated issues were being discussed. 
C.        INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS 
1. Professor Mark W. Stone 
Professor Stone teaches Acquisition and Contracting courses at the Naval 
Postgraduate School since 1993. Graduated as Attorney from the Santa Clara University 
School of Law, he worked at Apple Computer Corp and for ARGOSystems (a division of 
Boeing) before joining the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The purpose of this interview was to get insight about the characteristics and 
differences between private and military contracting practices, both of which Professor Stone 
knows in deep. 
The following is an extract from the interview conducted at NPS on August 30,1995: 
- / will make the assumption that the contract is the reflect of the negotiation 
process. Is that a fair assumption? 
In general yes, at least is the formalization of the negotiation process and should 
reflect it results. 
- In the context of contracting for unique equipment or technology, not readily 
available in the marketplace, what are the difference between private and military 
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negotiation and contracting practices? 
First of all, private contracting is based and evaluated on the basis of profit making. 
When negotiating a contract, the private program manager looks at the new equipment or 
technology as a cost component which has to produce profits through the sales of the end 
product. This new component must provide the feature needed within the time constraint 
given by the market window. 
The quantities involved in military sales will hardly exceed a couple of thousands 
units, which for private business is insignificant. Commercial items sales compensate for the 
investment as sold in large quantities. The contractor who provides the technology or 
equipment can be compensated on the basis of royalties, or paid directly for their work. 
Another difference is that private firms conduct more "in house" development 
projects. However, there is an increasing use of joint ventures to combine the technologies 
of several and even competing firms to set standards and to optimize the design of the 
components with the point of view of the user. Most frequently these alliances will look at 
marketing, strategic and co-development goals, grouping several independent competitors 
in an industry in a handful of dominant conglomerates. An example was the Motorola-IBM- 
Apple alliance to produce the Power PC. 
-Are "cost plus" contracts common in the private sector? 
No, they are not used. Private companies invest in multiple projects expecting that 
the successful ventures will pay for the unsuccessful ones. In that situation, the narrow 
margins considered in cost plus contracts (around 7%) are not acceptable. Firms engaging 
in leading edge markets invest heavily in development, and plan for markups in the range of 
25%. A big part ofthat markup will be used to reinvest in the development of new products 
in order to stay in business. 
- How can the company who contracts for a unique development handle the risk 
involved in terms of delivery schedule and performance? 
Contracts usually include arrangements for the purposes of oversight and report on 
the advance of the project, and also consider exit points in case something goes so wrong that 





In any case, the key for risk handling is a good working relationship between the 
parts. Frequent meetings, open communications, teaming and trust building allow early 
acknowledgment of potential problems and collaboration in the evaluation and solution of 
them. 
- To what extent the contract can help to create those relationship? 
The contract can provide the oversight and communications mechanisms necessary 
to keep the relationship going, but the relationship must be created from the very beginning 
of the negotiation, and usually goes beyond the current contract. The contractor wishes to 
perform to stay in business and ensure more contracts, and the customer wants to keep that 
supplier which can perform such a special or unique work. 
It helps to have a solid contract, where the expectations and obligations are clearly 
stated and understood by both parties, and they represent fairly the outcome of the 
negotiation. Such a contract should ideally be written, signed and never looked again. The 
shared and unequivocal understanding is what really counts. 
Some companies have put increasing emphasis in relationship building teaming. 
There is a tendency in corporations towards teamwork. In the case of the Motorola-IBM- 
Apple joint venture several symbols were interchanged, like mugs and tee-shirts, to 
emphasize the team work. 
-And what if something goes wrong, what are the options that contracts provide 
for? 
Most of the times when the contractor has problems to fulfill in the expected schedule 
or with the expected performance, they negotiate with customer to find a solution for that 
problem, or to terminate the project if it is not viable anymore. The contract may have 
incentives or remedies for an eventual failure of the contractor. 
The customer has to make the decision to go for a negotiated solution or to simply 
breach the contract. In any case, very few cases end up in litigation. The use of remedies or 
late fees to "punish" the contractor may help to recover some money, but will ruin the 
relationships with the contractor. Instead, arrangements may be made to get a fair settlement 
between the parts. 
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- How are these issues handled in international contracts? 
The relationship building gets much more of attention. Issues to be handled include 
different culture, customs and different meaning of what is appropriate, legal or ethical. In 
the case of Japanese businessmen, you can expect to have up to three days of social meetings 
talking of everything but business. They want to get acquainted and create a relationship with 
their counterparts before the beginning of real business. Counterparts will be willing to know 
beforehand what behaviors and practices are considered appropriate. Companies like Apple 
have training seminars to prepare businessmen/women for overseas assignments. 
- Is it usual to look for a third country to sign the contract in? 
It is common practice. Each party might feel at disadvantage if the contract is signed 
under the jurisdiction of the other party. They naturally expect that under a legal litigation 
a judge will tend to favor the local party. Being that a fair assessment or not, it is better to 
look for neutral grounds. London is a usual selections, since they have experience in that 
issue. Even between two sates in the U.S. they might sign under the laws of New York, 
which is very developed and predictable for business issues. Predictability allows the parties 
to make better decisions about what issues are worth to spend money and time in litigation 
for them. Arbitration is more often used than actual legal litigation. 
- Going back to risk handling. How does private firms arrange for eventual delays? 
Do they pay once the work is ended or depending on progress? Do they pay important 
amounts up front? 
Private development projects will not be sitting out for too long. Usually payment is 
made on delivery, but a certain amount is paid up front. That amount is required to provide 
the contractor with the initial funds to start the project, and the amount will depend on the 
size and the financial capacity of the company relative to the project cost. It may range from 
25% to over 50%. This up front payment is not made in cash, but in a letter of credit in a 
bank. The contractor can not draw any cash from that letter of credit, but can use it as 
financial backup. The letter of credit is handed over on delivery, or can be partially drawn 
on an advance basis. All of this is negotiated. 
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- How are decisions like source selection made in private businesses? 
If there is a critical project with no choice of sources, the decision to go or not will 
be taken at the highest level based in the reports of the project manager. That report must 
assess the feasibility, cost, profitability and risk of the project. 
We are talking about special projects, where there is not really open competition. 
Having two or three potential contractors is not really competition. Once the project is 
approved, the project manager or his/her business staff will select the participants with little 
intervention from above. The program manager has the authority and responsibility for the 
success and profitability of the project. 
- How are the contracts designed and written? 
The project manager explain to the legal or contracting staff what does he/she wants 
in the contract, and the specialists write it accordingly. They may also advice the project 
manager about legal contracting issues, but the advice is more appropriate at the negotiation 
stage. The responsibility for contract design lies on the project manager. 
- Why is that so different in government contracting? 
While corporations report only to their stockholders in terms of profit, government 
agencies represent the interest of all taxpayers, and success can not be measured objectively. 
The media looks for any issue that seems dishonest or inefficient, GAO will promptly look 
at it, while congressmen are ready to fight fraud, waste and abuse. 
The resultant is a system based on mutual mistrust, between the agencies within the 
government and between contracting agency and contractor. In this system, is not considered 
appropriate that the program manager works a deal and design the contract. Rather than that, 
a contracting officer reporting to other chain of command will sign the contract, hopefully 
in accordance with the deal negotiated by the program manager. In some cases, contracting 
officers conduct independent negotiations according with his/her agenda, overriding the 
program manager. 
Other limitation is that the government agency has to accept bids or proposal from 
any competitor. If there are reservations about the honesty or performance of the offeror, they 
must be proven by the contracting agency. Private business, in contrast, can do business with 
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whoever they want to. If the contractor has a bad reputation or bad previous experiences, its 
offer may not be considered and no protest can be issued. This is another tacit incentive for 
contractors to act honestly in private business. 
There is no "standard of conduct" establishing a minimum legal behavior in private 
business. Ethics are internal values held by the actors. If their standards go below the legal 
threshold, they might restraint to act in order to stay in business. Ethic behavior is relevant 
as perceived by the customer, and is essential to nurture the relationship between the parties. 
2.        Interview with ARGOSystems Executives 
ARGOSystem is a subsidiary of BOEING CO. dedicated to manufacture Electronic 
Warfare and communications devices for military applications. Their customer base include 
US defense contractors to which ARGOSystems provide components, and foreign military 
services, which buy complete systems as well as components. ARGOSystems is a relatively 
small company, with annual revenues close to 100 million dollars. Its technological 
sophistication and international business record made this company a good place to look for 
private business practices at a scale comparable to Project Kilo. The focus of the interview 
was to learn the usual procurement and contracting practices followed by private firms and 
foreign military services. 
This interview was conducted at ARGOSystems headquarters al Sunnyvale, CA. The 
executives attending to it were: 
Joseph Gruender, Director of Contracts. 
Michael Gotskind, International Contracts Manager. 
Gary Flood, Director of Electronic Warfare and Surveillance Systems. 
Robert Blanchfield, Director of Materiel Operations. 
- To what extent private firms acquiring unique pieces of equipment face the same 
kind of challenges that the military have in weapon procurement? 
Private procurement can be even harder, because of the lack of regulations. Federal 
Acquisition Regulations, and the audits performed under those regulations actually help 
companies, making military contracts safe, although more expensive. 
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- How do private firms handle the risks and uncertainties in those procurements? 
Basically they deal in dollars, meaning that they cover risks with higher husbands. 
Another method is having insurance covering for failure to comply. People with experience 
in the area is an important risk reduction mean. 
In protecting against poor contractor performance we look at the records of the 
company. However records must be studied carefully and discussed to isolate the reasons for 
a problem, and to what extent it might present itself in the current contract. 
Aggressiveness in legal issues is also another issue to explore. It is a matter of policy 
for a company to rely in good relationships to solve conflicts or to fight for every issue in 
court if necessary. Companies in the U.S. are required to disclose their relevant law suits, 
which is a good source of information before contracting. 
- What types of contracts are used between private firms (Fixed price, Cost+%, 
Time and Materials, or else)? 
Only fixed price contracts are used, sometimes with escalation formulas to adjust for 
variables which are not controllable by the contractor. Cost plus contracts are not feasible 
without Cost Accounting Standards. 
- What devices are included in the contracts to protect the parties from the 
expected and unexpected risks, like warranties, escrow accounts, letters of credit, exit 
points, milestones, advance monitoring, progress payment, late fees, incentives, remedies 
or else? 
The risk of non compliance is handled withholding a percentage of the total price, 
usually a 10%, until tests are completed. If possible, tests are completed at the factory, which 
is preferred by the manufacturers because no withhold is necessary after delivery. If external 
signals or other systems are required, tests are performed on site. If still compliance is not 
achieved, buyers can recourse to legal solutions or negotiated agreements. Usually bank 
guarantees are used to back compliance promises or breach of contract. 
Letters of credit are usual as a backup for up front payments, which can exceed 60% 
of the price, according to the capital requirements to perform the contract and the size of the 
contractor. 
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Warranties have a different use, and are more limited in use than compliance clauses. 
Warranties refer usually to materials and workmanship, and cover for 12 to 18 months after 
delivery, or a certain period after installation, but rarely beyond 24 months. There can be 
design and functional warranties, but they tend to be quite expensive. The company has to 
back the warranty with contingency funds, materials and spare parts, and report it as a 
liability, which involve cost of money. Another limitation is that subcontractor work is not 
passed through the prime contractor to the buyer. An important part of the parts are 
components are bought well before they are actually used, either to ensure critical parts of 
the job or to buy in convenient quantities. Usually these limitations are written in the 
exclusions. 
Although it is not usual, some large companies prefer self insurance and negotiate 
lower prices. 
- What problem-solving devices are used to handle conflicts? 
The preferred way to solve and even prevent problems is to establish good 
communications between the companies. "Get the lawyers to talk" is a good practice during 
negotiations and after. 
When conflicts arise at the Project Manager level, it is usual that the issue is taken 
to a higher level. It is expected that senior executives have a less involved point of view, and 
they care more for the long term success and reputation of the firm than the short term issues 
of the project. 
- What is the typical size and organization of a Project manager office in private 
firms? 
When small firms like ours make big procurements they appoint an executive as 
Project Manager on a part-time basis. In ARGOSystems the Project Manager can be up to 
a vice-president, depending on the amount involved and the importance of the project. 
We cannot afford to have a full-time Project Manager. Besides, the Project manager 
is usually in charge of the area where the equipment will be used, so he has vested interest 
and ample knowledge about it. We do provide support to Project Managers from 
headquarters people or external consultant if necessary. Finally the Project Manager has to 
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decide in terms of cost-benefit and respond for the good use of resources. 
- In your experience, how does foreign military services approach contractors and 
negotiate contracts? 
They usually approach contractors with "Request for Information" for a specific 
requirement. Firms respond in four to six months with technical information, preliminary 
price figures, and background information about technical and financial capabilities, as well 
as past achievements. The buyer use the information from all the respondents to create the 
specifications, taking the best of each one. 
The following step is a tour to the preselected contractors, to have a closer idea of the 
real capabilities of the contractor. Sometimes buyers interchange information about 
contractors and their systems (This is particularly usual in Europe). Apart from performance, 
buyers are concerned with other issues. Interoperability is a big thrust. 
Among our foreign customers, Australia has the most elaborate process to control 
time and performance. They break the work in measurable and discrete packages, including 
the end items and documentation. 
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APPENDIX D: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This appendix addresses the main and subsidiary research questions, according to the 
results of the analysis. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Main Research Question 
• Did the contracting practices of the Chilean Navy deal appropriately with 
the uncertainties and complexities involved in this acquisition? 
According to the analysis, it can be stated that Navy contracting practices as applied 
to Project Kilo were not completely appropriate, due to the lack of legal and business 
expertise in the Project Team, and the lack of a thorough risk assessment. 
In the positive side, the contract provided an efficient mechanism to trade schedule 
slippage for cost, and avoided most of the factors that produce cost increases in fixed price 
contracts. Keeping good relationships with the supplier and flexibility to address the 
problems was also a fruitful practice. 
The success of the project reflects that good practices and competence prevailed over 
the deficiencies in expertise and risk assessment. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
The answers to the subsidiary research questions, according to the analysis, are the 
following: 
• What are the challenges that the Chilean Navy faces when trying to acquire 
major weapon systems? 
• What are the general political, legal, financial and technical constraints 
involved in major systems procurement? 
The answer to these two questions is summarized in the fifteen general challenges 






1. Acquiring Effective Weapons Without a Technology Base 
2. Determining the Appropriate Maturity of Technology 
3. Determining Degree of National Participation 
4. High Impact of Failure 
5. Project Manager Rotation 
6. Lack of Experience and Information 
7. Maintaining Political Support 
8. Multiplicity of Actors and Goals 
9. Need for Communication and Negotiation Skills 
10. Scarce Resources; Few Major Projects 
11. Need for External Financing 
12. Lack of Cost and Pricing Data 
13. Structure of Technology 
14. Difficulty of Technology Transfer 
15. Immaturity of Contract Management Regulations 
• Was the Chilean Navy properly organized and manned for Contracting? 
As mentioned before, the Navy was not properly organized and manned when the 
contract was negotiated. It improved significantly though when Program Horizon was 
created. 
• What were the specific contracting challenges and constraints for the case 
under analysis? 
Project Kilo challenges were different from the general ones as explained in the first 
conclusion. It had consistent political support, consensus among the relevant actors and long 
permanence of project managers. The additional challenge was the cultural difference with 
Omega. 
• How did the Contracting Team deal with those general and specific 





Although without the required expertise, the Project Team was successful in putting 
together a contract that achieved the purpose of the project. The team kept good relationships 
with ALPHA and was flexible to renegotiate the contract as required by the circumstances. 
Project risks were not thoroughly assessed, but fortunately the worst events that could have 
happened did not materialize. 
• What conditions influenced the positive and negative outcomes   of the 
contract? 
The positive outcomes resulted mainly from the competence of Project Kilo team 
members, commitment of resources over a long period and stable political support within the 
Navy. The only negative result, getting the system two years after the expected date, was the 
result of the initial degree of development of the weapon system, and the lack of strong 
incentives and mechanisms to enforce compliance. 
• What could have been done to make the procurement process better within 
the current constraints? 
As mentioned in conclusion number 13, the following actions could have improved 
the negotiation process and contract conditions: 
Including contractual terms and conditions in the source selection. 
Having a more complete and expert negotiation team. 
Including all relevant actors in decision making. 
Assessing risks, worst case scenarios and contingency plans for failure. 
Ensuring participation of Omega Navy before committing to a contract. 
Reducing financial dependence to the up front payment. 
Relating the cash flow to actual deliveries of working and integrated 
subsystems. 
Including performance test protocols in the contract. 













• Exploring the possibility of future projects with ALPHA. 
• What can be done in the future to improve management conditions and 
eliminate constraints for achievement of better contracts? 
The following are recommendations that, if implemented, should improve the 
results of future procurement processes. They are explained in detail in Chapter VI: 
(a) Keep long term commitment to education, and extend it to negotiation and 
communication skills 
(b) Maintain the capability to put together teams with multiple skills. 
(c) Ensure long term budgetary commitment to make big projects possible 
(d) Involve all relevant actors in decision making 
(e) Recognize the power of non contracting means in negotiations. 
(f) Be wise and cautious in the use of competition. 
(g) Reduce financial dependence on the contractor. 
(h)       Write measurable requirements that ensure performance and supportability. 
(i)        Consider high involvement and r&m requirements to reduce after sales 
support risk. 
(j)        Provide flexibility and resources to take advantage of opportunities. 
(k)       Define and prepare for eventual failures to reduce risk. 
(1)       Negotiate to obtain win-win conditions in order to have better chances for 
long term success. 
(m)      Conduct further research in the areas of weapon procurement risk, negotiation 
and project management. 






1. "Acquisition Strategy Guide", Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, 1984. 
2. DoD Directive 5000.1, Feb 23,1991, "Defense Acquisition" 
3. "Estudio de Repotenciamiento de la Escuadra", Estado mayor General de la Armada, 1985. 
4. Karrass, Gary, "Negotiate to Close, How to Make More Successful Deals". Simon & 
Schuster, 1985. ISBN 0-671-55483-2. 
5. Mack, Ruth P., "Planning on Uncertainty, Decision Making in Government and Business 
Administration." John Wiley and Sons Inc. 1971, ISBN 0-47-56280. 
6. "Manual de Proyectos de la Armada", Reglamento 5-41/1-03, 1985. 
7. Martinez Busch, Jorge, "Politica Oceänica Nacional, Sugerencias Para Una Formulaciön." 
Servicio Hidrogräfico y Oceanogräfico de la Armada, 1994, Valparaiso, Chile. 
8. Paret, Peter, with Graig, Gordon and Gilbert, Felix. "Makers of Modern Strategy, from 
Machiaveli to the Nuclear Age." Princeton University Press, 1986, ISBN 0-691-02764-1. 
9. Sushka, Peter William Jr., "A Comparative Study of the Navy Project Manager and His 
Civilian Counterpart in Industry." March 1976, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 
California, Thesis number T 171685. 
10. Yuspeh, Larry. "A Case for Increasing the Use of Competitive Procurement in the 
Department of Defense." Included in:"Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and 
Allocation, Proceedings of a Conference at the Center for Applied Economics." Edited by 








INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Library, Code 013  2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
3. Eduardo Troncoso 2 
Estado Mayor General De La Armada 
Correo Naval 
Valparaiso, Chile 
4. Thomas H. Hoivik, SM/Ho      2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
5. Katsuaki L. Terasawa, SM/Tk 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
6. Roger Evered, SM/Ex 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
7. Donald R. Eaton, SM/E1   1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
8. Mark W. Stone, SM/St   1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
9. David V. Lamm, SM/Lt 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5101 
19] 
l  ................................ 2
1
............................................... 2
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I .......... '.............................. 2
l  ...................................... 1 
f ............................................ 1 
f l .......................................... 1 
i .......................................... . 
f  ........................................... 1 
3 
